This world cup will be remembered by several things that can be considered unusual: the vuvuzelas, the Jabulani, the total failure of the previous finalists, the clean run of the South Americans, Ghana becoming the most successful African team ever, Côte d'Ivoire missing yet again the second round, the stupid red cards by Ghezzal, Kaita and Felipe Melo, etc. But in the tactical history of the game, at a time when most coaches would say "formations are dead," one thing will be remembered in the years to come: the triumph of the 4-2-3-1 formation, and how it has been transformed into a very flexible philosophy rather than a fixed formation. The three teams that shone, Germany, Netherlands and Spain, all have used such formation, changing into a 4-3-3 in attack and a 4-4-1-1 in defense. To wit: Spain - ---------------------Casillas-------------------- Ramos---------Pique-------Puyol-------Capdevila -----------Busquets---------Alonso------------- -----Iniesta-----------Xavi-----------Villa------- ---------------------Torres--------------------- *In the semi, Pedro took Villa's place and Villa took Torres's. Netherlands - -----------------Stekelenburg------------------- Boulahrouz---Heitinga---Mathijsen---vBronckhorst -----------vBommel--------deZeeuw------------ ----Robben---------Sneijder-----------Kuyt----- ------------------van Persie-------------------- Germany - --------------------Neuer---------------------- Lahm-----Mertesacker----Friedrich------Boateng ------------Khedira----Schweinsteiger---------- -----Müller----------Özil-----------Podolski----- --------------------Klose---------------------- The general formations being: Def---------Def---------Def---------Def ------------DM----------CM------------ ----Wing---------AM-----------Wing---- ----------------Striker------------------ *Note in Netherlands the CM and DM positions are switched --vBommel as CM, deZeeuw as DM. This is a very flexible scheme that in attack transforms into: Def---------Def---------Def---------Def -|---------------DM------------------|- -|---------AM---------CM------------|- -v--WF----------ST-------------WF--v- a virtual 4-3-3 with the advantage that the DM can stay back and allow one of the CBs to move forward for a header without much risk. Further, the lines remain open for the fullbacks to add to the attack without finding the wingers on their way. This can be accomplished by keeping the wingers slightly closer to the centre, or making them perform central runs (in fact, modern wingers are often an AM/winger cross), or by having the fullbacks run closer to the centre while the wingers take wide-forward positions. In defense, the scheme proves even more solid: Def----------Def--------Def---------Def ----Wing-----DM-------CM-----Wing---- ------------------AM------------------- -----------------Striker----------------- The AM has a free run to both, help the central defense and initiate the counter. This defensive position requires that the wingers be apt at defending, and that the CM can also play a DM role. All three players, Schweini, Bommel and Alonso can do that. And Robben, Müller, Iniesta are apt defending. In all three schemata, the left wingers's job is not neatly defensive, but more a covering job. And that has also been shown time and again: the defensive positions fail at the left winger, and that allows the attacking team's right winger or right fullback to cross the ball not into the area (the defending teams LB is covering that), but into the space behind, where Xavi, Sneijder or Özil can catch the ball and wreak havoc. Having a box-to-box CM also complicates things for the other team in the sense that when he runs forward, he must be marked. With Van Bommel, Schweini and Alonso making runs into the area, the AM can retreat and wait for a pass from the sides --a pass that seems harmless, being a pass backward, but that allows to construct an attack. Most of the best attacks by these teams come from such a pass, from the left. Crossing into the area is never as successful, since each attacker is man-marked. But a cross falling a bit deeper to an AM with room and time to plan, that is the crux, and what makes the build-up seem a bit slower when compared to the usual cross-into-the-area.
To me this is not too different from 4-4-2. which is what Brazil had in 94. the key is to always have 2 defensive MF. Jorginho-----Aldeir----M.Satos-----Branco --------Dunga--------Mauro Silva-------- Bebeto-------Mazhino------Zihno------- ---------Romario------------------- back then they called it 4-4-2
Nice. A lot of people look at all these teams using the 4-2-3-1 formation and see uniformity. As you correctly point out, the only thing some of these teams have in common is the formation. How they play out of that formation is often very different.
This is true. I wonder if coaches will sometimes report their formation as being X to either throw off the opposition or to appease the media/fans, while in fact employing a subtly or even noticeably different formation.
New formations usually start as small adjustments from old formations. Bebeto and Zinho were no wingers. Bebeto played as a forward next to Romario. But he did withdraw a bit to look for the ball and he also was willing to play wide. So, Brazil wins the Cup, then other coaches look at their tendencies, and it may have been the genesis of the 4-2-3-1. The challenge right now for students of the game is how to attack this system without leaving yourself vulnerable to it.
The 4-2-3-1 is a formation based on verticality, not horizonality. (Or is it horizontalness?) By dropping a striker into the AM role, a team has a natural way to exploit the space between the mids and the backline in a 4-4-2. And with another box-to-box CM, and wide attackers given alot of scope, wherever the defense gets pulled out of position by the AM, there's an attacker there to exploit it. If it's a central mid, the Xabi Alonso role is open. If it's a center half, the striker is 1v1. If it's a wide player, then that side's winger or fullback is open. That's how I see it anyway. The traditional 4-4-2 tries to create openings horizontally, the 4-2-3-1 tries to create them vertically. I suspect that by Brazil 2014, teams will have started trying to find a countermeasure. Sam Allardyce, about as by-the-book of an English manager as you can name, ran Blackburn out in a 3-5-2 late in the season in a home match when he knew the visitors would be going 4-5-1. By doing this, he was able to match the opposition's numbers in the midfield AND play with 2 strikers. He could pressure the other teams backline with those strikers AND have 5 in the midfield. The other thing that might happen is the re-emergence of the libero. If the other team goes 4-5-1 or 4-4-1-1 when defending, a technical central defender can almost certainly surprise the other team 2-3 times a match by making a very aggressive run, and with little risk of giving up a cheap counterattacking goal. I wouldn't be surprised, if the US gets a creative tactician as coach, to see Maurice Edu groomed for such a role.
exactly although Bebeto was a straight forward in club when he played for Brazil that position was already taken by Romario so in essence he played as what you call today a winger.. His plays most of the time came from the right.. So brazil on paper had 4-4-2 but the way then attacked it was with 2 DMF for any counter-attacks, one creative MF in the middle, Zihno attacking from the left and Bebeto from the right, while Romario was glued to the box.
An important detail that makes the game differ in 2010 from the game in 2006 is the role of the centre mids. Currently, one is typically defensive, the other is more of a "box to box" type. That is very different from the approach of teams like Brazil 94 or France 06. Dunga and Silva were DMs, as were Vieira and Makélélé. Now, only one of the central players sticks to the pure DM role while the other is used as an AM in attack. Busquets stays, Xabi Alonso moves forward as an AM, Xavi moves even forward as a CF. Khedira stays, Schweini moves forward as an AM, Ozil moves even forward as a CF. De Jong (or De Zeeuw) stays, and van Bommel moves forward to act as AM, with Snejder becoming a CF in attack. That sort of movement draws one man from the opposing defense into marking the CM who runs forward, leaving the AM open for the pass from the sides. Xavi, Ozil and Sneijder are the vital men in the team, but they are not the classic #10 --they often withdraw too deep for that. Their role is more to be the brains of the attack, so they distribute the ball and follow it by a deep run, which can happen only because the CM (Bommel, Schweini, Alonso) is drawing some of the opposing defense off of him. That's the key difference with this system, that and the fact that the players on the wings don't play as just wingers but as AMs and can come inside to the centre allowing for a free run for the fullbacks, who act as classical wingbacks --and are covered by the DM guy, who normally stays behind.
Given that we'll probably never see "Total Football" like the Dutch Whirl of the mid and late 70s ever again, this would be the next best thing as far as I'm concerned.
and that comes from the new breed of players that can run 90 minutes defending while at the same time attacking if needed ..
That's my personal bet. This time it won't be a defender, as it was in the 70s, but a midfielder. The box-to-box CM is halfway to become that already. Add to that the use of "free roaming" AMs/forwards (Kaka, Messi) and you got the two elements of the classical libero already in use in different teams.
Yes. Watching games from the 60s and 70s, the players then don't seem to have half the stamina than the average player in this world cup. Teams like Germany, Spain, Japan(!), Argentina, Uruguay, Netherlands and Chile have players that have run a virtual marathon in each game.
Which makes one realize what an incredible attack machine Spain 2008 was, playing with Senna as sole destroyer in a 4/1/3/2. Not sure anyone has the personnel and balls to play with that formation again on a big stage.
While Vieira was older by 2006 - he never was strictly a DM - and even in 2006 he did play box to box - just more restrained than his younger days. A key value he added was getting forward to overload the defence
The odd thing about Schweini is that he has almost converted himself back into a classic box to box player - but playing in a 3
Interesting. I was young back then and could barely understand the tactical implications of playing with a libero, but I remember how much I loved to see Baresi play. So much so that when we role played in our school matches, all the kids wanted to be Van Basten, Gullit, etc and I wanted to be Baresi and play as CB, when (quite naturally), everybody wanted to be upfront to score goals. My question is how the re-emergence of the libero will impact on the ability of the teams to build the offside trap, which I believe is still one of the most effective (if performed correctly, of course) defensive weapons a team can employ. One example that comes to mind is Mexico’s goal against South Africa in the opening match. Not that South Africa was playing with a libero. Just an example of a bad performed defensive move and how a libero will make it even more difficult.
jonathan wilson had an article recently talking about this phenomenon. I don't think he thought the libero per se would come back, but more a hybrid dm/libero that drops into the middle of two technical ball-playing cbs who scatter out wide, meaning with possession you have 3 at the back, play a high line, and allow the fullbacks forward, a la busquets, pique and puyol when barca have possession.
Spain play various formations not just the 4-2-3-1. They won the Euro playing a 4-1-3-2 for most of the tournament and a 4-1-4-1 in the final because Villa was out. This cup they've used a 4-1-4-1 a few times including the last match against Germany.
You mean a kind of a 3-5-2 formation like AS Roma used to play in its glory years, with Candela and Cafu running through the lines as if they were wingers? I love that formation – if you have strong midfield players (like AS Roma had in Tomasi, for example), I think it’s the perfect balance between attack and defense.
It was really interesting how they were able to overload central midfield when pressing - and thus have numerical superiority at virtually all times.
and France had such a player in Makelele back in 06 when they destroyed Brazil in the semis.. A strong midfield with versatile players is IMO the key to winning the WC.. This is the reason why both Argentina and Brazil failed this year.. I still don't get Brazil's formation against Holland.. very sloppy and unbalanced.
sorta, that was a little closer to the 3-man defenses popular in the late '90s, early 00s, on both attack and defense http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/02/09/teams-of-the-decade-10-roma-2000-01/ good article about that side is here. I think that was specifically wilson and the ZM guy were talking about more modern teams, which wouldn't quite be the same as the roma team with totti (where he had an outstanding season as a more traditional 10) one of the teams mentioned in the article was this brazil, but of course they flamed out. http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/04/22/is-the-sweeper-set-for-a-return-to-prominence/ a link to the wilson article is in this link
Pretty much. Xabi Alonso pushes forward a lot. In fact I thought that was one of their issuses during the group stages. Xavi and Xabi seemed to be getting in each others way too much. But they've figured it out more or less. Busquets for the most part stays completely back. Though it also has to do with Villa since against Germany he was the only CF so he didn't drift so much to the left.