Iran's air defense can repel U.S. air strikes - Russian brass

That is not the problem. As in Blackhawk Down, the troops were pretty good in the survive situation. Problem is the planing. As that incident showed, the enemy already know in advance when the choppers left and how many of them.

That is why training and intelligence come to handy. I understand that right now Army started to use the situaton of Iraq to training new troops. That is good step. Afghanistan is a different situation as in Iraq. But if you need to do a "stealth" job in an Iraq neighborhood, you need to have "stealth" ops to do it.

Really I think you should refrain from making comments about things that you don't have first hand knowledge of.[/QUOTE]

 

You're foolish to call them a mob. Don't judge that battle by the film. What was present at that time in the market at Mog was a combat trained veteran army, certainly irregular, but in no way some Mob. They had planned this for a long time and were ready as every action on their part showed. This was no mob: from the quick reaction roadblocks at crucial roadways, to the well-planned in advance shooting down of a Blackhawk which would, they well knew, cause more troops to be sucked into a laager.

 

None of what you have said has any relevance to my post. When a particularly potent bloc of government is motivated by an ideology which can best be described by "Death to America" you're not going to get very far in dialogue. The government of Iran and the Iranian people are not the issue here: the Backroom Boys are.

 

[/quote]

And yet you refer to them as a "mob" though they had far more combat experience than most people round the world, after decades of civil war.

Another good example of the US doctrine of Warfighting can be found in the Fallujah campaign of a few years ago. There you had combat infantry marines on the ground, again against a determined enemy in an urban setting. You'll probably dismiss the jihadists there as a "mob" as well, when plenty of them had lots of combat training in hotbeds such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Lebanon, etc.

IN this instance, despite all the military doctrine in the world which suggests you outnumber your opponent by at least three/one when attacking an urban center, the Marines were actually outnumbered by three to one - and, as usually happens when the Marines fight, they didn't have enough of anything, including charges to blow doors open, ammunition, armor, etc. Nevertheless, they relied on a tremendous amount of Warfighting doctrine which had its roots in the battles for Hue during 1968, against the best infantry in the world. To have achieved what they achieved, with very little "electronic gadgetry", basically with grit, and small unit tactics and excellent organization, outnumbered by a determined experienced enemy who had plenty of time to prepare his position, and who had his own share of night vision equipment, cell phones, etc. - is pretty damned impressive.

We know from experience that the Iraqis, the Russians and the Chinese organize their troops from a top-down model. The US during the Cold War realized that numbers were against us and planned along a doctrine that called for small unit, independent tactics. In Fallujah and in Somalia those tactics were confirmed; also in both Gulf Wars.

 

Yes. That is mob. One of my friend was in one of those humvees that trying to rescue the Rangers. Believe me, decades of civil war will make some die-hard fighters but not necessary tactians. If those guys are good, I afraid that no Ranger will make back alive.

Sorry, I don't give Iraqi too much credit. And I don't give Jihadists either. Jihadists are high in blood but low on brain. I don't doubt their bravado on personal or even small unit level, but they lack simple tactics of warfighting.

You don't need to outnumber your opponents in a full picture if that opponents (insurgents) cannot launch a crediable counterattack. You only need to create the outnumber advantage in a small area to take out the enemy. Kind of like soccer, you create a 4 vs. 2 in a certain area for your advantage. Even though Marines are trained on trench fighting (securing bridge heads in landing, etc.), they were essentially doing a cleaning work in Fallujah. If I am the commader for enemy force, I would pull off my main fighting force out of the city and flank Marines from outside, and only leave some snippers inside the city to do picking job. But I don't think Iraqi insurgency has that kind of mid level coordination.

For VietCong troop during Battle of Hue, I would not go that far to call them the best infantry in the world.

I cannot command on Russians, but I would not use that to describe Chinese tactics. There are plenty books studying Chinese military tactics from "The Tao of Wars" to Chingis Khan tactics. Chinese tactics always emphsys on small units independant that fits in the big picture. You can look on Battle of Chosin Reservoir to see it. Also if you read Gen. Schwarzkopf's book, he would tell you where he picked up his flank-attacking strategy.

 

Not true at all. You have no basis for critiquing either their tactics or their quality, based on your "friend". You admitted in an earlier post that the Somalis knew when and where and how many Rangers were coming - their tactics were excellent in responding to this situation, as was their intelligence. The way they grouped and shaped the battle - including the shooting down of the Blackhawk - showed excellent tactics.

Again, study the battle of Fallujah to see how their ability to use tunnels and cell phones to react/respond to the Marines; note how they were able to create death zones in houses, like the candy factory. Excellent tactics again, not just bravado.

And you can poll any Russian who's had to fight in Chechnya about how effective the warfighting ability of those people are.

Correct

What the heck? Are you serious? trench fighting? Good lord!

The city was surrounded by an armored cordon, preventing that sort of thing. Plus, I imagine that would have been a lovely target for A10s and M1As: a target of large size, out in the open.

Then you don't know what you're talking about.

Ancient Mongolian and Chinese history tells us little to nothing about current Chinese doctrine. The battle of the Chosin resevoir, if it emphasized anything at all, emphasized the total inadequacy of the Chinese army. To have a battle force of that size and near total surprise, surrounding the enemy and to allow that enemy to battle its way out with all its equipment, all its wounded and many, many prisoners is not a very optimistic view of Chi nese warfighting ability.

 

No. A trained good army will just keep the Rangers entrapped, then wipe out the rescue teams.

Never doubt their group tactics, but they don't have mid-level coordination.

I would put the collapsing of Russian Army as a major factor there too. Same Chechnya veterans were wiped out by Chinese speacial ops when they rescued US Rangers in Afghanistan.

Marines are famous on fighting those inch-by-inch battles but not on long range mobile movement. Maybe changed some.

Insurgents can easily get out by mixing into civilians exdus. They can get their weapons in outside and start divergent attacks on other cities. By leave few snippers here and there to attacting Marines, they can have a better fighting space in other cities which eventually can pull Marines out of Fallujha. Also you don't have to amass a large size of troops. It still can by small units in movement, and only assemble right before an attack that can be launched in the night.

No. North Vietnamese is NOT the best infantry in the world.

The Chinese didn't have enough firepowers to take out whole division and regime size during the night time, and they don't have airpower to make a netural battle conditions during day time. That was main reason Marines survived (but Army was totally destoryed, like 2nd Division). After that, Chinese only took bite at company and battlion level size. If they have like Soviet level of firepowers, the Marines will be totally wiped out.

As for today, Nobody will look to fight a land war with China. Seriously.

 

Which is exactly what they tried to do. That was their entire strategy. Bring down the helicopter, suck in reinforcements, etc. and create a huge body count. However, the body count was lopsided the wrong way, which allowed the Rangers, Deltas, Spec Ops boys, etc. to get out the next day.

Well, that's certainly debatable. Apparently their idea was - again, like Mogadishu - to create a large body count and thus demoralize the American people via Vietnam Syndrome. As that seems to be the case, midlevel coordination is a nonentity. You wouldn't need it in this scenario: you'd break it down to squad level tactics, which is what they did.

agree with you on the first point, however I don't know anything about the second point.

Changed some? Absolutely. They are designed to be shock troops able to hit hard and fast and operate a good distance from beachheads. Long range mobile movement is totally within their doctrine.

By leave few snippers here and there to attacting Marines, they can have a better fighting space in other cities which eventually can pull Marines out of Fallujha.

 

Of course US troops are individually far better trained and far better equipped (both in firepower and protection) than the insurgents.

In Fallujah though it has to be taken into account that 1) the US troops outnumbered the insurgents (many of the non-local insurgents exited the town before the city was cordoned)

There were 8000 US troops (5000 non combatants, to prevent ppl from fleeing) and US estimates report 4000-5000 insurgents, event though if 1200 were killed and 1000 captured i don't get where the others have gone since all the city was cordoned and there was no way to escape.

I say probably there were at most 2000 insurgents. And a good part of them were killed by the bombings.

2) the city was heavily bombed for weeks including with questionable methods (white phosphorous and much probably Mark-77) and by heavily bombed you should read bombing anything that moved.

The rational behind this tactic was exactly to minimize the most pure urban warfare where superior tech and firepower would have played a lesser part and to avoid higher casualties among the US troops.

There was still limited urban warfare and it costed the lives of 95 US troops and 630 were wounded.

1200 insurgents were said to be killed but we don't know how many of them were really fighters and how many of them were killed by the bombings rather than during the urban warfare.

 

There were actually TWO battles of Fallujah - I was referring to the first one when i spoke of the Marines being outnumbered. i was referring to the warfighting success of the Marines in that situation.

During the second battle of Fallujah the bombing was less intensive than you allege. Every bit of TV footage showed a city with remarkably untouched infrastructure. The troops were not struggling through the rubble of a bombed out city Stalingrad style.

 

Well actually they didn't even try a real urban warfare.

That has more to do with the fact that free video footage was not allowed for months than else. There was an effective censorship in place.
I guess exactly to avoid the public opinion at home getting to realize that there was extensive damage. (it's the effect of having embedded jounalists, or better inbeds, and free journalists being targets)

1/5 of the buildings were totally destroyed and 2/3 of all the buildings suffered notable damage.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Phantom_Fury

Now a part of the fallujans is back, little reconstruction has been done and still the US troops get attacked in the area.

 

Let's put this way. We don't need to downplay what Rangers did in that hectic situaion but we don't need to upplay what enemy did. There was no clear plan to trap the Rangers and tried to wipe out reinforcements. It just a choatic fighting.

The best chance for insurgents to fight Americans in Iraq is to keep their move stealth and using gueralla tactics. It means that you only fight when you are in advantage and in initiative, and you should run when odds stack against you. Anyone try to DEFEND a city ist totally out of such doctrine. The best case for US forces and worst cases for insurgents is to fight a war with numerous numbers in a well defined battle ground. The worst case for US forces and best case for insurgents is to fight a "stealth" war that can use its numerous numbers to attack US small units and finish the work before any inforcement--such as attacking airplanes come. Defend a city to death is good for Jihadist bravado but bad fro insurgent tactics.

Just a quick summary. US specail force units were encycled by Al Quada forces that happened to be mainly Uyghurs who are veterans of Chechyna. Pakistani reinforcements are pinned down so US asked China for help. Chinese special forces went over the snowy peaks and suddently showed up at the back of Al Quada forces and wiped them out and rescued American Rangers. Then they work on a joint action plan to take off the groups that hold the Pakistani troops. Chinese commander suggested to climb over the mountain peaks to attack from back, but American commanders think that maybe tough for Rangers who may have breathing problems at 5,000 meters high altitudes. I would not blame them because Chinese speical forces normally training on 6,000-7,000 mountain ranges. So the plan was that Chinese will go over the peaks and embush the enemy when it retreats while Americans took choppers and attack in front. The enemy left some snipers in the front to delay American advances and think that they have enough time to escape but found out they were embushed by Chinese and only few of enemy surived as captives.

People will make mistakes just by thinking that Chinese only by using numbers advantage. What Chinese did is to identify the weak point of UN's defense line. That normally come as South Korean units. Then they will use faked the attacks to confuse American commanders, then just concentrate on overrun South Korean units. When South Koreans ran away which expose the flanks of US forces that forces US forces withdraw. Meanwhile, other Chinese units already occupied those withdraw routes, so they just inflict as much as damage on the retreating forces. That is how US 2nd division lost over half of its personnels due to this tactics. Marines was lucky because they retreat slowly with their equipment intact. The reason I called them lucky because China never got what Russia promised on the heavy weaponary. If Chinese had what Russia have or even North Korean have in the strat of War, the 1st Marine will be wiped out. I wouldn't consider Chosin a disaster for Chinese. Even though they failed to totally wipe out Marines, but Army troops were wiped out.

 

In what sense? In the sense that they didn't go in for the kill and were withdrawn? Nevertheless, and as one who spent some time in Beirut in the Eighties I can tell you if you're in an urban center and being shot at from 360 degrees, it's "real urban warfare".

I'll give you that - but my argument is that they didn't bomb the hell out of the city before hand - no more than two 500 lb bombs used before the ground fighting. Most of the fighting was up close and personal. Structure damage came about during the actual offensive from rockets, some armor, AC130 strikes, grenades, etc. All the collateral of infantry combat.

I tend to doubt everything and anything that comes from Wikipedia. It's been found to be wildly innaccurate.

The Mosques were used as weapons storage and sniper havens and so they were particularly targeted if, according to the Rules of Engagement, fire was taken from them.

Still, my contention to the earliest arguments were that the Marines acquitted themselves well in what can be considered one of the more difficult battle enviroments. It went back to Shaster's original argument that "take away the technology, etc. and the US soldiers are unable to fight". My contention was that they've shown that they can. That's all - not whether the war was/is worth fighting or whether the battles for Fallujah were successful in ending the insurgency, etc. My own opinions on those matters are far different.

 

Fair enough on your first points. I disagree with some of it but that's fair, right? I'd like a link for the Chinese/Pakistani thing - no offense.

But I disagree with your assessment of the Chosin Reservoir. The Chinese had every intention of wiping out the Marines. They had numbers and surprise on their side. They had them surrounded and had the high ground on the ridges. The Marine withdrawal was spectacular for the fact that they broke out, brought everything with them, including multiple prisoners.

If I'm the Chinese general officer in charge, I'm going to be feeling pretty ashamed of myself. There is no excuse for losing the prize, except that they were outfought.

You give the impression that the Chinese could care less and/or only cared about the South Koreans or units like the Army that made the mistake of not luckily "retreating slow", which I'm not even sure what the hell that means. They failed miserably despite the huge, vast manpower of the 9th Army Group and how many divisions against what was essentionally 22,000 men of the Marine First Div.
http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/frontline/chosin.htm

The Marines were "lucky they didn't have . . . the heavy weapons the Russians promised them"????? I'd say the Chinese were lucky there weren't two divisions of Marines or they would have driven the Chinese back across the Chosin.

It's simply a farce for you to say that Chosin was not a shameful disaster for the Chinese. I can't find a single positive to come from their inability to finish off, or just slow down the Marines.

But enough about this. My original contention, way way back, was that they US is not completely "technology dependent" to the extent that you or someone else posted: take away the technology and they die.

My original contention was that Warfighting Doctrine, which has been ramped up and honed since Vietnam, focuses on squad level decision making with no electronic advantages. I know this for a fact because I've been there. Compasses, marksmanship, tactics, etc.

 

It is in writing by one Chinese special op leader, but it is in Chinese.

I don't think with the firepower they have, they can wipe out whole Marines. The Chinese troop is 9th Army Corp that has 3 Armies (9 divisions). It is a light infantry units without heavy artillery. The small Mortal (60mm) they carry were not work due to severe weather, and their "heavy" weapon" is grenade. The soldiers were from South and most of them saw the snow first time in their live and their clothing was way out of the line. What the number they had were 6 divisions (under-strength) around 55,000-60,000 against 30,000 UN troops (First Marine Division had 25,000, plus 7th Infantry RCT, and British Royal Marine) with total air support, ammo supply through air (also evacuate causulties, and supply some new blood), and all heavy weapons. I don't think that number is so much overwhelming.

Also Marine Gen. Smith was pretty much unhappy with MacArthur, esp. with Almond, he already slow down 5th and 7th Marines and keep his troops consolidate.

No. The General in charge didn't think his troop was finish the preparation. But he found that is the last chance he can strike before any suprise element gone. But actually the US field commanders were already aware of large numbers of Chinese troops present--they can hear from the radio communications. Only one were "surprised" --those staff in Tokyo headquater. What you can blame Chinese side was their failure to capture the Hugari-Ri on time to cut the Marines off their retreating route and destory whatever airfields there. The troops supposed to use on this had to divert to join the fight against 7th Infantry that took extra two days to finish US Army troops off.

Acutally the reason for Marines successful withdraw was because they were not run like hell like Army who abandoned all equipments. Marines did their best to stick together as units and made their slow-but orderly step-by-step movement. What I call it lucky--because Chinese didn't have adaquate firepower, so Marines can hold over the onslaughters at night and wait for air support coming on daytime. Army actually tried to run as fast as they can, so their heavy equipment were not used for their advantage and protection. Put it short, Marines are "We are out together, or we die here", but Army are "Whoever run out who save their own". If Army can stick together, Chinese may have same problem as Marines. But if Chinese had whatever Russians promised in heavy artillery, Marines would be done.

Not a single chance. Even two divisions of Marines, they don't have enough troops to cover their flanks.

They did inflict enough damage on Marines and their strategy goal was to drive UN out of North Korea.

My original contention is with high tech goodies that US military enjoyed against other militaries, US is NO BETTER than others. That means others prefer to fight a low tech war against US forces than a high tech one.

 

"The American Marine First Division has the highest combat effectiveness in the American armed forces. It seems not enough for our four divisions to surround and annihilate its two regiments. [You] should have one to two more divisions as a reserve force. The 26th Army should be stationed close to the front." Mao to General Song.

Sounds like a lot of guys to me. Four divisions, even smaller Chinese Divisions are still a hell of a lot more than two RCTs. Marines are also, I might add, light infantry by definition.

Yes, that slow but orderly withdraw against overwhelming odds to break an envelopment was why they were successful. I don't know why it is you insist that this was not a brilliant, well executed manuever against superior forces.

On November 30, X Corps ordered the Marines to withdraw. So began an incredible breakout and 13-day fighting retreat by about 20,000 troops, spread out loosely over a narrow, mountainous, one-lane supply road, covering about 78 miles to the Sea of Japan and Hungnam. For the first 35 miles, from Yudam-ni to the Army's 3rd Infantry Division positions at Chinhung-ni, the Marines were on their own, battling continuously with 10 CCF divisions.
The 1st Marine Division took full advantage of its artillery and air support ... but it also time and again fought the Chinese man-to-man, hand-to-hand, night and day, while cut off from the rear and with transportation at a dead stop. In the bitterly cold, sub-zero winds of Chosin, as in steaming jungles of an earlier war, the Marines never lost their will to fight, or their capability of fighting effectively.
Heavily outnumbered, the Marines successfully defended against every attack, and in turn successfully attacked the Chinese wherever they had cut off the MSR. The Marines not only fought their way out, they brought out their wounded, and most of their dead and equipment.
I think any objective student of war studying the battle of the Chosin Reservoir would conclude is that the Marines outfought the Chinese despite massive odds against them. They too were subject to the weather. They too were without heavy weapons (for the most part), they were cut off and surrounded. Any objective student of the battle of Chosin would probably say, the Marines won a remarkable battle; the Chinese failed in their aim despite heavy odds in their favor, then failed to block the Marines from retreating through the pass.

They seemed to do all right with two RCTs against several divisions. The evidence is there.

Mao's directive was to "destroy the First Marine Division." Which they failed to do. I don't know why this doesn't register as a "military failure" to you. I'm amazed. You seem fairly well indoctrinated.

And my contention was that that's not true and I gave examples to prove it.

 

Well, Mao though he can drive Americans out of Korea which is not feasible due to logistics. The 9th Corp supposed to stay in Manchuria for awhile and doing some training, prepare for winter clothes, but when their trains pulled in, the order was directly going into North Korea. When the Troops in the borad saw what they wear, they were stunned, and they took off their clothes to give the poor soldiers but that apparently not much. The soliders were in the open for 6 days and without adaquate clothes and food, so when the fighting started, their capacity already reduced somewhere between 30-50%. As matter as fact, there were more casualties due to weather than combat (probably same in Marines side), so even though they originally cut Marines to four piecies, but they cannot break the defense parameters build by over hundreds tanks.

I would not put Marines light infantry compare with CCP's light infantry.

I never insist the withdraw (reacting to severe situation capability), I was more criticising on planning.

You have a strategy sense and tactic sense. The strategy sense is that UN troops being expel out of North Korea. The tactic sense is that Marines get out with half-pieice and could be just finished like 2nd Division. You have a half-full and half-empty look on it. But I disagree that Chinese has the firepower to totally destroy a single Division, and after the first battle on both West and East front, the direction is to only try to destory one Regiment or even smaller unit. The problem for Chinese commanders is that they can only attack during the night and have to finish it during the night before American airpower coming in.

Put in historic perspective, the ability to airleft out of casualties, resupply new personnels and ammo, especially Marines close-in air support, etc. probably are high tech that time. For example, Chinese did destory the last bridge toward Hangnan, but Americans were able to air drop temp bridge to get troops cross.

Numbers is not a sole factor of firepower.

You don't understand Chinese military doctrines. The Chinese saying is that "When generals are on the field, they don't take orders from emperiors." Mao's generals will NOT take his suggestions literarally, instead of depends on battle field situations to make the decision. When Chinese troops didn't get Hangari on time, the commanders know the trap wasn't close. There is no way they can stop Marines run out. The only way is to inflict damage.

The current Chinese military doctrines regarding a war with American (in case of Taiwan) is rather simple--If America has problem to handle 3,000 loses during 4 years of Iraq, they will have problem to handle it within first hour with China.

 

Shaster, in true Chinese military doctrinal tactics you've worn me down with your vast numbers of strangely written and dubiously researched responses. What began as a discussion long ago about Iran's air defenses has descended into a sort of Chinese bluff and deal card game. I'd keep a debate going endlessly if there was any merit in it but with your light and nimble skirting of facts - Generals not taking orders from Mao? Rangers operating in Pakistan and then calling in Chinese reinforcements? Four divisions of one massive army group letting the Marins out of Chosin because . . . well, I'm not even sure about that one. I still can't decipher you. And then suddenly we're onto Taiwan.

I've gone back and read many of your posts and have made a conclusion about you. You are able to draw every argument back to China in some magical way - military, history, politics, NFL football, Wisconsin cheese production. You're based in California yet your English is stilted and strange. I'm going to go out on a limb and identify you as a Chinese immigrant and/or student - or a first generation American - and therefore there is no arguing with you. You have Immigrant Fantasy Syndrome. I know this syndrome well from my grandparents, uncles, aunts, etc. all of whom came from Italy and none of whom could speak rationally about Italy. Everything about Italy was superior, and their slant on history was strange to say the least. Then we'd go to Italy and they'd turn the other way and condemn Italy things, etc. The problem was they were immigrants and therefore they didn't quite fit in either place and felt some need to create a bulwark of superiority in both of the nations they felt separated from.

You seem to be suffering from the same thing. Thus your posts all orbit around China in some vague way.

Then there's your armchair generalling - if I were in charge, I'd have used snipers, etc. blah blah blah. Somewhere in the Sunni triangle of Iraq there are some pretty shamefaced insurgent leaders. Why, they are asking themselves, why oh why did we use our years of actual experience to plan this battle? Why didn't we call in that Chinese guy in California who's read quite a bit about history and tactics on the internet?

 

Interesting discussion.

I don't quite get your point about the heavy artillery. How would it have been helpful if the light stuff (mortars) weren't working ? Is the heavy stuff more or less reliable in bad weather ? And how would they have moved it in position in the mountainous terrain and the snowy weather with the Marines retreating under daytime air support ?

 

You won't get what you're looking for, Doc. Something vague and amorphous will follow - just you wait.

 

Russia was supposed to supply enough air powers to neturalize American air superiority and supply enough heavy artillery and tanks. All those promised were not fillful in the start. Some of the help came later when the battle line fully defined between 37-38 zone. Someone suspected that Stalin didn't have enough confidence on Chinese ability to push Americans out of NK.

Anyway, heavy artillery were supposed to move into the areas that have effective ranges to hit the defined battle area. For that to happen--1) you need to have enough of them; 2) you need to have some of the neturality in the air to let you do that. Of course, if Chinese had the air cover, they may lost the element of surprise. But look on the picture, the whole purpose for China to join the war is to keep Americans south of the 38th parallel. If Chinese didn't need a bloody war for that, they will go for it.

As the mortal I mentioned, it is what called "60 guns" like this one--

http://www.xibaipo.gov.cn/node2/node1318/node1321/node1326/new/bmssl/userobject1ai307663.html

I don't think they can move that during the battle, they had to do it before starting a battle. I think Chinese generals were impressed by few things from Amercain troops:

1) Marines' quick raction under intense fight. Marines were suprised by the attack but reorgnazed pretty quick by using Tanks to form a parameters. Some of lessons fighting against Japanese may contribute to Marines experience.

2)Marines were better to use the combination of firepowers, especially Marine close-in air support, much better than US army troops. Especially when they found out that they were in a trap, they didn't display the kind of panic move as Army units displayed. That I can contribute to their doctrines like landing on a beach, etc.

3) Engineering Corp. General Song though he destroyed all the bridges that will stopped Marines 1400 strong tanks, artlleries, and vechicles and forced Marines to fight without heavy equipment, but US engieering corp was able to build a bridge within one day with all stuff airleft in. That stunned most Chinese troops.

 

We are discussing why many military in the world think that they have a good chance to defeat US troops if they can disable US' technical advantage, then you come up with "Iraq, Russian and Chinese are same..." argument. You need to understand Chinese military doctrine includes all you see from Huns, Mongols, Japanese, North Koreans, and Vietnamese. And the last two wars in Asia is not something US cannot learn from.

About Generals not taking order from Mao, if Marine General Smith didn't take order form Trumen, MacArthur, or even Almond but use his professionalism to do things good for his tropp during a real battle, why you fail to understand this is same for most of good military generals?

Here is the link about that Special Force action story, you can find someone translate for you:

http://web.wenxuecity.com/BBSView.php?SubID=military_best&MsgID=97

Chinese is doing this on their own interests too. 3 of Taliban/Al-Quada training groups are East-Turkistan movements.

Damn. Time to start personal attack? How you know who am I? If I told you that I was a US military force veteran, do you surprise?

 

Are you trying to say that Chinese Light Infantry was/is better than The USMC?

 

I am saying the USMC light infantry has much "heavy" weapons than Chinese light infantry during Korean War.