Having read this post yesterday in another thread, I wanted to discuss a potential reason for the disappointment of our 2006 World Cup squad. Conventional wisdom suggests that the average FIELD player is in his prime between the ages of 25-29 (let's leave goalkeepers out of this discussion). If we can accept that as true (at least for the sake of argument), it stands to reason that a World Cup squad will be more successful if the bulk of its impact players and/or its roster are made up of players in that age range. A look at our World Cup rosters from 2002 & 2006 may indicate an underlying reason for our successes & disappointments in each tournament. In 2006, Bruce Arena seemed to rely on older veterans and fairly young players (under 25) as the meat of his squad. Older veterans such as Claudio Reyna (32), Eddie Pope (32), Brian McBride (34), Eddie Lewis (32) were all relied upon as starters. Many additional key players on the roster were all under that 25-year old threshold: Landon Donovan (24), DaMarcus Beasley (24), Oguchi Onyewu (24), Bobby Convey (23), Clint Dempsey (23), Eddie Johnson (22). It seems to me that a mini-generational gap exists here in the roster. Where are the impact players on the roster who are supposed to be in their prime (ages 25-29)? Where are the guys born between 1976-1981? Our talent pool among this mini-generation appears to have been lacking. Here's a list of players aged 25-29 on our 2006 WC roster (born 1976-1981): Pablo Mastroeni (29/30), Josh Wolff (29), John O'Brien (29), Jimmy Conrad (29), Ben Olsen (29), Brian Ching (28), Carlos Bocanegra (27), Steve Cherundolo (27), Chris Albright (27). Of those 9, only 5 played a notable role in the World Cup, and perhaps only 3-4 can be considered key contributors (Conrad, Cherundolo, Bocanegra, and maybe Mastroeni). But I feel like this mini-generation just didn't have as many quality players comprising our total player pool. In 2002, the prime age range of 25-29 would encompass all players born between 1972-1977. A look at our 2002 WC roster returns the following players meeting that criteria: Frankie Hejduk (27), Gregg Berhalter (28), Pablo Mastroeni (25), John O'Brien (25), Eddie Lewis (28), Claudio Reyna (29), Clint Mathis (25), Josh Wolff (25), Brian McBride (29). Of this group, you can argue that anywhere from 7-9 of these guys were key contributors to the World Cup squad. 7-9! Compared to only 3-4 on the 2006 roster. When you're looking at a roster of only 23 players, those extra 4-5 guys in their prime in 2002 may have been a big difference maker. Let's look back a bit at this missing mini-generation of US players (1976-1981): In the 1999 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the USA finished 2nd in its group with 6 points and bowed out to Spain in the Round of 16. Of the 18-man roster that year, 12 players went on to have established professional soccer careers. Only 7 players from that roster have earned over 10+ caps with the USMNT, those being Steve Cherundolo, Carlos Bocanegra, Tim Howard, Taylor Twellman, Chris Albright, Cory Gibbs & Danny Califf. In the 1997 FIFA U-20 World Cup, the USA finished 3rd in its group with 3 points and bowed out to Uruguay in the Round of 16. Of our 18-man roster that year, only 7 players went on to have established professional soccer careers, and only 3 players (Josh Wolff, Ben Olsen & John O'Brien) went on to earn at least 10+ USMNT caps. The USA did not qualify for the 1995 FIFA U-20 World Cup and I haven't been able to locate any info on our qualifying team. I realize there are some other players from that mini-generation who weren't involved in the youth national teams, the most prominent being Clint Mathis, Pablo Mastroeni, Jimmy Conrad & Brian Ching. Still, the list of quality USMNT players born between 1976-1981 seems quite thin. Part of the problem is that injuries and/or early career deteriorations have taken their toll on guys who were supposed to be impact players in their prime for the 2006 WC, namely: Ben Olsen, who was once tabbed a rising star in US Soccer before his 1999 injury. John O'Brien, who had a wonderful 2002 WC @ age 25, then saw his career stall and deteriorate due to injuries. Clint Mathis, who rose to stardom in 2002 @ age 25, earned a nice move to the Bundesliga, then saw his career stall in 2004/05. And even Josh Wolff, who once looked like a star in the making at striker before his career stalled after the 2002 WC. Maybe if you give us these 4 guys at their highest projected level for the 2006 World Cup (since all would've been 29 year olds), our team's outcome is much different. Perhaps this is all a flawed argument, since our 1982's (Landon Donovan & DaMarcus Beasley had been around long enough in 2006 that they should've been considered veterans in their prime, but I think the material presented above at least gives us something to think about regarding the Missing mini-Generation.
Well, hopefully this can happen in 2010. We have the really young guys in Adu, Altidore, Bradley Bornstein, then have the proven vets in Donovan, Beasley, Dempsey, Boca, Dolo, and really wont be depending on anyone that is in their 30's. Which is a good thing.
Some of the notables on that team were Mathis, Kirovski, Chris Klein, Wade Barrett, Leo Cullen, Billy Walsh.
One way to look at it is that you would like each U20 team to yield six players who go on to significant national team careers, hopefully two of them as starters. Looking at some of the past teams, this was the yield: 1995: Mathis, Kirovski, Klein (1 starter who faded early and two marginal backups, a poor crop, Mastroeni was part of the age group but was not yet a US citizen) 1997: JOB, Wolff, Olsen (a thin crop with some outstanding quality at the very top, the lack of depth was exacerbated by injuries to the three, this was partly offset by the emergence of late bloomers Ching, Conrad) 1999: Cherundolo, Howard, Bocanegra, Twellman,Albright, Gibbs, Califf (good numbers from this group, the only thing missing is a big star, but Howard is still young for a goalie and could yet become that big star) 2001: Donovan, Beasley, Onyewu, Convey, Casey (not as much depth as the 1999 vintage, but more candlepower at the top) 2003: Convey, Johnson, Adu, Dempsey, Clark, Mapp, Marshall (when one throws in late bloomers Guzan, Bornstein, Parkhurst, this has to be considered an excellent vintage) 2005: Adu, Feilhaber, Spector, Wynne, Sturgis, Gaven, Nguyen (a solid vintage that has been augmented by Edu and Davies) 2007: Adu, Altidore, Sturgis, Wallace, Bradley, Szetela, Rogers, Zizzo, Seitz (would have included Kirk and Smith if not for injuries, potentially the vintage of the century!)
I talked about this in a thread during the WC06 aftermath. I thought a big reason we weren't as good as we could've been was the downfall of JOB and Mathis. Those two guys are two of the most talented American soccer players ever, but their careers just didn't pan out because of injuries and other problems. They should've been at the peak of their careers and leading us in Germany. Frankly, JOB shouldn't have even been there he was so out of form.
You might have a point about the missing generation here but the bottom line is that we could not catch any breaks and Arena's tactical choices were not great. 1. Czech Republic..........starting Eddie Lewis, a left winger, at left back and then having him go walkabout on the first goal staggered us early. And there sat Bocanegra on the bench. A short time later, Reyna hits the post. If it is 3 inches to the right, it is suddenly a 1-1 game. 2. Czech Republic........starting DMB at right wing. Another terrible choice, especially in light of Dempsey's strong performance against Italy. These two coaching decisions all but guaranteed we would not win, and a tie was not likely. 3. Italy.........We played our best game, but it should have been evident in game 1 that Pope was a step off the pace. In fact, he became our Jeff Agoos of the 2006 World Cup. Conrad should have started against Italy. Bad breaks........shocking decisions by the referee. Pope deserved his sending off because he was fouling, constantly a step behind. But Mastroeni's red was a farce. You could see tackles like that EVERY single game in the WC without so much as a card. Next, Beasley's goal. I have watched dozens and dozens of games every year at all levels for the past ten years and I have NEVER seen that called, before or since. A complete sham. To go places in the WC, the little things HAVE to break your way, or you WILL lose.
He refused to start Dempsey. He didn't select a dedicated left-sided fullback. He didn't select a dedicated right-sided midfielder. He wasted a spot on O'Brien. He started Reyna. He introduced the 4-5-1. He had no answers for Ghana.
Definitely worth thinking about. However, while the age range mentioned is generally accurate, focusing on it leaves out two things: 1) the rare exceptions of players who are actually better when they're older, and 2) the fact that a player younger than 25 may not be at his best level but could still be the best player at his position in the player pool. The first one is rare, but when you are talking about a saquad of 23 players and one of them fits this description, that's a more significant proportion. For example, Fabio Cannavaro is at his best at 33-34. Donovan is a good example of the second point.
Good point about the generations. The depth of the player pool in a given age range is a key point. It reminds me what Bruce Arena once said about the American player pool...you put the top 100 American players against the top 100 Brazilian players, and the US would get blown out of the water. However, if you take the top 15, then you like your chances on any given day. If Ben Olsen, Cory Gibbs, Josh Wolff, John O'Brien, Clint Mathis weren't all ruined by injuries (or beer), then maybe you're looking at a much better, deeper team in 2006. I mean, what were our major issues on that team? You can dig up the old threads and hear people bitch about tactical issues ad naseum (hell people are even trying to turn this thread into that), but there were two key issues for that team. 1. We had no central midfield control. Claudio was not match fit. John O'Brien had played only a handful games since WC 2002. Ben Olsen is a fine player that I respect very much, and had he never had that horrible injury he very well might have been a starter...on the right wing. He was out of his depth in the center of the park at the World Cup and he knew it...you could see it on his face. 2. We had no dangerous striking threat. McBride is a beast but you mark him with a physical CB, close down the service and he can't offer much. There was nobody that really made the other side adjust tactically, like Koller for the Czechs did to us. Ching didn't play despite his excellent form. EJ was not mentally up for it. Wolff just didn't offer what he used to. You add that injured generation to the squad and that's a whole different team. But one can bemoan injuries all day long, but the key fact to note here is that we had nobody capable of replacing them. Until the US improves that elite tier of the player pool from 10-15 guys to 25-30 guys, then a few key injuries will produce similar results. Our success at the world cup will be largely decided by our fortune in the training room.
Mathis and O'Brien were, by some distance, the most talented players of this mini-generation. They should have been automatic starters. Losing them was bad enough, but toss in the fates of Olsen, Gibbs, and Wolff-- and Albright's failure as a forward and Kirovski's failed promise in some respects-- and it's a bad situation all around. Bocanegra and Howard are almost the only ones who got better from 02 to 06-- and they play positions in which that was likely to happen at their age. It's amazing how really thin we are and how dependent on early-identified prospects we are. How many chances did Kirovski and Albright (maybe Califf, too) get based more on rep and youth play early in their nats careers? One sidenote of this that is slightly pathetic -- Conrad and Ching were the only players mentioned here as "late developers." If you really wanted to stretch that, you could argue for DeMerit and Eddie Robinson as well. Other than that, our nats - at least this group - were fated from these youth teams. So much, possibly too much, depends on how we evaluate talent at that level and then these guys just move up the ladder and dudes like Zizzo or Davies are earning senior call-ups in some degree based on what they did in a youth tournament or at Boston College. That just seems...wrong somehow. At the risk of being really cynical, one troublesome thing here is that I don't believe this group will be better in 2010 than they should have been in 06. Sure, Donovan or Gooch or Beasley could play better those few weeks than they did in 06, but going into the thing would you guess you will expect more out of these guys in 10 than you did in 06, or collectively are their careers at a standstill? Again injuries took a toll in two cases, but only Dempsey I would expect to be a clearly more central player in 10 than he was in 06.
There's another point. For a long time, I've been saying that Wolff's skill set indicated that a change to RW might benefit him. (From reports, he's been playing there alot for 1860 Munich, and reasonably well.) But at the relevant times in his development, it never made sense for his team. When he was a youth player, we didn't have the depth at striker to move him; we needed him up top. In MLS, same story. Look at Chris Albright's career. If he had been born 10 years later, I think he would have been Spectorized at a young enough age that he would have become a "natural" right back. God didn't bless him with the quickness and change of direction to be a top notch player, but he has size and speed. Move him at an early enough time, and he would have figured out the tactics. He could have been nearly as good as Steve C. So he could have been a decent left back. Part of it is random bad luck (Gibbs, Mathis) and part of it was an accident of timing. Albright at LB and Wolff at RW wouldn't have been match winning players...but they would have neutralized a pair of weaknesses. They would have bumped match losing players out.
olephill2, very insightful post. Rep coming your way. Can there be any doubt that healthy, in-form play from the following three players would have made a HUGE positive impact on the 2006 Cup squad: O'Brien: He was going to be the key central midfielder, backed up by the defensive work-rate of Mastro. It would have allowed Reyna to be a veteran bench player instead of a starter for 3 consecutive games. JOB was one of the US's top players in 2002, and SHOULD have been the best US player in 2006 -- the clear leader of this team. His loss was irreplaceable. Mathis: He should have been the striker the US has never had. Daring, assertive, clever, and a good finisher. Partnered up top with McBride, the US could have had a respectable strike pair. Gibbs: He should have been the younger, yet experienced replacement for Pope. It would have allowed Pope to play the veteran sub role that he was better suited for in 2006. He was also a serious option at the black hole of left back, and Arena seemed to be leaning that way until Gibbs was hurt. Either way, Gibbs would have solidified a wobbly back line. These guys wouldn't have been just marginal players, but star players at key positions. But it didn't turn out that way, sadly. The US just doesn't have enough depth in the player pool to overcome the loss of three key/star players in their prime playing years. The loss of Olsen was also a shame, as he could have filled the other big weak spot at right mid. But his injury happened even before the 2002 Cup, and so there were enough years to try and find a replacement. The losses of O'Brien, Mathis, and Gibbs occured in the few years before the 2006 Cup and became impossible to replace. As with any "failure" like the 2006 Cup squad, there are multiple reasons. But I would put the loss of these "prime-age" players at the very top of any list of reasons for the 2006 knockout. It was their time, but they couldn't perform and it gutted the potential for the 2006 squad.
Another blame Arena for everthing poster. 1. Didn't select a left-sided fullback -- Gibbs was the projected starter and was hurt shortly before the Cup. Hejduk was the emergency backup and was hurt before the Cup. Sure, blame Arena. 2. Wasted a spot on O'Brien -- Your better option at central midfield was??? Zavagnin? Armas? Sure, that would have gotten the US out of the 1st round... 3. Started Reyna -- Without O'Brien, who else at central midfield? Olsen? Zavagnin? Armas? Frankly, Reyna was the best US field player in the horrible Czech game, and he played a fine game against Italy. Which of the weaker reserve central mids would have been better in the first two games? All anyone remembers is Reyna's ugly error in the Ghana game, but where were the better options? 4. Introduced the 4-5-1 -- I'm not a big 4-5-1 fan myself. I coach my youth teams in a 4-4-2 most of the time. I'll give you this point, but once the ball is in play, formations are far less important than the form, skills, and attitude of the players. There is a lot of positional switching in soccer, and getting all hung up on specific formations is a mistake. Talented Euro club teams win championships with the 4-5-1. Weak Euro club teams get relegated with the 4-5-1. The key difference is the talent/ability of the players. 5. He had no answers for Ghana -- What does this actually mean? Mastro had foolishly gotten himself red-carded the prior match and so Arena was down another key central midfielder. Reyna, Onyewu, and Conrad manage to bollocks up their defensive roles on the 1st Ghana goal. Boca makes a hash of a clearance to loop the ball back into the US penalty box and then the referee gives a phantom Red Card to Oneywu for the 2nd goal. Donovan passes up an open lane 20 yards from goal and instead drops the ball into traffic for Olsen. Ghana flops and dives for the final 45 minutes to slow down the game. What should Arena's "answers" have been to those problems?
Man, you can say that again. In fact, if we could have had only O'Brien and Mathis firing on all cylinders, I think it's safe to say we would have been in the hunt to win the group, which would have avoided Brazil in the round of 16, and would have led to a result AT LEAST as good as 2002.
I think it comes down to 4 simple reasons we did not fair well in 2006 1-Gibbs injured, O'Brien injured, Mathis gave up staying in shape. We are not a nation that has oodles of talented depth. 2-Playing very tough teams: If we were in easier group we go through 3-4-5-1: Or more generally Not playing players in positions for them to succeed 4-Most of all players not playing up to their capabilities or even exceeding them. In 2002 Sanneh played like a great RB. O'Brien played like a world class MF, E.Stewart played great. Down the line for whatever reason players maximized their talent in 2002 and in 2006 they didn't.
Only if he was moved into an academy-type system with other top players at a young age. If the Albrights of the world develop in Philly high schools and NCAA programs - even ones like UVa - they are likely going to be their team's best player and no coach is going to move them to right back in those instances. Granted, this was a while ago and our youth depth is much greater than it once was, bit I played with and against Brian Maisonneuve and Mike Clark throughout middle school and HS and they were clearly two of the most skillful players in our age group in our state, if not 1-2. Mike Clark's HS coach wasn't going to extrapolate, however, that he had no future on a national level as a central midfielder and move him to the back line at age 16, a time when he was an all-state second teamer as a sophomore. I guess this is getting way off-topic, but IDing and centralizing our best players at a young age when they can get a more individual-focused soccer education -- not one in which the goal for the their teams to win games -- seems key. Bradenton helps but some regional academies in current soccer hotbeds would help as well. Otherwise dudes like Albright are going to be their team's star players until it is late to switch their roles. It's no accident that your example, Spector, was a forward as a youth player until an emergency forced the switch and it was only in a youth system he was deemed to have a future in the back rather than up front. Chicago Sockers were playing him where he could help them win games in the here and now; Man U played him where he had a future as a professional.
I wish you were right, but his tactical mistakes are the main reason we got bounced. It is the managers job to put people in situations where they can succeed, not fail. 1. Lewis at LB. Set up to fail 2. Beasley at RW. Set up to fail. During the World Cup, players were grumbling that they were basically overcoached, some even admitted they had no idea what to do on the field, or what their role was out there. So here we are, game 1 against the Czech Rep., and we get blown out 3-0, and the players looked clueless with Italy up next. Tournament over. Period. Teams that lose the first game rarely get through to the next round. Trouble is, Arena started believing his own press clippings and his ego got in the way. He fashioned himself as some sort of tactitian which he never was. This missing generation has some weight to it. The problem with this theory is that you are only looking at the American team. The United States usually brings an older team to the tournament compared to the others (in average age.) I would guess our team was the same age as it was in 2002. Every team brings a mix of youth and experience. We did have other issues, and they were evident in our "warm-up" games before the world cup. The biggest one was we just could not score very much. In fact, before the world cup I started a thread asking "Where da goals gonna come from." But Arena firmly messed things up in game one, and that was pretty much the end of the tournament.
albright was playing at fc delco, one of the top youth club systems anywhere... he and convey played at penn charter, convey as an 8th grader was playing varsity... i think the depth problem hurt more than anything, losing your best, and having less than top talent to replace affects your tactics.... NOW, usa has far more promising depth, so losing a key player, say beasley, bocanegra and dempsey, everything would not fall apart, as there are more options ... it hurts to lose three, but the world would not end.. more players can play now at a higher level..
Well now, Bradenton took Jonathan Spector as a forward too. Not as a defender. It was only after a while that John Ellinger -- not Man U -- decided to try Spector at defense. As for Albright being a right back early, don't kid yourself. He scored goals aplenty as a U20. It is hindsight bias now to say that he was never really a forward; he certainly was one, and the nation's brightest prospect by just about all accounts, too. Ain't nobody would have moved him to the back line, at last not in the U.S., because he was better than the other U.S. young forwards.
But it wasnt and should not have been. Going into the last game we knew we could qualify for the second round if we beat Ghana. It was there for the taking. We can blame the referee for the penalty call and for not doing enough with the Ghanians time wasting in the second half. But there was not enough urgency poured into the second half of that game.
Regarding Albright Regarding Albright...I wasn't thinking so much of converting at Bradenton. I was thinking of him hitting MLS at age 17, and getting moved to wing and then fullback by age 20. A guy with his size and speed, nowadays, would more likely than not go to MLS immediately after "his" U-17 world cup.
not that it matters all that much, but your statement is not completely true. the Ita/Czr match was being played at the same time, and there were possible results from that game that would have eliminated the US, even if the US had beaten Ghana. of course the Italians won that match, and opened the door for the US, but the US could not deliver the needed result in their own third game. I completely agree with this part. nor was there enough quality play from the US in either half of their game versus Ghana.
I've been tracking the U-20 list and what it means for our progress for a few years now. From a player perspective, the 2006 disaster came down to three things: 1) We had huge holes in the pool - partly from the mini-generation theory - that led to players out of position (Lewis at LB, Beasley at RW, no support for McBride, etc.) 2) An over-reliance on the older crowd (Reyna, Pope, McBride), in part because... 3) Donovan and Beasley didn't play up to expectations We could have controlled the first two factors. To Arena's credit, he did look for some answers: Ralston and Quaranta received some time at right wing, but either injuries or loss of form (or lack of talent exposed) meant that neither made it to Germany. The third factor killed us. One of the few advantages we had over teams was our speed and counter-attacking through Donovan and Beasley. For whatever reason, neither played well at the World Cup. However, in some odd way, I think this highlighted just how special Donovan and Beasley are as US Soccer products. Go back to the 2005 U-20 list. Who among that list would you expect to: - Lead the team through qualifying - Become an integral part of the squad's style of play - Not just make, but star on the World Cup squad Though many guys from the 2005 U-20 list might make a World Cup team, I see exactly one who could follow the Donovan/Beasley path, and that's Adu. And he's really a 2007 U-20. The good news is, he is joined by Altidore and Bradley, two others with Donovan/Beasley potential. We have our first generation of MLS internationals about to reach their prime. If any of the 2007 U-20s make an impact, predictions will go from "Knocked out in the Group of Death" to "At least the Round of 16." And hey, since 1994, we've alternated fantastic World Cups with dismal showings. We're due in 2010
Yes, and quite literally, without those 2 we wouldn't have made the 2nd round in 2002. 2 special plays in one move against S Korea that no one else on the team had the ability to make. But this is what you get when your pool is small like ours. Clint Mathis and John O'Brien were talents like we'd never had before in this country. They would be replaceable on any other top 16 team in the world. We overachieved in 2002 with some special performances, great team cohesiveness, and a region that leveled the playing field. We also surprised teams. In 2006, teams actually counter-attacked on us. Talent-wise, we're still 3-4 world cups away from being a serious contender. And that assumes we expand the professional league and development system.