Goal contribution of the best players

I did not mean they were. But it is clear that the same Netherland 74 that you mentioned spurred a totalvoetbal revolution that was based on the premise that (ideally) players should be perfectly interchangeable, all contributing the same. Of course it is not that before the seventies managers and players had not yet understood the team play nature of the game. But I would say that slowly but surely the game has become more and more collective over the decades. Something that in any case would imply, say, a 5-to-10 difference in GC% given same player prowess, not more.

 

Hungary 50s had a forward line of for example Budai, Hidegkuti, Czibor, Kocsis and Puskas (I've shown it as 3-2 i.e the first 3 names coming from behind the other 2 generally, and then Bozsik would regularly join in too) all combining and trying to create chances for each other.

 

Here is an AI overview re: Juventus 1951/52 for example too (I've read similar from non-AI sources before, and I suppose AI just takes things from elsewhere anyway):

The 1951/52 Juventus season, marked by the arrival of Hungarian coach György Sárosi, was characterized by an aggressive, high-scoring, and technically refined attacking style that saw the team win the Scudetto while scoring nearly 100 goals. Giampiero Boniperti acted as the intelligent, versatile fulcrum of this attack, thriving alongside Danish goalscorer John Hansen in a system that emphasized rapid, efficient movement and precise passing.
Playing Style and Tactics (1951/52)

• High-Octane Attack: Under Sárosi, Juventus played a thrilling, attacking brand of football that focused on maximizing the talents of their elite forward line, resulting in a dominant season.
• Fluidity in Attack: The frontline was not rigid; it featured a, "Trio Magico" (Magical Trio) dynamic of Danish imports John Hansen (aerial/clinical finisher) and Karl Aage Præst (wing play) complementing Boniperti.
• Midfield Solidity: The attack was supported by experienced players like Carlo Parola, who provided the defensive balance and transition to allow the forwards to thrive.
• Result-Oriented: The team was efficient and deadly, often dictating the rhythm of the game through intelligent play rather than just raw speed.

Giampiero Boniperti's Role

• The "Playmaker-Forward": Already a proven goalscorer, by the early 50s, Boniperti began evolving from a pure striker into a versatile "pivot" of the attack.
• Intelligent Creator: He was known for his incredible vision, positioning, and ability to "direct traffic," according to descriptions of his, "clear ideas" on the pitch.
• Technically Complete: He was versatile enough to play as a center-forward, inside forward, or on the wing, shooting efficiently with both feet.
• Supporting the Trio: While John Hansen took the primary scoring role (30 goals in 51/52), Boniperti acted as the crucial link-man, creating spaces and feeding the attack.

Coach György Sárosi's Influence

• Hungarian Influence: Sárosi brought a, Central European, attacking philosophy, encouraging, rapid, intelligent attacking play.
• Immediate Impact: After taking over, he stabilized the team, leading them to a 6-0 derby victory against Torino and securing the league title with a 7-point gap over AC Milan.

The 1951/52 Juventus team was a formidable force, combining the clinical, technical precision of Scandinavian and Italian players with a, proactive, goal-driven approach led by Sarosi's, tactical, acumen.

 

This is another similar one (highlighting a bit more right winger Muccinelli and the other Hansen who was nominally also a 'forward' I suppose: technically I think it might be that Boniperti would often be seen as nominally the centre forward and John Hansen inside left but the summary is realistic anyway I think because it's said that Boniperti was given even a freer role to roam around under Sarosi than before I think, in a way playing as a throw-back to some 1930s centre forwards, or perhaps in some respects playing a bit like Cruyff even, although the Netherlands in 1974 used 4-3-3 not an older system with more players committed as attackers primarily):

During the 1951/52 season, Juventus reclaimed the Serie A title with a thrilling, high-scoring playing style defined by a potent Danish-Italian attacking core. Under the leadership of Hungarian coach György Sárosi, the team adopted a fluid and offensive-minded approach that saw them score 98 goals in 38 league matches, nearly reaching the century mark.

Tactical Philosophy
The team's success was built on a "thrilling" and "breathtaking" offensive rhythm.

• Hungarian Influence: Coach Sárosi, a legendary former player known for his own tactical intelligence and versatility, shaped a side that valued constant movement and technical proficiency.
• The "Trio Magico" (The Magic Trio): The tactical heart of the team was the partnership between the "three Danes"—John Hansen, Karl Aage Præst, and Karl Aage Hansen—and Italian icon Giampiero Boniperti.
• Fluid Attack: The front line was highly dynamic. Ermes Muccinelli and Carl Aage Præst provided width and service from the wings, while John Hansen acted as the primary finisher.

Key Player Roles in the 1951/52 System
The 1951/52 squad featured a blend of aerial dominance, technical skill, and tactical discipline.

Player Primary Role Key Contribution
John Hansen Centre-Forward / Striker Capocannoniere (Top Scorer) with 30 goals; known for elite aerial ability and being in the "right spot".
Giampiero Boniperti Inside-Forward / Second Striker The "connective tissue" of the team; used his intelligence and vision to link midfield and attack.
Carl Aage Præst Left Winger Provided pace and high-quality crosses to fuel the high-scoring front line.
Ermes Muccinelli Right Winger A creative force who freely scored and assisted throughout the campaign.
Carlo Parola Defensive Midfield / Captain The defensive anchor (famous for his overhead kick) who provided stability behind the attacking talent.
Karl Aage Hansen Central Midfielder A vital part of the Danish core, facilitating the transition from defense to the clinical attack.

Season Highlights

• Goal Mastery: The team secured the Scudetto by a margin of 7 points over Milan, finishing with a goal difference of +58.
• Derby Dominance: A defining moment of their style was a 6-0 victory in the Derby della Mole against Torino.

 

Not necessarily. As you quoted-me, he turned a great team into a dynastie. He were a ceiling raiser. In a hypothetical scenario where Ronaldo didn't move to Real Madrid the team would probably build around Kaká or Benzema, or they could bring Neymar to be the focal point from santos before barcelone who knows. I don't think without Ronaldo but with Benzema, Di Maria, Kaká, Ozil and then Bale, James, etc... the team would score the same as before/after Ronaldo. But I still think they would score less than they did with him. And I don't think the gap would be a 0.2 gpg difference as @Trachta10 said. But all this is in the theory territory as we really don't know cause it didn't happen. What actually happened is Ronaldo came and scored more than anyone else

 

You're strawmanning me and then punching this strawman cause it's easier. I never said "player x has 1.2 g/a and his team scored 2.7 gpg so without him his team would score 1.5 gpg". In fact I agree with what you said. That other player would be the focal point or even the team would play more collectively and various players would score few goals and the team would still mantain a high output. I only disagree the gap would be so small without an atg goalscorer in the molds of Ronaldo. And I'm not saying he were the sole reason for Real Madrid increase/decrease in their output before/after his move but he played a big role in spiking their goal production.

 

I suppose Di Stefano's goals share were higher before Puskás' arrive. Same as Kubala before Czibor and Kocsis arrivals

 

It is difficult to interpret what these numbers mean. Whether it is their relative hierarchy within the team, or their actual individual form, or some sort of gravitational weight that takes into account the forms and hierarchy of themselves and their teammates.

If Alfredo Di Stefano and Omar Sivori are apt comparisons in terms of the rough landscape of their era, career pathways in terms of starting out in Argentine leagues and ending up competing versus one another in the European Cups for their respective European domestic champions, how would you personally interpret their GC%, and how much of it is influenced by individual form, team structure, level of teammates, and playstyle?

Why is Omar Sivori higher in GC% score than Alfredo Di Stefano even before the arrival of Ferenc Puskas? Is it his individual capacity, the level of their respective teammates (what would be the rough GC% figures for players such as John Charles or Hector Rial), relative focus on on-the-ball actions? Why doesn't this trend repeat if we wind back the timeframe back to their days at River Plate?



It seems they both played for championship-vying team in River Plate during the earlier stages of their careers. Were their roles drastically different, from how they were used for their respective European teams?

Do you perhaps have any GC% figures for some of their more prominent teammates?

 

Yes, true. It can be Di Stefano was carrying the team from an output perspective more earlier in his RM time, although of course they didn't reach the same level of success in that period (not forgetting the European Cup didn't yet exist of course and he did take them to the Liga title in 53/54, even if the goal/point scoring of RM didn't leap hugely over the season compared to 52/53 - he was certainly regarded as a star and to an extent already all-timer I know anyway at the end of that season, and praised for juggles/skills and solo play as well as team play and scoring).

Kubala had some injury issues but yeah once Barca had the Hungarians, Suarez had emerged and there were players such as Martinez, Evaristo too then he played more games for example as right winger I know.

 

From what I understand Di Stefano's role/style was probably more different (in a way it makes sense because of the timespan I suppose though even, with Sivori moving straight from River to Juve).- being more of an outright centre forward (having been selected to take what was Pedernera's place, but to play with more of a 'striker's' emphasis because of a tactical decision about how River's system should evolve to counter opponent tactics against them IIRC) and using a lot of speed and running (not to say having no skill or not trying any individual moves/tricks with the ball whatsoever, but maybe more like the Vardy example you referred to at least compared to playing arguably somewhat like a mix of a Hidegkuti&Neeskens, or older-Kane&Matthaus later on as famed RM player I suppose).

I have less of a clear idea about Sivori though as River player, and potentially he'd have had less emphasis on scoring goals himself if he was one of two inside forwards, as when he was at Juve I think he was more like the second striker and the other inside forward, being Boniperti late in his career, was specialising more than ever in creating and linking I think, so more what we'd expect from a playmaking number 10 in recent times (Boniperti, for clarification, I mean)....

 

Alfredo Di Stefano's GC% makes sense in my mind, it is Omar Sivori's erratic numbers that makes less sense to me.

1) Level of teammates that occupy the role of deciding plays in the final third

When Ferenc Puskas joins Real Madrid to operate in the final third of the pitch, Alfredo Di Stefano's GC% numbers go down as one might expect.

Omar Sivori's GC% figures for his Juventus years in particular, even without the pre-assists, seem to surpass 50%, that is a huge jump from his figure during River Plate days. He played with John Charles who was a prolific scorer during that period also, so I do not understand the noticeable sudden jump in GC% values during his Juventus years, if it comes down merely to the overall level of forwards within the system.

2) Playstyle

I think players who demand a lot of the ball in the final third, by their nature, not necessarily their pragmatic value, tends to benefit from GC% numbers, but as I understand it, Omar Sivori looks like the type (without knowing his usage rate statistics or share of possessions lost) that might be more of an on-the-ball type. It is difficult for me to imagine Sivori having the kind of on-the-ball proficiency and overall usage of empty spaces without the ball to the levels of Alfredo Di Stefano, without finding more success overall.

The thing is, if styles influence the numbers, it should translate more into their River Playe days also. It is not like Alfredo Di Stefano is frequently mentioned as the greatest River Plate player of all-times. They were both young, and unfinished in their development, but the discrepancy does seem large.

3) Relative position on the pitch

I think there is a sweet spot for GC%, perhaps the second-striker role, where you are not pushed too far up the pitch to pin the centre-backs, and not too deep where your goal-scoring opportunities are limited to strikes from afar. I understand how Alfredo Di Stefano may have been used more as a goal-scorer than Omar Sivori, but I am struggling to find the exact role Omar Sivori played within River Plate in particular, whether he was a forward player who was not yet a potent enough goal-threat, or whether he actually played closer to a midfield role.

This is probably the reasoning I hope clears my confusion over the Omar Sivori figures, and maybe Omar Sivori was not used as the main source of goals during his River Plate years, but I do not know whether that means he only could score a lot in certain systems, or whether River Plate had a massive presence in the forward lines that relegated Omar Sivori to a deeper role.

Due to the lack of data-sets, knowing precisely what the numbers represent has been a massive problem for me.

 

Maybe using AI summaries is too much in the realm of short-cutting research @Letmepost (and for Juve 1951/52 I'd already found similar things on real web pages and historic references etc), but for what' it's worth I got this result (note that of course the 1957 trio referred to is for Argentina 1957 in the Copa America, not River Plate - that Argentine side also had attacking wingers though, in Corbatta and Cruz):

"In 1956, Omar Sívori was a key member of the Club Atlético River Plate side that won the Argentine Primera División, playing as a left-sided inside forward (often described as an attacking midfielder or secondary striker).

1956 Formation Context

• Tactical Role: Sívori functioned in a highly creative role, operating on the left side of the attack, often feeding or playing alongside legendary striker Ángel Labruna.
• "Angels with Dirty Faces": While this specific nickname is often associated with the 1957 trio, the core of that attack—Sívori, Humberto Maschio, and Antonio Angelillo—was developing during this period, with Sívori providing the creative flair, dribbling, and scoring ability (left-footed).
• Key 1956 Personnel: Alongside Sívori and Labruna, the 1956 team often featured attackers such as Félix Loustau and Roberto Zárate.

1956 Squad Highlight
Sívori was essential to the 1956 Primera División championship, one of three consecutive titles he won with River Plate (1955, 1956, 1957) before his world-record move to Juventus.

• Known Lineup (vs. Boca): A 1956 lineup against rivals Boca Juniors included the attacking combination of Labruna, Vairo, Sívori, Cucchiaroni, and Zárate.

Sívori's 1956 form was defined by his quick acceleration, dribbling, and trademark nutmegs."


For comparison a summary about Juventus 1957/58:

"The 1957/58 Juventus season marked a turning point in the club's history, defined by the formation of "The Holy Trident" (Il Trio Magico): John Charles, Omar Sívori, and Giampiero Boniperti. Under coach Ljubiša Broćić, Juventus adopted a dominant, attacking style that blended British physical power with South American flair and Italian tactical intelligence, resulting in the 1957/58 Serie A title—their first in six years.
Playing Style Components (1957-58)

• John Charles ("Il Gigante Buono"): As the central striker, Charles was the team's linchpin and top scorer (28 goals in his first season). His style was characterized by immense aerial power, strength, and the ability to hold up the ball, allowing him to dominate rugged Italian defenders without resorting to dirty tactics.
• Omar Sívori ("The Maradona of the Sixties"): A diminutive, left-footed forward, Sívori provided the creative spark, dribbling ability, and flair. Known for his "audacious" style, he used quick changes of direction, feints, and his trademark nutmeg (the tunnel) to terrorize defenses.
• Giampiero Boniperti: Already a club legend, Boniperti adapted to a deeper role as an inside-right or playmaker to accommodate the new arrivals. He acted as the intelligent connector, providing vision, leadership, and precise passing to feed Charles and Sívori.

Tactical Approach

• The Trident's Synergy: The trio was highly complementary. Charles occupied central defenders with his physical presence, while Sívori created chaos with his dribbling, and Boniperti orchestrated from midfield.
• Immediate Impact: In 1957/58, the team operated with a "thundering" offensive approach, often overpowering opponents.
• Mental Toughness: Despite the rough treatment often received in Serie A, the 1957/58 team was known for resilience, with Charles leading by example through his calm, composed sportsmanship.

The 1957/58 season, where they won the Scudetto with an eight-point margin over Fiorentina, solidified this trio as one of the most iconic in Italian football history. "

Here is the DBS Calcio Juventus 1957/58 Serie A summary:
dbscalcio.it/team_search.php?team_name=Juventus&season_year=1957%2F58
I guess it can be interesting in theory to compare the grades to the end product/contributions (by clicking on the names and then the game tallies), although of course that's just the first season of Sivori (and Charles) and he probably peaked early in the 60s.

 

If the AI summarization is correct, Omar Sivori did play a similar inside-forward role? Rather than being asked more midfield duties. It could have been other factors at play then.

Given the fact that Omar Sivori's peak as a goal-scorer seems to coincide with John Charles' tenure at Juventus, it would be interesting to see how much they assisted one another.

It would not be the first time, a technical player combined well with a physical specimen that created spaces off their raw presence alone.

A player like John Charles winning signficant number of aerial duels, would contort the defensive shape in a manner that maximizes space for Omar Sivori-types to operate in.

 

These can help a bit I think:
juventus goals 1957-58 season - YouTube (and similar for other seasons)
Omar Sivori - 147 goals in Serie A (part 1/2): 1-65 (Juventus 1957-1960)

I would think, and maybe the AI summary implies it, he could be more of a second striker in Juventus (and perhaps less confined to the left side of the pitch? - I'm not sure though and certainly inside forwards did roam to both sides a bit even when there was an inside right and inside left in similar roles). Not just to stick up for the playmakers lol, but don't forget Boniperti's role referred to (but yes Charles's role could be very significant too, even if on the video below I put two 'cute/clever assists' so not typical 'big centre forward ones' as such, and neither to Sivori):
Best 2 Goals, 2 Assists of batch 4 of a selection of top players of the 2nd half of 20th century
John Charles (Goals from 3:30, assists from 3:38)

 

I briefly watched both John Charles' Serie A goal compilations and Omar Sivori's Serie A goal compilations, and the fact is that both sources are quite incomplete and difficult-to-utilize in terms of being video record proof for tallying assists for a certain player. I would guess that the Omar Sivori statistics posted by Trachta10 were tallied from written newspaper records, or personal collections, rather than readily available YouTube videos.

Omar Sivori - 147 goals in Serie A (part 1/2): 1-65 (Juventus 1957-1960)

The above does seem to be one of the examples of John Charles assisting Omar Sivori, but I can't tell without the shirt-number, and I am going mostly off by the tall stature. A lot of both player's goals have a surprisingly high number of rebounds, but without full footage to double check for shirt numbers leading up to the goal, I really cannot make any meaningful tallies.

John Charles was mentioned ahead of Boniperti, because I feel the toolkits he brings to the table, might have had the most impactful change in terms of game set-up, because it seems none of Omar Sivori's River Plate teammates in the forward line had the sort of height and athletic presence John Charles had. It could very be the case that Boniperti individually linked-up better with his forward partnerships, for more combined goal-involvements, but I was think more along the lines of what can explain Omar Sivori's drop in GC%, and what sort of teammate could bring-about that change.

Basically, I am thinking maybe it was at least partly the physical presence of John Charles that aided Omar Sivori's gameplay. Especially if he was part of the forward line for the River Plate teams also.

 

Yes, I feel fairly sure that was Charles with the header-assist you picked out.

This page I had read previously, so it led me on some things:
The Ball Tells: Giampiero BONIPERTI

This indicates how Boniperti's role had changed too I think:
Pes Miti del Calcio - View topic - Giampiero BONIPERTI 1947-1952 & 1957-1960

But yeah surely Charles and Sivori formed a very effective partnership in attack, and sivori would be able to 'play off' the Welshman and utilise spaces because of him yeah. Boniperti seemed to have valued both play6ers a lot, and apparently (with hesitation about making any list/choice seemingly though) put them top 2 in a poll in the 80s:
Juan Alberto Schiaffino - how great was he? | Page 2 | BigSoccer Forum
(see posts 42. 43, 44 for example)

 

This formation might represent Sivori's earlier time as River player quite well I guess (and remembering that Labruna had always been a goalscoring type of inside left, also back in the days of La-Maquina with Moreno and Pedernera, while Gomez was an individualistic/virtuoso kind of striker I think who mostly played in the attacking zone):

 

So Giampiero Boniperti feels like he was a half-winger/half-midfielder, Sivori was half-winger/half-forward, and John Charles was the striker.



As I understand, River Plate used a five man forward line-up.

Racing Club vs River Plate # 2 - Campeonato de Primera Division 1956

Santiago Vernazza, Enrique Omar Sivori, Eliseo R. Prado, Angel Amadeo Labruna y Roberto Héctor Zarate.

60 years after River champion of 1956

Santiago Vernazza, Eliseo Prado, Enrique Omar Sívori, Ángel Labruna and Roberto Zárate

Both these sources seem to list in the order of right to left, and I am not sure, but it does look like Omar Sivori might be one of the inside-forwards, so doesn't that mean he played roughly the same position as he did at Juventus, or was he used more like the winger?

Anyway, the point I was trying to say that was that his probably was one of the three most advanced forwards for both these teams, in terms of proximity to the box. Which does seem to align with the formation you posted above.

 

I dont interpret total football quite the same way. Premise on perfect interchangeability I agree on, but not the same contribution. Those are not quite the same things.

Because striving for perfect interchangeability is practically of value, but striving for the equal contribution is practically counter-productive at certain point. Total football is not about eradicating roles within team altogether or about being fair by giving everyone equal time play in each role, but about striving for developing individuals in a way that they can execute multiple ("adjacent") roles, because doing so introduces fluidity to a team in a way that makes them react better and quicker in chaotic situations on the pitch than team with rigid roles.

It was born from a recognition that football is naturally dynamic and chaotic, meaning initial formations often break in a way that left fullback, for example, finds himself in a left winger position with a lot of space. In a rigid team, when that happens, left fullback hesitates to exploit open space in which he naturally found himself in, because it is not his role to dribble like left winger per se. In a fluid team, such (countless) instances are opportunities to quickly react against an unprepared defensive structure. Rigidity makes you slow, fluidity makes you quick. And since football is very dynamic and chaotic at times, ability to quickly react to changing circumstances on the pitch, is essential aspect of playing and often the difference between losing and winning. This is why total football has become a cornerstone of modern football.

The shift that total football made was from thinking of football as a rigid role-based execution to understanding the necessity of knowing how to do mamy things on the pitch.

For example, central defenders were percieved as defenders, so they had to know how to tackle, mark, intercept, and all other things associated with their primary role. On-ball ability in a central defender was considered a minor bonus if not completely irrelevant. That is a very rigid and narrow conceptualization of central defender role. Broadly speaking, it was believed that attackers are used for attacking and defenders are used for defending with minimal or zero overlap.

This is exactly what the total football revolution was. Bursting the conceptual bubble of rigid role-based game. What turned out to be much more effective conceptualization of football is fluid understanding of roles. Attack starts with defenders, defending starts with attackers. Everyone contributes to all phases all the time. No discrete separation between defending and attacking.

This reconceptualization of roles did not lead to complete erradication of roles and structures, but to more dynamic understanding of roles and the scope of each role. The scope of each role got wider.

Ideally, each player should be able to play whatever role he finds himself in, but practically speaking this is not feasible, so what happened is a rise of demand to be able to play in multiple adjacent positions that are reasonably plausible to occur for given role. For example, left fullback needs to have a bit of left winger in him or left central midfielder/def midfielder or left central defender. Because finding hismelf in these positions/roles is reasonably plausible. Of course, left fullback who can also be able to play as a striker or a right winger, if he happened to find himself in that situation, is better, but likelihood of that happening becomes so small that it is practically irrelavant. So ideally, perfect interchangeability is North Star, but in practise, the result of the total football revolution is an expansion of responsibility of each role across the pitch.

The equal contribution of each player is not the goal of total football, because trying to optimize for equality is not effective in practise, because it is always the case that players are better at some things than others. Trying to artificially flaten ways in which each player contributes to the game is countrary to the truth that players are not equally good at all aspects of football. Artificially equalizing contribution and time spent in each role leaves on the table niche advantages that each player bring. Essentially, tactical systems are about optimizing for niche strengths each player brings while remaining fluid so you can take advantage of dynamic nature of football. Total football doesnt result in flatening contribution across players.

Regarding GC%, the difference between tactical systems of the past and modern ones is the level of sophistication. In both cases, the goal was finding arrangement of involvement that wins. They were both optimized for that.

The difference is that in the past, the way they would involve their star player was through very rudimentary patterns. The reason why rudimentary tactics doesnt mean higher GC% is because rudimentary attacking patterns would always be counter acted by rudimentary defensive structure.

This is simply game dynamics. If a team of the past would always pass the ball to a single star player, they become predictable in the way they attack (irrelavant of the level of sophistication) and oppositions adapt to it by marking the star player. Any time team focuses their pattern of play through a single funnel (star player) they are easily neutralized. So even in rudimentary tactical systems, it is not straightforward to simply spam your star player. There is always a sweatspot on how much it is optimal to involve your star player. There is too much and too little in both cases.

Modern teams are better at finding their star player in promising positioms through sophsticated patterns of play, but also modern teams have more sophisticated ways of defending. Again resulting in a balnce of how much it is optimal to include your star player into the game.

It is not necessarly true that optimal balance of involvement of a star player in the past was much greater. It cant be easily inferred by considering level of sophistication.

 

Thanks for your input, but since I am trying to configure the relative magnitude of the components that might make the GC% figures different, even if the same actual pragmatic value was provided for the team, there are still unanswered questions.

Essentially, none of the selected timeframes from Alfredo Di Stefano surpasses Omar Sivori's peak, and this happens to be the case despite Alfredo Di Stefano seemingly having a significant GC% head-start during the earlier phases of their career. There must be further explanations as to why this occured, other than raw playstyle, or developmental differences.

1. Alfredo Di Stefano

I have mentioned before that I think Alfredo Di Stefano is a notch above Johan Cruyff in terms of his off-the-ball value, especially if we take into consideration how backwards the tactical movements were back then. So we are essentially in agreement that GC% does not capture all of his greater value, especially if we emphasize his ability to needle a deadly pass in the final third, which might be more of a Ferenc Puskas metric.

Alfredo Di Stefano's GC% figures seems more constant, despite the variations caused by age, strength of teammates, and his relative on-the-ball hierarchy. The fact that any selected years (of the same duration of sample size) for Alfredo Di Stefano, still lags behind Omar Sivori's years at Juventus, is somewhat annoying, but having elements further explained would do away with that.

From what I've read, both played in championship winning River Plate squads, and have respectable, but maybe not godlike River Plate legacies that surpass the the earlier legacies of Moreno or Pedernera. So it was personally surprising to me, that Alfredo Di Stefano had the head-start in terms of GC%, but then got surpassed later on in Europe (despite Alfredo Di Stefano's seemingly meteoric rise at Real Madrid), suggesting an added external variable change, rather than purely stunted growth from Alfredo Di Stefano, or superlative growth from Omar Sivori as an individual player.

I have already discussed the formation, and roles asked by the team, but it does look like Omar Sivori was still asked to similar tasks (similar enough, to degrees that might not fully explain the GC% value difference by simple differences in position) as an inside-forward for River Plate also. Yes, it looks like he played closer to goal, right behind John Charles, which may not be the case at River Plate, but Alfredo Di Stefano had been dropping even further away from goal during the various stages of his career, without losing significant values in terms of GC%

2. Omar Sivori

If it was solely due to playstyle and their relative focus on what to do on the pitch, it doesn't quite explain their numbers at River Plate, Omar Sivori was relatively speaking, looked more comfortable with the ball in close quaters, probably the more potent dribbler and perhaps more creative and imaginative on-the-ball even back then, no matter what his age. From what I understand, he was great during the South American championship of 1957 also, so it sounds much of what made Omar Sivori great at Juventus, was still around in copious amounts back then also.

I am assuming it has to do with the symbiotic or more unsynchronized relationships between his teammates, and the share of on-the-ball resources, which might impact Omar Sivori's playstyle more than Alfredo Di Stefano, which is why I asked for GC% values of his teammates at both River Plate, and Juventus, but I guess that is a question that will be properly answered in another day.

 

Playing style has nothing to do with GC% beyond certain playstyles being more suitable for certain roles that have higher or lower expected GC%. So certain playing style can be pre-selected for certain role. But, a role within team is the bottom line that needs to be considered in analyzing GC%. Playing style is redundant variable.

Player in a counter-attacking team can have expected GC% of 50% or 50% in a possession-based team. It is irrelevant how it is done as long as their given role is expected to produce the same expected GC%.

Formula for GC% is very simple:

Goals + assists + pre-assists / total team goals

So there are 3 variables that determine GC% value:

1. Role within a team that is either more or less aligned with expected contributions via goals, assists or pre-assissts

2. Player's performance. Contributing above, at the level or bellow expectany given a role.

3. Performance of teammates independent of the player in question.

Any GC% value is a product of these 3 variables and ALL answers lie within analysis of them. GC% is bounded by mathematics.