OK, I`m just reading a book dedicated to the "forgotten" World Cup - Chile 1962. Based on match reports presented in this book, I would select the following three teams from the tournament: Team A -----L.Sanchez----Amarildo-------Albert------Garrincha -----------------------Didi------Masopust -------Schnellinger---Popluhar----Pluskal-----D.Santos --------------------------Schrojf Team B ------Zagalo------Tichy--------Jerkovic-----Pospichal -------------------Sekularac---Zito -------N.Santos----Solymosi----Contreras----Lala --------------------------Soskic Team C ------Skoblar-----Kvasnak----Scherer-----Chislenko -------------------Rojas-----Flowers --------Novák----Erhardt----Zozimo------Armfield -------------------------Grosics
Some general comments on the "forgotten" World Cup - Chile 1962: Three player generations were present in Chile. On the one side the aging Stars, who were about to leave the football stage in the following years, Santamaria, di Stéfano and Puskás among the Spaniards, Didí and Nilton Santos among the Brazilians, Schäfer and Erhardt in the West German team or Grosics and Sándor among the Hungarians. Furthermore there were a variety of popular players at the pinnacle of their careers, like Sivori and Altafini (Italy), Gento and Peiró (Spain), Haynes, Flowers and Hitchens (England), Szymaniak and Seeler (West Germany), or Sanfilippo (Argentina). They already had World Cup experience, but oftentimes they failed to meet the expectations people had in them, mostly because they were too inflexible to adapt to a variety of new tactical systems. Players that met the expectations of the experts were Suárez (Spain), Saínz (Argentina), Ivanov, Ponedjelnik and Metrevli (Soviet Union), Tichy (Hungary), Radakovic, Sekularac and Jerkovic (Yugoslavia), Losi and Maldini (Italy), Armfield (England), Leonel Sánchez, Rojas and Navarro (Chile) as well as Vavá and Garrincha (Brazil). All of them aged between 25 and 30 and able to fulfill expectations. Finally, an eye-catching guard of youngsters move into the spotlight for the first time, who would soon - due to their World Cup experiences - be the new hopes for the future of various football nations. They were: Schnellinger and Haller (West Germany), Moore, Greaves and Bobby Charlton (England), Jusufi, Galic, Skoblar (Yugoslavia), Marzolini (Argentina), Lalá and Stibranyi (CSSR), Göröcs, Albert and Solymosi (Hungary), Toro (Chile) as well as Pelé's substitute, Amarildo (Brazil). A big talent was also the 18-year-old Italian inside forward Gianni Rivera (Italy), who inexplicably only starred in one match. Tactical Systems: The matches in this World Cup were dominated by the competition of several tactical systems and general ways of playing. A lot of experimenting was going on. That`s why the formation published shortly before each game was not something to go along with like in the years before. It was never a given which position a player would be playing in. The sports journalists ignored these tactical finesse in the formations of the teams by simply putting players in the old WM-System when they wrote their reports. At the end of the tournament, it became obvious that those teams playing with the newly-created 4-2-4 were the most successful. Be it in the defensive variation of the CSSR or Yugoslavia or in the more offensive variation of the Southern Americans, like BRazil and Chile. The impact of Catenaccio meant that several teams weakened their attacks, like West Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Switzerland. After the competition, it had become clear that the old-age WM-System could not be relied upon anymore. The rigid man-marking and symmetric, motionless formation of the old WM was ready for the museum. In Chile 1962, a new phase of open and variable tactical systems was introduced...
Excellent summary, although it is worth noting with regards your thoughts on the WM formation that Benfica won the European Cup that year playing WM. The Benfica coach was Bela Guttman who had helped pioneer 4-2-4 in South America.
Yes, you`re right! In terms of club football, the WM-system was still not dead yet. I think some teams kept on playing WM right into the mid-1960s, including some European Cup winners (but I`m not fully sure - not having been around back then and not having many games of that era on tape, I have to rely on the tactical formations presented in various books and not all of them are fully reliable). Of course not every team wanted to change its long-used tactical formations overnight, or was not in the position to change it due to lack of fitting players. But in the long run, no team could afford sticking to WM. Though in World Cup football, the last two Cups were won by teams playing 4-2-4, which made it pretty clear that you had adapt to these new tactical challenges if you wanted to be successful, especially since the whole semi final in Chile consisted of teams that had successfully adapted to 4-2-4.