How Do You Rate the Chances of a Military Confrontation Between the US and Iran?

Iran's society, in political terms, is divided as follows. These divisions are clear based on election results and voting patterns in all elections since 1997, including when reformists were winning big majorities.

1) Ideological Conservatives (army of 10 million)

The total number of supporters this group can muster is around 10 million. They are the die-hard supporters of the revolution, they are most poor even if the foundations and figures that support them are among the most influential in Iran.

This group voted for Nategh Nouri instead of Khatami in 1997; voted for conservatives instead of reformers in 2000 Majlis electoins; voted against Khatami in 2001; constituted the core voting block that saw conservatives win muncipal elections in 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2004. In the recent election, this group voted in the first round for Ahmadinejad, Qalibaf and Larijani, and in the 2nd round for Ahamdinejad.

2) Traditional Conservatives (3-4 million)

The traditional conservatives can count on the support of around 3-4 million voters. Their power comes from the traditional clerics in Iran, along with its close associations with the bazaar and important elements in the regime.

This group actually voted for Khatami in 1997 and 2001, and for independent candidates in 2000. They have been loyal to the regime, under Rafsanjani's guidance, and participated in elections such as 2003 and 2004 even if a group with a somewhat different ideology took the spoils. In 2005, they voted for Rafsanjani in both the first round and the runoff.

3) Moderate Reformers (5-6 million)

There are roughly 5-6 million Iranians, mostly spread across provincial areas, that are conservative but neither are very politicized or ideological (unlike #1 category) nor, unlike the traditional conservative supporters, are they financially well off. This group, by and large, is too unsophisticated to follow the lead of any outside secular groups, although they aren't happy with the way things are. They generally vote for the "least corrupt mullah" or, alternatively, the "most pious, least corrupt" mullah supported candidate. They did vote for Khatami in 1997 and 2001, and for moderate reformers from Khatami's clerical faction in 2000. They did vote in the 2003 and 2004 elections as they were led by regime loyalists, moderate reformers, such as Karrubi. That is who they voted for in the 2005 elections, but chose Ahmadinejad over the "corrupt" Rafsanjani in the runoff.

4) Radical Reformists (6 million)

This group is secularists in orientation, their hero is generally Dr. Mossadegh, and while they were Khatami's most vocal supporters in 1997, they were also the first to be disappointed by the pace of reforms under Khatami. They voted en masse and without real exception for Khatami in 1997 and reformists in 2000 and most voted again for Khatami in 2001. They stopped voting in 2003 and 2004, and were split in this election. Some did not vote, those who did voted mostly for Moin although a few chose to vote for Rafsanjani for pragmatic reasons. In the runoff, this group was split; most voted for Rafsanjani, but some thought that the Ahmadinejad was the bigger "regime outsider" than "Mr. Insider Rafsanjani" and either did not vote or voted for Ahamdinejad.

Unless revitalized, many in this group are totally disillusioned. In a way, Moin was the least they expected and many among them voted only because of the looming foreign threats. Otherwise, most have become too disillusioned to be called reformists anymore. They have either become apathetic or revolutionary.

5) Monarchists (2 million)

The number of regime opponents is speculative, although there are some indications that can be gleaned from several sociological surveys. It would appear that supporters of Reza Pahlavi can still count on something like 2 million supporters inside Iran if there were elections that allowed them to vote for him. However, they are not well organized at all, and their supporters that remain in the country are too apolitical (mostly older middle class, upper middle class) to get down and dirty. Essentially, outside perhaps a few hundred activist (many with connection to foreign agents) the rest are irrelevant politically. They do watch exiled TV stations religiously though. By and large, this group never votes in Iran; a few voted for Khatami in 1997; a trickle (worried they will lose their satellite tvs) voted for Rafsanjani in the runoff.

6) Exiled Secular republicans (no organization in Iran, but radical reformists could be swayed in their direction)

This group is not organized within Iran, but basically can count the radical reformists as their ideological brethren. The only different between them is that the radical reformists are in Iran and have more to lose by non-participation. The ones outside are more prone to "giving up" on the idea of reform and call for a secular democratic republic. Although some in this group were formerly Marxists, most are not, instead being ympathetic to the old National Front and seeing the late Dr. Mossedegh as best representing their aspirations.

7) MEK (less than 1 million, but with some organization routes)

The MEK is literally hated by almost everyone in Iran, but they have had a long history, a well financed organization, once upon a time genuine support among many leftists in Iran. Today, they are a cult; since 1982 have received backing of first Saddam and now Israelis and some of their sympathisers in the US. They are a terrorist group but they the "opposition group for hire" in Iran.

The rest of Iran basically either are not into politics or go with the wind. A few who are not into the groups mentioned above belong to separatist groups.

 

I nukes are taken out of the equation, Iran would be able to bring Israel to its knees in less than 3 days.

Israel's "real airforce" has no reach to do much against Iran. A few dozen of its aircraft have the range to fly to and back from Iran, but they won't make it back as Iran has very sophisticated air defenses (including S-300 ground to air missiles) and its air force is more capable than what you imagine.

All of Iran's "old airframes" have been renovated, updated, and other than the frames, everything else in them is new. Of course Iran also has the Mig29, which it has improved from the export version offered by the Russians. We also have some decent Chinese fighters.

The latter, indeed, offer a good clue as to the effectiveness of Iran's "old airframes". From antedotal evidence, it appears to me that even today Iranian pilots prefer to be assigned to F-14 squadrons than those with newer aircraft.

 

Ben,

I am not here to engage in "propaganda games", as I don't think the fate of anything is decided on "bigsoccer". Unlike some people, I care about being accurate, exchanging information based on the best available evidence.

The same way I knew that the "political projections" of the crowd you trust is entirely ridiculous and off, I know that their "military projections" are off. I have read for many years what they have said, compared it to what Iranian military analysts and planners were saying, and between the two, the latter was usually proven right.

Of course, we have not had combat to test the proposition at issue here, but given the "credibility" gap on all their other pronouncements, and the rather credible (and realistic) projections from Iran, and just putting 2 plus 2 together, I can come up with my own conclusions.

In the meantime, guarantee that there will be no "nukes" used; guarantee to leave the US out of it; and I am sure Iran would take you up on your offer and would relish the idea of testing your theories. According to the analysis by Iran's military command, Israel would be defeated in 3 days. Since they can kind of explain what they have in mind, as opposed to making incoherent noises, I kind trust their assessment.

 

My understanding of the issue is that Iran does have issues as far as how many sorties some of these planes might be able to fly in combat situations. Yet, since the "heightened tensions", Iran has been flying a rather good number of sorties using these planes, which itself was contrary to what "experts" from outside were saying Iran was capable of.

That said, Iran is undergoing major renovation of its air force. The experience of taking those old frames, and making them operational, has taught Iran a lot. The Shafagh project indeed is near completion already wtih a report that the porotype will be flying this year.

I read everything about Iran that I can find, including from Jane's.

It proves that those "old airframes" are still pretty good planes, because we all know the capabilities of the Mig29. Rather good planes too. Iran has extended the range of the Mig29, but while I don't know much about the issue, apparently the "cockpit" is not designed all that well. I read Iran is working on fixing the "cockpit" and vision issues with that plane too.

I am going to post some recent pictures of Iran's "old airframes". Since you seen to have some knowledge in this area, you tell if they seem rusted and not air worthy. I am a novice on military issues, just going based on the sources that have proven more credible overtime.