Ukraine v Russia II

It’s doctrine. Reinforce success. In a generic force on force doctrinal template, they array two up and one back. The rearward element is there to flood the penetration as explained above.

Let’s see how much blood and treasure they expend to take their own “pork chop hill.” Hopefully a s h i t load.

 

Their nukes were huge money grabs for contractors and, to our benefit, the product suffers for it.

I still don’t subscribe to the insufferable “bUt WoRLdWaR tHrEe” auto-retort (or excuse)

Russia is absolutely petrified of NATO stepping in. They would get decimated in one targeting cycle and they know it. That’s why they always threaten nUkEs whenever they can. I’m over it, and their country of zombies too.

I’d support a UKR incursion into RUS, targeting High Value Targets (terminate).

Here’s further reading on how overstated the “bUt WoRlD wAr ThReE” is.

It’s natural to be worried about the threat of a nuclear war, especially with all the rhetoric coming out of Russia. Here is some analysis from the perspective of research on authoritarian regimes, war outcomes, and international bargaining.

— Professor Olga Chyzh (@olga_chyzh) May 20, 2022

 

She's a respected name in the discipline so consider her argument a reasoned counterargument to the ones my IR friends espouse (and I parrot here).

 

Don’t trust the trapped in a cauldron claim. Ukrainian troops are where they are because their commanders want them there, not because they are trapped there and they can be withdrawn if desired. They are just bleeding the Russians dry at the moment. It’s definitely causing a lot of Ukrainian casualties, but the Russians are losing a lot more.

 

Russian OpSec continues to suck. Yesterday a Russian propagandist posted pictures of one of Russia’s most powerful artillery pieces shelling Ukrainians.. Today, Ukraine posted video of them blowing it up after geolocating its location from the photos.

Update on that Russian 2S4 https://t.co/1KbXI8oee0 pic.twitter.com/8eGumIvkR3

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) May 21, 2022

 

“All right. They’re on our left, they’re on our right, they’re in front of us, they’re behind us … They can’t get away this time.” ~Chesty Puller

“They’ve got us surrounded again, the poor bastards.” ~ COL Creighton Abrams

 

I saw a Russian tank with infantry support in one of today’s videos… Unfortunately for the infantry, the were riding on top of the tank and the video was from a Ukrainian ATGM crew as they were firing and destroying the tank….

 

The thread does a decent job of arguing that even a major loss against Ukraine would not pose, or be seen as posing, a threat to Putin's status. But going from there to "thus, he won't use strategic nuclear weapons" presumes that the only motivator for Putin to go nuclear is a threat to his own status. That may be true; but it can't just be presumed.

 

Putin may use nuclear weapons if he feels there is an existential threat to Russia. The problem is, he thinks an existential threat to Russia is Russia not being in control of Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltics, and a nice chunk of Poland and a west that is free, prosperous, and united. Ukraine was never supposed to be a war - it was supposed to make Russia stronger while unbalancing NATO enough for the rest of his plans.

I strongly, strongly recommend this video:


Vexler has a bunch of others that are really good too, but this one is the key.

Now, that doesn't mean I am in fear of his nuclear posturing and don't think it can be managed by our policies. Russia has not shown any actual unusual activity in regards to their nuclear weapons yet, and while the West may be a threat to his vision of what Russia is, an impossibly savage NATO response to nuclear use is also a existential threat to Russia so I'm sure he has reason to hesitate here.

 

Another take opposing Chomsky’s take

Pattern #1: Denying Ukraine’s sovereign integrity

Pattern #2: Treating Ukraine as an American pawn on a geo-political chessboard

Pattern #3. Suggesting that Russia was threatened by NATO

Pattern #4. Stating that the U.S. isn’t any better than Russia

Pattern #5. Whitewashing Putin’s goals for invading Ukraine

Pattern #6. Assuming that Putin is interested in a diplomatic solution

Pattern #7. Advocating that yielding to Russian demands is the way to avert the nuclear war

https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2022/05/...16Q4PsS_l79lzoIF_Xnr7ERpn_WVl8lOoRhX_jZHA0SAo

 

Russia: *invades Ukraine, struggles to ford a river without catastrophic losses*

Finland: *laughs in wetlands* https://t.co/TN1MPCuMX3

— Dr. Siiri Takala (@Oppenhiney) May 22, 2022

 

So the more interesting question is, what is NATO's response to the use of a tactical nuke?

 

I would imagine that there would be a strong movement to reply in kind, especially in the US.

 

Say what you want about St Javelin, but my money is on minor deity Stugna… Ukraine released a video of a single unit destroying 12 Russian vehicles over a 4 day period.

#Ukraine: The 1st Separate Special Purpose Brigade of the Ukrainian army claims that they destroyed 12 Russian vehicles in 4 days, including 5 APCs, 5 Tigr IMVs and 2 tanks - as seen, the impact against one of the tanks made its turret spin uncontrollably. pic.twitter.com/ZY149kAv6W

— 🇺🇦 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) May 22, 2022

 

BBC morning news says Ukraine losing 50-100 soldiers a day in the Donbas. If that's roughly the same across everywhere else -- Kharkiv and Kherson fronts -- then Ukraine has lost a lot of soldiers. It also suggests that the Russians may be losing an equivalent number, given tactics involved, meaning (back of napkin math)... 1,400 Russians a week.

At that rate the starting forces (190k Russia, 230k Ukraine) will be all dead in 135 and 164 weeks.

Which says to me the Russians can continue this fight significantly longer than a collapse in the next few weeks as I previously thought.

 

I think it will be a bit decentralized. My guess would be Eastern Europe would respond on NATOs behalf. I also think it would be fast and consequential; SRBMs to key RUS hubs within UKR. It would also open the door to giving UKR a greater standoff capability so they can engage key hubs across the border

Doing nothing undermines the very existence of the alliance. Strategically, a nuke detonation has little to do with UKR.

 

My BDA math would tell me this isn’t too far off, however the assumption here is that losses are consistent across the Operational Environment.

UKR in a deliberate defense is going to have, proportionately, lower casualty numbers. Unless they’re counting civilians in those numbers I’m not sure UKR casualties are as high as assessed. Russia is ok with the meat grinder.

That being said, as per previous discussion, unless they dig in for an expanded frozen conflict, no way this goes their way. I think UKR can outlast the invaders. Assuming NATO continues to pour arms Into the country.

 

If you're right and Russian-Ukrainian losses are 2:1 or 3:1 then the Russian army is about to run out of soldiers any day now. Which would be fine by me, so let's hope you're right.

 

Back in February there was an alleged failed assassination attempt on Putin

https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-...ny-troops-as-in-nine-year-afghan-war-12541713

 

There's no tactical (=on the battlefield) use for nukes in the Ukraine.
Only nuking a city can make a difference, but that's not tactical.

 

Already?! [emoji23][emoji23]

 

It's not. Donbas is, by far, the most active and most deadly area of the war.

Also, from what I understand, Russia is losing 3-4 times as many soldiers as Ukraine, so if the Ukrainian deaths in Donbas is accurate, that means Russia is losing 150-400 a day. Add in the typical tripling for other casualties and Russia is in deep doodoo unless they start mobilizing more troops.