I wasn't arguing the exclusiveness of NATO and the EU. I was simply going with the idea that Ukraine would become something akin to Sweden, Finland or Austria. EU members who are not members of NATO. Considering that even if Ukraine were to concentrate hard and have a unified policy of EU membership it would be at least ten to twenty years away, I think that is not a pertinent issue to anyone except Ukrainians trying to enact reforms. Ironically, all three major parties agree on EU membership and I have no doubt that eventually it will happen. With regards to Russia giving out Ukrainian passports, this is much more common than you think and is entirely seperate from the Georgian situation. Ukrainians who went to Russia schools, most people who graduated school before 2004 in the east, can obtain a Russian passport by filling out a few forms. There are plenty of people who obtained Russian passports a decade ago or more but continue to live in Ukraine. Unlike Georgia, Ukrainians and Russians have a much more complicated relationship. Russians view Ukrainians as almost an ethnic subgroup of Russians, with little distinction between the two. Ukrainians have a very complicated relationship with Russia, only the far western nationalists advocate any sort of openly anti-Russian agenda, which ironically is where Yushenko's base of support is. Central and Eastern Ukrainians have a very large intricate web of relations with Russia and the majority are not interested in angering them. I have no doubt that Russia will only further exacerbate the Crimean situation, which is being overblown in my opinion by western commentators who probably don't know that much, only if Ukraine takes a hard turn west and becomes openly anti-Russian. The current presidents party is openly anti-Russian, but the other major two parties are not. Yushenko's popularity is around 2%, which means that when the 2010 presidential election rolls around, he's probably going to lose. My speculation is that Russia is going to patiently wait for that election. The favorite to win would be Tymoshenko, and although she is an ardent Ukrainian nationalist, she is also at heart a cunning buisness woman and flexible politician. She knows that Ukraine occupies an awkward position in that it needs to please Russia and Europe, no easy task, and further esclation is not in Ukraine's interests.
Understood on EU and NATO. I understand the complex web of relationships between Russia and Ukraine. Western Ukraine was part of Poland before WWII and was also part of Poland during the Middle Ages. That part of the country is Catholic (though of Slavic, not Latin rite) and always looked westward, not eastward. All of this though begs the question as to why any of this is the problem of the United States. Frankly, now that the Soviet Union is gone, it really matters to me little whether Ukraine faces east or west (I would assume and hope that it matters to the Europeans, and my sympathies are that Ukraine faces west).
I hate to sound like a broken record, but it's hard for me to understand how Georgia could be an aggressor within its own borders. As for the interview with Powell, it still amazes me that anybody cares what that callow, gutless loser thinks about anything. Powell is, and always has been, a particularly spineless proponant of realpolitik. This isn't news--I'd be surprised if he'd said otherwise.
Borders are what, lines drawn on a map. Everyone knows that if you open fire on Russian peacekeepers and separatists who have Russia's backing, that you are going to get attacked by Russia.
"Borders are what, lines drawn on a map." That's a pretty shaky definition of state sovereignty right there. Also a pretty empty standard for any semblance of international law or anything short of anarchy.
You're focusing on the wrong aspect. On the map Georgia might appear to hold some form of territorial integrity, but reality intercedes at some point. The two regions were essentially independently functioning entities, in everything except international recognition. Russia had troops in the region and had made it quite clear that it supported them. So saying that Georgia gets an excuse for provoking a violent conflict because it was within its borders ignores the reality of the situation. Iraq, Kosovo and Ossetia have proved that sovereignty only exists at the end of a gun.
If anything that situation is similar to Ossetia. The people of the Islands want to be part of Britain, but Argentina claims the island as its own.
The Falvinas War atleast spawned some good songs, Ossie Ardiles even got a shout out. I can't imagine these Borats coming out with anything good from this war. http://www.macclads.co.uk/hectic_house/lyrics/lyrics_alpha/buen.html You can keep that poof Ardiles, we're going to have your Malvinas I might avoiding singing this when I visit Buenos Aires to see Racing.
Right, and that independence was almost entirely due to Russian support and the presence of Russian troops. Yup. So, basically, in your world might makes right. I never said that Georgia's actions weren't ill-advised; YOU said that it was the aggressor. That's a massive over-simplification. Those three situations are all different, very different. The US has not tried to dismember Iraq and even the Kurdish leadership is nominally committed to a unified Iraqi state. Kosova has a long history as a defined geopolitical unit, and it was unilaterally conquered and annexed by the Serbian state in 1913; not to mention the more pragmatic fact that Kosova is large enough to function as a legitimate nation-state. South Ossetia is too small to meet that criteria, and until Russian-supported low-key ethnic cleansing, ethnic Ossetians were actually a minority in South Ossetia. One size does not fit all.
Might doesn't make right in my world, it makes right in THIS world. Big countries tell small countries what to do. The US invades Iraq without UN approval, Russia invades Georgia, without UN approval. China occupies Tibet for 50 years, though with the approval of big countries. The point is not whether I think it is right, it's about what realistic situations. Georgia knew that by escalating the situation, it would get thumped. Not to get to drawn into other topics, but the examples of Iraq, Kosovo etc were to show that sovereignty is an imaginary concept. Their is no divine right of borders and state power, it exists when someone exercises that power. Iraq was not approved by the UN and a lot of countries were deeply opposed to it. The US did it anyway. Kosovo didn't want to be part of Serbia, so a cluster of European countries and US said okay you don't have to be. Now half the world says, those borders are concrete and Kosovo is an indpendent country. Well the other half says no, so who am I to believe? The point is that this whole idea of borders, nation states and the such are contructions of themselves. Realpolitik is still being practiced, whether you or I agree with it.
Really? What country do the people of Ossetia want to belong to? And, are there aproximately 1800 people in all of Ossetia, and are they all basically bribed (ie given welfare) to remain there by a colonialist nation, so that a colonialist power that has no business being in the South Atlantic can sell the fishing rights for the area at high profits? If not, then it is not a similar situation.
The people of Ossetia want to be part of Russia, which to use your language is the "colonialist nation." But I will grant you that Russia has no interest in fishing rights. Meanwhile, my numbers are that the population is 70% of British decent.
I think Ossetia has a greater history of tolerance than Bosnia, even (although I guess it helps that Ossetians and Georgians are of the same religion). If you look back far enough into history you will find that almost any neighbouring peoples in Europe have warred with each other, but the only conflict of note between Ossetians and Georgians, besides the current one, seemed to happen in the power vacuum of the immediate aftermath of WWI. The current conflict dates to the last years of the Soviet Union, when it became clear that the Soviet empire was crumbling and a new power vacuum emerging.
Not according to Bargrat Djikayev http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7625038.stm
It's also inaccurate. At least, he mentions something about the 2nd century, which is impossible. First there is hardly any records from interior Russia at that time. Second, the Ossetians moved into Georgia during the 12th or 13th century to avoid the Mongols. Georgia was at its height then, but it too got crushed by the Mongols. I don't know how much this has to do with anything about the modern day version of events.
I totally agree. I only know a little about the region, but there seem to be a lot of parallels with places like Bosnia, where "ancient hatreds" turn out to be largely a product of recent history and modern nationalism.
The real standard is whatever West thinks right is right and whatever West thinks wrong is wrong. You have arguments, show us the barrel size of your guns. At 1984, When Brits said they can defend Hong Kong, all Chinese fell down the ground and LAO.
This conflict seems to be rooted into the Soviet legacies and power grabbing after its breakdown. Chechnya, Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazya, Ossetia all seem to have similarities in that respect.