NSR: The History Thread

Discussion in 'Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, & the former Soviet Repu' started by Zenit, May 20, 2010.

  1. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    Jun 3, 2000
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    Heh, well there's a topic that is guaranteed to get you a couple of opinions :)

    Its important to remember that both airborne and marine troops are at their core infantry soldiers with specialized training as to their specified method of insertion; the marines train on amphibious assault, while army airborne train on insertion by primarily LALO/LAHO/HALO/HAHO parachute jumps. Once they are on the ground and/or have established a beachhead, doctrine is for them to fight as light infantry forces until relieved by heavier equipped forces with full complements of armor and artillery support. That's classic doctrine; you can see that the Marines in WWII significantly departed from classic doctrine in the Pacific campaign, which combined with the fierce tenacity of the Japanese soldier, and the difficulties of amphibious assault resulted in significantly higher percentages of casualties than Army infantry units deployed in the Pacific theater.

    I do find it curious that a former Nazi military officer would be talking about an enemy combat component which his side never faced in WWII; maybe he was having a Belleau Wood flashback moment in the previous World War, which to this day remains as one of the finest examples of American gallantry in combat in our relatively short history. Or maybe he simply knew what insanely tough bastards the Japanese were.

    Are the marines and airborne troops "elite" troops in the sense that they are highly trained infantrymen that are experts at a specialized form of warfare? Yes. But not on a level that the Army's Rangers, SFOD-D (Deltas), and Green Beret detachments, the Navy SEAL & SWCC teams, British SAS/SBS units, Russian Spetznaz, Israeli Shayetet 13/Sayeret Maktal/Shaldag units, etc.

    As far as the Fallschirmjager in World War II, I'll bet you can still find some old Waffen SS and Army Grossdeutschland Regiment/Division/Corps & Panzer Lehr Division veterans that will vigorously dispute the contention that the Fallschirmjager troops were the best in the Nazi arsenal. Certainly, the Fallschrimjager had some impressive successes; the textbook air assault capture of the Belgian fort Eben Emael was certainly a high point, even more impressive when one considers the vast part of the operations on the ground were conducted by a sergeant-major when all of the officers in the initial landing detachments were rendered combat ineffective. 78 highly trained paratroops captured one of the most formidable fixed fortifications ever devised by man, and took as prisoner over 1,000 Belgian troops manning the fort- really, one of the most remarkable operations of the war. The Fallschirmjager was led throughout the war by one of the most underrated and ablest of Nazi generals, General Kurt Student. However, after the airborne assault on Crete, which resulted in a very high rate of casualties, they were never used in a large scale airborne capacity again for the duration of the war. The heavy casualties suffered by the Fallschirmjager could hardly be blamed for; German intelligence significantly underestimated the Commonwealth forces on the island. Also, the cat was out of the bag thanks to the ENIGMA decrypts, the British, ANZAC and Greek troops knew when and where the Germans were coming, and even with the heavy casualties sustained by the German airborne it was somewhat surprising that the Germans did indeed end up prevailing, with two such costly intelligence gaffes working against them.

    After Crete, the Fallschirmjager were used as elite ground troops, originally acquitting themselves quite well on the Eastern Front. As the war progressed, just as in the Waffen SS divisions and, to a lesser extent, the Grossdeutschland and Panzer Lehr divisions (GDL later was expanded to an army corps when it was joined with the Brandenburg Division, which at one time was also considered an elite army infantry formation) the quality an training of the conscripts was in no way able to match the earlier supply of highly trained soldiers that had previously made up the bulk of the Fallschirmjager, Waffen SS and elite Army units. Almost without exception, the cream of the elite Nazi formations had bled out on the Eastern Front; by the time the 2nd front in Europe was opened, the levels of skill, training, competence, and motivation of the elite Nazi units were a shadow of what they were in June 1941.

    Based on its track record from France 1940 all the way to the complete destruction of the formation near Pillau (modern day Baltiysk in Kaliningrad) in 1945, I'd have to say it would be a pretty tough argument to say that the Fallschirmjager were overall more "effective" than Grossdeutschland Regiment/Division/Corps. GDL regiment had a large part in the victory over the battle of France, led the drive on Moscow in late '41 (and then was almost completely destroyed in the following Soviet counteroffensive), was reconstituted and refitted as a division in 1942, took part in the initial drive to Stalingrad, was a major reason behind the Nazi victory in the Third Battle of Kharkov, was refitted again as a mechanized infantry division, was heavily engaged on the southern edge of the Kursk bulge during that battle, followed by more action at Kharkov, the bloody battles of Krivoi Rog and the Cherkassy pocket, after which the unit found itself fighting defensive battles in Romania and East Prussia, barely escaping total destruction during the reduction of the Memel pocket (modern day Klaipeda, in Lithuania) only to be evacuated to Pillau and completely wiped out there.

    There have been some questions of the authenticity of the author's account, but "The Forgotten Soldier" by Guy Sajer, a former GDL corporal of mixed Alsatian/German parentage, is one of the best accounts of life (as a personal narrative, not as a serious chronological study, which is where some of the controversy comes from) in the GDL during its time in France and on the Eastern Front.
     
  2. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    ...speaking of which, these boys were in action on the Mavi Marmara, overnight. Not exactly the operational success that these guys are accustomed to...
     
  3. Dimuha

    Dimuha Member

    Oct 18, 2007
    northpole Chicago
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    I thought Deltas = Green Beret, isn't Green Beret just a general term like Spetsnaz ?

    I hear Australia has incredible special forces but where would they get their experience from ? Surely they're not as hardened as American or Russian units.
     
  4. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    No. SFOD-D and the rest of the 5 Regular Army/2 National Guard Special Forces groups currently active share a common heritage, but have different missions. SFOD-D is primarily direct action oriented and heavily trained in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue; designed for very rapid response times. Green Berets specialize in unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense, and training.

    Although both are considered Army assets, SFOD-D generally gets their orders fron US Special Operation Command (DoD) and SF usually gets its orders fm US Army Special Operations Command
     
  5. LokomotivZee

    LokomotivZee Member

    Aug 28, 2009
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    You are almost on track. The term Special Forces, which is the real name for Green Berets (ie. Berets have 'Special Forces' on their shoulder not 'Green Beret'. Green Berets comes from their headgear which used to be unique as Army dress unis had hats. Now everybody gets a beret just not the green color), has come to have the same catch all use in American English as Spetsnaz in Russian. You can say of a veteran "He was Special Forces" and the general public will understand his job, with specifying he was a PJ, SEAL, Force Recon, Special Forces, Delta, ect.

    In addition to Z, Delta gets more training than your average Green Beret, as Delta and DEVGRU (known as SEAL Team 6) conduct operations for CIASAD. In other words, the US's REAL State Department. Additionally Delta is a best of the best situation. You don't enter the Army and go to Delta school. You have to be a Special Forces Operator or Ranger for 2 years, and have achieved a high enough score on the ASVAB to qualify.

    Aussie SASR is very well respected. You forget the instability of the countries around the Anglophonic South Pacific, and when any Special Operations unit conducts a successful mission you WON'T hear about it.
     
  6. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    yes, that generally goes for most of the special ops outfits; one of the reasons why this snafu with the Turkish freighter is such a confounding boondoggle, being that Shayetet 13 was involved and the thing still went sideways.
     
  7. LokomotivZee

    LokomotivZee Member

    Aug 28, 2009
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    Shayetet 13 can turn things inside out upside down and still manage to keep it quiet. They make CIASAD forces look like Elephant Calvary. This is a major slip-up for them and their first in a LONG time (that hit in UAE was not Shayetet 13 or Mossad. Not their style)
     
  8. FootyFan365

    FootyFan365 Member

    Jun 23, 2008
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    Zenit I saw about 8 of the World at War episodes, very well documented series. We were so lucky that winter struck in earlier October, seemed like Moscow would have been doomed in a week otherwise. Why didn't the Germans wait until April/May of the next year? Big mistake, weather saved Russia twice against the two most formidable military's in world history haha, fate was on our side thank god.

    During one of the commercials they were advertising a DVD set, Crusade of WWII. Have you seen that one? Footage looked very intense.
     
  9. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
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    You know, weather argument is a bit deceiving - October weather in 1941 was not all that wintery. In fact, it was a true quagmire (in the meteorological sense of the word). The true Winter, with its frozen (thus - easily passable) ground, hit in November. This is when Germans made their last push and failed. Not because of the weather but because of pure exhaustion, being unprepared for a long campaign. Glantz says that weather or no weather, Germans were not likely to succeed at Moscow in 1941. And, in case they did, it wasn't likely to be the victory for them. Main Russian forces, preparing for a counteroffensive, were gathering to the North and to the East of Moscow, so the capture of Moscow would not mean a military victory.

    As Germans expected, Soviets did throw all their available reserves around Moscow. And after their moderately effective counteroffensive, they significantly battered the Germans. Germans Army, as the result, was no longer able to advance on all directions of the Eastern Front as they did in 1941. The decision was made to concentrate on one - Army Group South. I think it was a logical decision. Unlike Army Group Center, Army Group South did not suffer significant reverses. Sure they retreated around Rostov and in Eastern Ukraine but did not suffer a significant defeat. Another reason was that Soviets did not expect an offensive there as it appeared that a stalemate was reached. Soviets remained concerned with the Army Group Center as it remained at the distance of 150-200 kilometers from Moscow in some places. Thus, most of Soviet reserves were kept there, pretty much denying Germans their target on that front - Moscow.
    One more factor was the condition of roads. While the central part of European Russia was experiencing their yearly quagmires in March/April, the Ukrainian steppe was far better passable to concentrate better and larger forces. And from April/May until the beginning of their Summer 1942 offensive, Germans were beefing up their forces of Army Group South.
     
  10. Real Corona

    Real Corona Member+

    Jan 19, 2008
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    As I understand it, it was the mud that stopped them. Anyone who has driven on a rural road in Russia or Ukraine, and has been there in October, knows what I am talking about. The mud gave the Russians time to regroup.
     
  11. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
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    Well, while the mud was certainly a factor, it also allowed the Germans, in desperate need of reinforcements and depots, to prepare for one final push, which occurred when the ground froze solid. At that point the ground seized to be a problem. The last push occurred in November. Maybe it was too late in the year - possibly so. Remember, Germans were not planning to still be fighting that late in the year. One has to credit the Smolensk Battle and the resistance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in Ukraine with prolonging the struggle.
     
  12. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    I have seen that advertisement - that announcer is so over the top, and it has the "as seen on TV" tag on their website that I am a little leery of buying it. Having said that, I'll probably sucker out for it one of these days.

    One of the points of contention about the '41 campaign is that whether or not the Yugoslav uprising and the campaign in Greece had anything to do with the failure of the German Army to deliver the knockout blow before the quagmires of fall and the winter weather set in; the original start date for the invasion was set in mid-May, which ended up being pushed back over a month due to the intervention in the Balkans. It is an interesting question, one that poses a lot of fascinating "what if" questions. On the surface, the extra three weeks that post-conflict German sources say the campaign would have gained certainly seem important; I'm unconvinced that in the end it would have made any appreciable difference. While the weather had a lot to do with how things eventually turned out, the strategic disconnect between Hitler and OKH that developed shortly after the beginning of the campaign certainly contributed more to any kind of timeline delay and the prolonging of what was supposed to be a lightning strike knockout campaign. Remember, the German Army doctrine in France '40 was that of maneuver, either destroying, incapacitating, or rendering combat ineffective large numbers of enemy troops via battles of encirclement rather than pitched affairs as the French had planned for. While the first stage of the Eastern campaign certainly saw numerous examples of large numbers of Soviet soldiers and equipment either destroyed outright or captured, it also became clear to both Hitler and OKH that German intelligence had vastly underestimated the size of the Red Army. At that point, shortly after the Battle for Smolensk wrapped up and barely a month into the campaign, Hitler was already dithering with the original plan, ultimately deciding to focus on the destruction of industrial capacity in the hopes of denying the Soviet ability to continue the war.

    While one can argue about the strategic validity of this plan, one thing for sure is that in general, making those wholesale changes in strategic directives in such a massive campaign barely a month into it created a severe disruption in logistics, command and control, and initiative that hardly was conducive to ultimate success. Of course, the following battle around Kyiv that resulted in the wholesale destruction of 4 Soviet armies (some 40+ divisions, a staggering amount of manpower) and the capture of anywhere between 450k-600k Soviet troops (depending on your source) can hardly be viewed as anything but a resounding success. However, at the conclusion of that battle, Hitler wavered again and belatedly launched the drive on Moscow at the start of October, hardly an ideal time of year, and in the face of intense Soviet preparations for a determined defense of the city. In the end, Hitler ended up juggling two sets of strategic objectives and ended up accomplishing neither; this indecision most likely had as much to do with the failure to win the war in '41 (as was the original idea) as anything else.

    Waiting until April or May '42 simply wasn't an option for the German Army; they just weren't built or designed that way, for long periods of pitched battles along static lines, having to maintain extremely long lines of supply over an extended time.

    It does present a fascinating set of "what ifs?" as mentioned before. What if the German Army continued driving upon Moscow instead of diverting the significant number of armored divisions to help Army Group South out? Without the almost 2 month delay that allowed for the significant buildup of forces for the defense of Moscow (and the following counteroffensive), it would seem at least very possible if not likely that the Germans could have indeed captured the capital before inclement weather set in if the original objectives had not changed. In a scenario where Moscow is captured by the Germans, the communications and supply hub of the country, it again seems possible if not likely that given those conditions, the Siege of Leningrad either would have been very short or would not have happened at all. Whether the capture and occupation of either city or both cities would have been enough to force Soviet capitulation in '41 is a matter of speculation that makes for some interesting debate.
     
  13. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
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    One note, though, Hitler's decision, from the standpoint of the strategic situation in August of 1941, to turn one of the tank groups of the Army Group Center towards the South, through Gomel towards the right bank of Desna with following break through to the East of the Kyiv bulge, may be seen as a correct one. Soviet SouthWestern Front, time and time again had shown resilience and continued to counterattack as Berdichev counterattack experience indicated. Due to this front having large yet unbroken forces so far West of the Army Group Center did create a threat (even though largely theoretical or even imaginary) to their right flank, which could materialize at a very inopportune time. Soviets were throwing every reserve towards the Western front, anyways, to continue to slow the Germans down in that direction, which potentially would have tied most of the Army Group Center down and made them unable to react to such a threat as might be presented by whatever armor the Soviet SouthWestern front still had.

    Glantz argues against the German ability to capture Moscow in 1941 under any circumstance from a different standpoint. He sees that the availability of large Soviet troops elsewhere (which ultimately did tell), coupled with increasing problems of resupply and communication for the frontline Army Group Center troops would have told before the rainy weather set in and Wehrmacht did make the best of it by turning most of their armor South, while, otherwise they would be mired in the annual quagmire in front of Moscow.
     
  14. Dimuha

    Dimuha Member

    Oct 18, 2007
    northpole Chicago
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    The French did take Moscow but not formally.
     
  15. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    It would be seen as a correct decision as far as classic thought goes, but then again, a dangerous thrust upon the German southern flank would have required a such feat of disengagement, speed and maneuver that given the Soviet dispositions at the time, one can hardly think it possible, even theoretically, much less actually being successful. Certainly the Soviets up until that point had not demonstrated anything remotely close to the ability to pull something like that off in this stage of the campaign; when Glantz lays the blame for the relative costly failure of the Moscow counteroffensive at the feet of "lack of strength, vehicle mobility, fire support, logistical train and communications", it is hard to believe the Southwestern Front could have done much better in far worse circumstances 4 months earlier; the 4 Soviet armies of the Southwestern Front destroyed in and around Kyiv didn't exactly demonstrate much in the way of nimble maneuverability while they were being surrounded by the 2 armies detached from Army Group Center (in spite of being led by one of the more capable Soviet generals in the field at the time, Kirponos). But that is more of an indictment of the ham-handed Budenny holding a command about 6 levels of organization higher than he should have, and Stavka's obstinate refusal to allow any type of strategic withdrawal and/or attempt at defense in depth, than any reflection on the conduct or leadership of the Southwestern Front from the beginning of August until the end of September.

    It also must be mentioned that the Germans basically ignored a similar “threat” to their southern flank in France ’40, although it took a little bit of subterfuge and quasi-insubordination (List’s “reconnaissance in force, wink wink” order to Guderian on 19 May) to do so, after both Hitler and Von Rundstedt got a bit queasy.

    Also, while Army Group South was the "weakest" of the three initial Army Groups, that's a rather relative term - it still represented a very potent force of 3 strong German armies (1st, 6th and 17th) directly opposite a line running from Kyiv to Uman (this does not count Schobert's 11th Army and the two Romanian armies, of AG South, as they were incidental to the operation). If the entire Southwest Front has attempted to wheel and attack the southern flank and von Weich's 2nd Army (which more than likely would have been assigned flank duty had the drive to Moscow been continued), that would have left a gaping opportunity that no one could have possibly missed. Given that the Southwestern Front, while giving a relatively good account of itself in spite of orders from above, remained fully committed opposite AG South during the time the decision was made to turn south instead of continuing onto Moscow, the threat of any challenge to the southern flank of 2nd Panzer or 4th Army would have been negligible, at best, should the decision have been made to continue the drive on to the capital.

    Glantz does indeed state that in his opinion, the best opportunity to capture Moscow for the Germans presented itself in October, and not September. He does not categorically say that he believes that the Germans could not have captured Moscow, under any circumstances, in 1941. He does state that it is his belief that the combination of faulty logistical planning exacerbated by overextended lines, the stiffening of Soviet defenses, better Soviet command and control, and Hitler's insistence on continuing to employ battles of encirclement and destruction against a force that had a virtually limitless supply of manpower versus what Guderian and von Manstein still wished to do (exploit the breakthrough and bypass instead of encircle, thereby denying the enemy the chance to reconstruct defenses (such as what happened after the conclusion of the Battle of Smolensk,) as contributory factors as to why the Germans failed in their bid to capture Moscow in '41. To quote Glantz: "By late October, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army resembled two punch drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other...in retrospect, the German forces had gone as far as possible for 1941 and needed to go into winter quarters; at the time, however, Stavka had to face the possibility that once the first hard frost restored mobility, the invaders would be able to capture or at least encircle Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and Rostov."

    One of the things I really like about Glantz, and the late John Erickson as well, is that neither of them get caught up in advocacy based on the availability of their sources, as both of them have rightfully accused most Western historians of (leaning too much on German records.) Both Glantz and Erickson were two of the first prominent Western historians to have fairly far reaching access to Red Army archives, yet they both managed to retain a fair sense of objectivity while debunking some of the common misconceptions held in the West about the campaign on the Eastern Front (one of those most prominent myths being, of course, the "if only for the bad weather" theory as the primary cause of German failure to capture Moscow in '41.)

    There's two books out now about this very battle that folks should read, for an example of how this happens quite often amongst historians.

    Representing the red corner:

    [ame="http://www.amazon.com/Greatest-Battle-Desperate-Struggle-Changed/dp/074328111X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1275599022&sr=8-1"]Amazon.com: The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of World War II (9780743281119): Andrew Nagorski: Books[/ame]

    Fighting out of parts west, in the black and white trunks:

    [ame="http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Moscow-Col-Albert-Seaton/dp/0785814043/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1275599022&sr=8-5"]Amazon.com: The Battle for Moscow (9780785814047): Col. Albert Seaton: Books[/ame]

    If you happen to read the two, you might come to the conclusion that the authors are writing about two totally separate and completely different battles. As is usually the case, the facts probably reside somewhere in the middle.
     
  16. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
    Club:
    FC Dynamo Kyiv
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    I have very little to add to the above accept to point out that the 11th Army, as well as the Romanians, were faced by the Southern Front (which was no slouch either). Both SW and S Fronts performed as well as they could be expected to given the strategical situation to the North of them.

    To get a full nitty gritty account of the actions of the both Southern and SW fronts from the beginning of the Great patriotic War to about the counterattack at Rostov, I enjoy reading Isayev's volume, fully available on the net (in Russian). I do not know how your endurance is like reading in Russian, but, trust me, this is a great volume. He goes all out into tactical movements down to the regimental level. I love it.

    And, believe me, there are a few things there that a person educated in conventional account of the World War II Eastern Front history will not expect to see, including quite a unique assessment of Marshall Budyonny.
     
  17. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    I agree that the Southern Front forces of 4-5 Armies were more than a match for the 2 Romanian Armies and Schobert's 11th, in fact probably a mismatch as all the 3rd Romanian Army did at the time was flank security for 11th Army, while 4th Romanian was given the task of securing Odessa. IIRC, one of the Southern Front armies was headed by Malinovsky in this stage of the campaign, although I forget which one and am too lazy to look it up at this late hour.

    Thanks for the link! That looks like some very interesting stuff...definitely going to spend some time this weekend on this. My tolerance level for reading Russian is fine, as long as it is a topic of interest and/or not some super technical or specialized topic in some kind of discipline that requires a specialized dictionary, and military tech/order of battle vocab is right up my alley - however, I have a very low tolerance for reading anything on-line for long periods of time, in either language. Call me old fashioned, but that's why the Sunday NY Times arriving at 6 AM is to this day one of my favorite indulgences on Sunday mornings. So....with regards to the aforementioned works, looks like the laser printer at work will get a bit of a workout today ;)

    I know that both you and I take a great deal of pride in our library collections of history and military history. Although compiling a respectable library of Russian literature in the native language is not all that difficult anymore (ask me how I managed to come across a complete set (1920) of the full and complete works of Saltykov-Shchedrin (20 volumes!) someday), augmenting one's military history collection with good quality Soviet and/or Russian volumes is not so easy, mostly due to the oppressive luggage weight restrictions now in play.

    (as an aside, I remember an episode in 1996, arguing with the Schipol authorities about whether I could take my carry-on on board, which was the legal size but which contained about 15 0,5 bottles of the finest distillate products of the Liviz distillery in Piter, a few bottles of an excellent Dagestani cognac, and 6 bottles of Stepan Razin Zolotoye (probably weighed well over 100 pounds)...I ended up winning the argument...fat chance these days, huh?) ;)

    I only have about 20 or so volumes about the Great Patriotic War in the native language, limited to the usual suspects and biographies and memoirs of some of the more notable Soviet generals/marshals involved. I've scoured both ruskiniga.com and kniga.com for more in depth analytical studies, but have found few - however, I'm sure I may have missed a few worthwhile reads on either site. Have you any recommendations that you think might be worthwhile reads? Any suggestions you may have will be greatly appreciated.

    I'm a member of the Society for Military History, who puts out the excellent quarterly Journal of Military History (in addition, SMH members get academic database access thru EBSCOhost). In addition to the 6-7 new peer reviewed articles that come out every issue, they publish snapshot reviews of anywhere from 100-150 of the newest military history books that come out, which makes it a little easier to weed out titles. Unfortunately, I don't know of a similar resource for Russian language works of the same genre..but if you do, G, then I'm all ears.

    Do you know that Glantz is one of the major players backing the publishing of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies ? It is ridiculously expensive, yet I am tempted...I recently joined the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (C.V. required for evaluation for membership) which gets you about 70% off of the price, or $55/yr. I'll be happy to share these with you if you have any interest.
     
  18. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
    Club:
    FC Dynamo Kyiv
    Nat'l Team:
    Ukraine
    I do like the Journal of Military History. My familiarity with it is rather limited. I was laying in the hospital due to complications to an ACL reconstruction surgery; my uncle, a former ВДВ man and also a solid military history buff, brought several issues of this periodical. It cheered me up greatly. I was not, at the time, aware of anything of that sort. I do get an odd issue from him now. The second journal I am not familiar with. I will read up on it. Sounds interesting, though.

    Also, my uncle is in possession of an 8-volume (I think) Soviet Encyclopaedia of World War II. It is a 1957 edition, which is incredibly detailed, I realize that the date of publication may leave some questions as to the veracity of some of the information, but the whole breakdown of every minor action I found very appealing.

    If you don't mind, I would like to use your materials if I have a military history inquiry from time to time. Even though I do have quite a few tomes, I often find some inquiries still stump me.
     
  19. FootyFan365

    FootyFan365 Member

    Jun 23, 2008
    Indy
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    FC Dnipro Dnipropetrovsk
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    Even if the Germans took Moscow, didn't the Soviets move a lot of industry further east and they would have still been able to manufacture war materials? Still scary as hell, I remember driving to the airport in Moscow, and there was a monument on the way there commemorating the spot where they stopped the Germans cold. Nowadays its inside the city limits...

    I remember WWII class at Uni, they showed us some German propaganda videos, one was soldiers skiing in the Caucus Mts, as they put it, even had time to vacation :D don't know about you guys but WWII propaganda is very entertaining to look at for me. All sides had great versions.
     
  20. Real Corona

    Real Corona Member+

    Jan 19, 2008
    Colorado
    Club:
    FC Metalist Kharkiv
    Nat'l Team:
    United States

    In my novice opinion it would have been a psychological blow, but everything I know about WWII seems to indicate a German loss was inevitable sooner or later.
     
  21. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
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    Jun 3, 2000
    Above the Tear Line
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    See, I think something like that is still of incredible historical use, and I would love to get my hands on a copy of something like that. yes, some of the info may be dated, but most of that is going to be top level data- digging into the minutiae of a work like that - fascinating stuff.

    As far as your query - what is mine is yours, I will be happy to share what I have and any access that I may have, you only need mention it and I will be happy to comply.

    I printed off the first 2 chapters of the Isayev link you suggested. Getting ready ti sit down outside and delve into them now. Thanks again, this looks like very fascinating reading material for the evening.
     
  22. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
    Staff Member

    Jun 3, 2000
    Above the Tear Line
    Club:
    Zenit St Petersburg
    Nat'l Team:
    United States
    'Twas a good read, G, I'm going to print off the next two chapters on Monday. You were right, the operational details were fascinating to get into- I broke out a couple of old Soviet era maps I have while reading the chapters, it was just like reliving history. Great stuff.

    I'm saving my pennies for this, my Xmas gift to myself:

    [ame="http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-History-Cold-War-Hardback/dp/0521839386"]Amazon.com: The Cambridge History of the Cold War 3 Volume Hardback SetÂ…[/ame]

    Very spendy, but the first comprehensive and complete history of that era. It got a pretty decent review a few months back in Foreign Affairs : http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66033/lawrence-d-freedman/frostbitten

    Another book that I just recently finished, after having it sit on a bookshelf for 5+ years, is this:

    [ame="http://www.amazon.com/Reagan-Gorbachev-How-Cold-Ended/dp/0679463232/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1275739199&sr=1-1"]Amazon.com: Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (9780679463238): Jack Matlock: Books[/ame]

    This was an excellent read, and had I known what a good book this was I would have moved it up on my reading list a long time ago. A quite incredible depiction of two very intelligent men, coming from complete opposite sides of the political spectrum, who learned how to defeat their own long-held stereotypes of the "other side" and reach across ideological boundaries to establish an common-sense relationship. Granted, Reagan's intelligence may have been limited to the fact that he knew he was more of an ideologue and a statesman than anything else, and that he was out of his depth in complicated affairs of domestic policy, the economy; still, it takes a very savvy individual to realize this, upon being elected to the most powerful position in the world, and to surround himself with the best and brightest, deferring to their opinion in matters of state. Slick Willie could have taken a lesson there. Reagan has already cemented his place in history as one of the greatest Presidents in US history; Gorbachev has spent the last 20 years being vilified and reviled by most of his countrymen and former compatriots. Yet I still stick to my opinion that some day, Gorbachev will rightly be known as a superb statesman, a pragmatist, and one of the most important and influential figures in Russian history since Peter the Great. He to this day is still one of the very few public figures in Russia that does not buy into Putin's vision of going "back to the future" and attempt to re-create the Cold War era; I remember his disgust upon hearing Putin comment on his view that the break-up of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. He is one of the few people within Russia that seemingly cares and understands what a free and independent media means for a society. He is cognizant of the fact that Russia and the United States have much more in common as far as shared interests and common enemies go, and should not be viewed as adversaries in this new age, but partners. I just wish his party, SPS, and Yabloko could one day get their collective acts together and realize their petty differences are nothing in comparison to the bigger picture, the forthcoming Putin dictatorship.

    One of the highlites of my life was to personally meet Misha and Raisa when they stopped in St. Paul in May of 1990, two months after I was honorably discharged from the Army. The streets were thick with people...it is not every day the GenSec of the KPSU stops to hobnob with the common folk in one's neighborhood. I only got in front of him for about 10 seconds, but I was able to convey to him in his language (IIRC he never studied English) what an important job I thought he was doing. He said thank you for the kind words, asked me where I learned Russian, and offered a handshake - I can describe that moment to all, but never adequately in words, it was a thrill of a lifetime for me.

    I will also never forget how Gorbachev looked at Reagan's funeral. He looked so tired, a man who tried to bear the weight of the world on his shoulders a couple of times over. He looked genuinely sad to lose someone that the book intimated he viewed as a good friend; after both were out of power, Reagan invited Gorbachev to visit his ranch, which Gorbachev declined at the time because he was getting absolutely savaged in Russia for the somewhat humorous & tacky Pizza Hut ads he did (remember those?)

    [ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9lvzzH0STw"]YouTube- Pizza Hut - Gorbachev[/ame]

    It is also known than Reagan, upon Raisa's death, wanted to travel to Moscow for her funeral, which the State Department and Nancy both nixed because of Reagan's severe Alzheimer's issues at the time.
     
  23. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
    Staff Member

    Jun 3, 2000
    Above the Tear Line
    Club:
    Zenit St Petersburg
    Nat'l Team:
    United States
    Tomorrow (Sunday), the Military Channel is featuring the all-day D-Day Marathon - looks like some good stuff, see below:

    12:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Hitler's Last Deadly Secret: The Hunt For U-864

    TV-PG, CC

    Deep in the icy waters off of Norway lies one of the last great secrets of the Second World War. In February 1945, the German submarine U-864 disappeared without trace during its clandestine journey to Japan.

    1:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    World at War
    Nemesis
    TV-PG

    Hitler retreats to his bunker in Berlin while Germany and the 1,000 year Reich dream crumbles around him and Himmler and Goering betray him. Hitler orders his soldiers to fight to the death against the brutal Russians as he prepares to marry Eva Braun.

    2:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Battlefield Diaries
    Tank Battle Vietnam
    TV-14 (V), CC

    It is the first and only tank battle of the Vietnam War. On March 3, 1969, North Vietnamese armor and infantry unleash a surprise attack on a remote US Special Forces Camp near the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

    3:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    World's Deadliest Aircraft
    B-29 Superfortress
    TV-PG, CC

    Designed as a replacement of the B-17 and B-24, the B-29 was considered the ultimate bomber of WWII and is best known as the aircraft that dropped the atomic bombers on Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of WWII.

    4:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    20th Century Battlefields
    1942 Stalingrad
    TV-PG, CC

    Peter and Dan travel to Stalingrad to show us how the battle of Stalingrad became one of the most epic and tragic battles of World War II.

    5:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Operation Valkyrie

    TV-PG, CC

    Operation Valkyrie is the definitive film on Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and the doomed 'Valkyrie' conspiracy to assassinate Hitler on 20th July, 1944.

    6:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    From Geneva to Baghdad: The Rules of War

    TV-PG (V), CC

    Take a closer look at the Geneva Conventions, the laws of armed conflict, signed by more than 150 nations. They set a code of behavior that requires warring parties to act humanely off the battlefield. Why did American soldiers violate the rules of war?

    7:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Decisions That Shook The World
    FDR and World War II
    TV-PG, CC

    In 1940 Adolph Hitler was determined to conquer all of Europe. Despite isolationist sentiment, President Roosevelt planned for US entry into the European conflict. His courage in the face of popular opposition ultimately allowed for the Allied victory.

    8:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Operation Valkyrie

    TV-PG, CC

    Operation Valkyrie is the definitive film on Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and the doomed 'Valkyrie' conspiracy to assassinate Hitler on 20th July, 1944.

    9:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    World at War
    Inside the Reich
    TV-PG, CC

    The summer of 1940 sees the German people in a buoyant mood - they are the conquerors of Western Europe and feel like the war is already won. But the mood quickly changes when 250,000 men are killed at Stalingrad. It is total war now for the Germans.

    10:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    World at War
    Morning
    TV-PG, CC

    The Western Allies resolve to invade Europe. England becomes a floating supply dump and the British and Americans assemble the largest invasion fleet in history on June 6th, 1944.

    11:00 am
    (60 minutes)


    Clash of Wings
    Hitler's Biggest Gamble
    TV-PG, CC

    Hitler's massive campaign against the Soviet Union in 1941 ground to a halt when he transferred the Luftwaffe to the Mediterranean theater. This deprived the German army facing Moscow of the airpower it so desperately needed.

    12:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Clash of Wings
    Battle Over the Sea
    TV-PG, CC

    The German U-boat battle proved costly, with 784 out of 1126 being sunk. If the Nazi's had started with more U-boats, they would have certainly won World War II. Starting off strong, the German fleet became vulnerable and then obsolete.

    1:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Normandy - The Great Crusade - Part 1

    TV-PG, CC

    The personal experiences and military achievements of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the legendary invasion are chronicled. The Normandy landing proved to be the turning point of World War II.

    2:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Normandy - The Great Crusade - Part 2

    TV-PG, CC

    The personal experiences and military achievements of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the legendary invasion are chronicled. The Normandy landing proved to be the turning point of World War II.

    3:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Day After D-Day

    TV-PG, CC

    The Day After D-Day is D-Day plus three; the crucial 72 hours following the June 6th invasion as told by combat veterans who fought in the villages, beaches, hedgerows and bridgeheads of Normandy.

    4:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler
    Part One
    TV-PG, CC

    How did Hitler win the support of the German people? Having fallen prey to his "fatal attraction," they were ready to support him in his road to war, genocide and an imperial German Reich that his propaganda machine claimed would reign for a 1,000-years.

    5:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler
    Part Two
    TV-PG, CC

    How did Hitler win the support of the German people? Having fallen prey to his "fatal attraction," they were ready to support him in his road to war, genocide and an imperial German Reich that his propaganda machine claimed would reign for a 1,000-years.

    6:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    World at War
    Inside the Reich
    TV-PG, CC

    The summer of 1940 sees the German people in a buoyant mood - they are the conquerors of Western Europe and feel like the war is already won. But the mood quickly changes when 250,000 men are killed at Stalingrad. It is total war now for the Germans.

    7:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    World at War
    Morning
    TV-PG, CC

    The Western Allies resolve to invade Europe. England becomes a floating supply dump and the British and Americans assemble the largest invasion fleet in history on June 6th, 1944.

    8:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Normandy - The Great Crusade - Part 1

    TV-PG, CC

    The personal experiences and military achievements of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the legendary invasion are chronicled. The Normandy landing proved to be the turning point of World War II.

    9:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Normandy - The Great Crusade - Part 2

    TV-PG, CC

    The personal experiences and military achievements of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the legendary invasion are chronicled. The Normandy landing proved to be the turning point of World War II.

    10:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Day After D-Day

    TV-PG, CC

    The Day After D-Day is D-Day plus three; the crucial 72 hours following the June 6th invasion as told by combat veterans who fought in the villages, beaches, hedgerows and bridgeheads of Normandy.

    11:00 pm
    (60 minutes)


    Normandy - The Great Crusade - Part 1

    TV-PG, CC

    The personal experiences and military achievements of the soldiers and civilians who participated in the legendary invasion are chronicled. The Normandy landing proved to be the turning point of World War II.
     
  24. goliath74

    goliath74 Member

    May 24, 2006
    Hollywood, FL, United States
    Club:
    FC Dynamo Kyiv
    Nat'l Team:
    Ukraine
    Sadly, this channel is not available to me. Is it, in any way, affiliated with the History Channel? I could have sworn, I had seen some of these videos on the THC
     
  25. Zenit

    Zenit Moderator
    Staff Member

    Jun 3, 2000
    Above the Tear Line
    Club:
    Zenit St Petersburg
    Nat'l Team:
    United States
    Really? It is one of the Discovery Channel family, so I'm really surprised you don't have it down in FL.

    I would definitely call your cable operator and ask WTF Chuck?.
     

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