FSU Politics/Current Events V

The first time around they suffered staggering losses and the were the far better equipped side were they not?

 

Yes but they won't fight as hard for NK as the Armenians would, and it's a matter of fact that fighting on your own soil is a big advantage in war. Motivated troops mean everything. The Armenian military leadership is far more savvy as well due to experience in Afghanistan.

I definitely don't see the Azeris wiping the floor with them.

 

I do realize that the first time was in 1990s but the Soviets (and Russians) originally did side with Azeris and had left them 90% of Trancaucasian military district's hardware. Armenians had defeated the superior Azeri forces then with not much more than bare hands. I think Dimuha is right about the motivation: The 90% ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorny-Karabagh means far more for the Armenians populating it than the militant Azeris from the neighboring regions. Defending your home is usually all the motivation you may ever need.

 

By the way:

I know, it is just Wiki, but the article and this statement are cited.

 

But how different can it be now? It is never going to be on Russia vs. georgia scale.

 

I wrote a paper on Human rights in the North Caucasus if anyone is interested. Quite lengthy.

IGNORED BY RUSSIAN LAW & ON THE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE​

Human Rights in the Russian North Caucasus​

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INTRODUCTION​

Chechnya’s battle with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in “butchery and savagery on a scale and intensity [of] World War II.”[FONT=&quot][1][/FONT] With an estimated 100,00 persons killed so far in Chechnya since 1994, the last few years under President Kadyrov regime have seemed to be a time of relative tranquillity for the region. However, the apparent quieting of insurgency in Chechnya and the spill over of violence to the other nearby regions has not been without a continued cost to individual human rights.
A United Kingdom Parliamentary Human Rights group (PHRG) went on a fact-finding mission to Chechnya in February 2010.[FONT=&quot][2][/FONT] A Chechen told the group, "Russian laws do not protect me.”[FONT=&quot][3][/FONT] In fact, it is hard to believe Chechnya is a part of Russia, who’s Constitution (Art. 2) proclaims: “Man, his rights and freedoms shall be the supreme value. It shall be a duty of the state to recognize, respect and protect the rights and liberties of man and citizen.” [FONT=&quot][4][/FONT] It is even harder to imagine that Chechnya is in fact, via Russia, a part of the Council of Europe who’s Mission is to “to reinforce democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”[FONT=&quot][5][/FONT] The Council of Europe, created in the wake of World War II, is now home to violence reminiscent of the last world war.
Unfortunately, the international community has followed Russia’s lead in deeming it an internal matter of Russian affairs, and the conflict in the North Caucasus has been largely ignored.[FONT=&quot][6][/FONT] In Dagestan, a neighboring republic to Chechnya, President Magomedsalam Magomedov himself depicted it both a problem with insurgency and the enforcement.[FONT=&quot][7][/FONT] In Chechnya, Kadyrov has created an “atmosphere of fear and terror created by the security forces' scant regard for human rights” while being condoned by Moscow. [FONT=&quot][8][/FONT] In Ingushetia, another Northern Caucasian area, 184 people have disappeared in kidnappings by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia since 2002.[FONT=&quot][9][/FONT] And by UN Charter, Russia is justified in military action as a country is legally entitled to defend any threat to its territorial integrity as a matter of domestic concern.[FONT=&quot][10][/FONT]
The PHRG has called on a need to act in response to the "dire state of human rights."[FONT=&quot][11][/FONT] There have been positive steps taken, most notably the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which has recognized the basic rights such as the right to life which have been flagrantly violated in Chechnya. However, security forces continue to engage in acts of serious human rights violations in Chechnya including torture, enforced disappearances, and unlawful executions while being condemned for the failure to offer domestic remedies.
This paper will consider the conflict in the North Caucasus in light of the failures of the government at all levels to guarantee the individual rights proclaimed in the Russian Constitution and even the most basic human rights recognized by international norms to which Russia agreed when acceding to the Council of Europe. It will focus primarily on Chechnya, the breakaway republic that has been the spark to re-ignite the fire in the region. It is also where Russia has tested a possible solution for the region through its pet dictator President Kadyrov, who himself is responsible for many brutal acts of violence. However as the repression in Chechnya and the unifying spread of militant Islam area has caused the conflict to spread to the neighboring regions. This paper will touch on issues in those regions when relevant, most notably in the most violent republic today, Dagestan, and the tiny but very dangerous Ingushetia.
First, I will trace the origin of the conflict in the region as the historical animosity and cultural clashes between the North Caucasus and Russia play a large role in the conflict today. I will then discuss the political situation in Chechnya and its place within the political infrastructure of the Russian Federation. I will then discuss current human rights abuses in the North Caucasus as well as the actual extent of insurgent violence in the region. Next I will discuss Russian law and its relationship with human rights and the European Union. I will then analyze the impact of the European Court of Human Rights on both the Russian Federation and Chechnya. I will then consider the dangers of the cycle of violence perpetrated by security forces and Kadyrov, followed by a look to the future to see if there is any chance in the foreseeable future that Russia and European citizens in North Caucasus can receive the basic rights they are entitled to under the Russian Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights.

HISTORY AND ORIENTATION​

The North Caucasus lies between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea in European Russia.[FONT=&quot][12][/FONT] The Northern Caucasus region is included in the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the Russian Federation and includes seven republics, most notably the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan.[FONT=&quot][13][/FONT] The region is extremely diverse with multiple ethnicities and linguistic groups.[FONT=&quot][14][/FONT] In 1859, the Russian government through a sheer show force, overtook the territories and claimed sovereignty over the people across the North Caucasus. [FONT=&quot][15][/FONT]
Chechnya epitomizes the fight against Russian domination of the region and the strong loyalties of the indigenous people to their culture and land. The culture is one based around extended clans of patrilineal lines tied to a particular geographical location.[FONT=&quot][16][/FONT] Clans formed the groups and served as the political and economic unit as each was often isolated from the next geographical region.[FONT=&quot][17][/FONT] Sunni Islam in the region was crossed with a Christian influence, and it was not until Russia attempted to expand to the North Caucasus that Islam became more entrenched as a resistance to Russian Christian rule.[FONT=&quot][18][/FONT]
The history of conflict between the Chechens dates back to the late 1700s, accounting for over 200 years of bloodshed. Russia’s first incursions were likely a part of the Tsars plan “extend their geographical sphere of influence” and protect key trading routes.[FONT=&quot][19][/FONT] In 1783 and after a long guerilla war, the Chechens and Ingush fought off the first Russia incursion.[FONT=&quot][20][/FONT] The Russians pressed onward using brutality towards the people they considered as foreign, and when victory was achieved they deported 600,000-1,000,000 Islamic people and attempted to resettle the area with Russians.[FONT=&quot][21][/FONT] The area was ripe for an ongoing and vicious battle between the two sides.
An attempt to form an autonomous independent Republic during the Russian Revolution resulted in a Bolshevik military occupation of the region.[FONT=&quot][22][/FONT] During World War II some Chechens supported the invading Germans, and in 1944 the Soviets deported the entirety of the Chechen and Ingush populations to Kazakhstan where nearly one-third of the population died amidst the forced journey and Soviet atrocities. [FONT=&quot][23][/FONT] They returned home thirteen years later, a decimated people to a decimated land.
In the early 1990s, with the Soviet Union in the midst of a coup in Moscow, Chechen nationalist Jokhar Dudaev was elected President and declared Chechnya a sovereign state.[FONT=&quot][24][/FONT] Chechnya was in fact independent, from November, 1991 to the beginning of 1994, until Yeltsin intervened leading to a deadly and destructive war lasting from 1994-1996. [FONT=&quot][25][/FONT] The guerilla war devastated Chechnya and the truce period afterwards was a time in which Chechnya’s economy was truly nonfunctional. Radical Islam known as Wahhabism became popular, attacks continued, and after apartment buildings were bombed in Moscow in 1999 by terrorists (or possibly the FSB), the new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stepped in vowing to crush the insurgents.[FONT=&quot][26][/FONT]
Russia then engaged in another violent war with insurgents in Chechnya, which mirrored the first in destruction and savagery. Russia’s forces were incompetent and overly violent, and by this time Grozny, Chechnya’s completely destroyed capital, had earned its reputation as “Hell on Earth.”[FONT=&quot][27][/FONT] In 2000 Russia took Grozny, Putin was elected President on the back of his campaign to take back the backward Republic, and the next few years saw a trade off between guerrilla insurgencies and blatant human right violating retaliations by the Russian. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Putin called his own problem in Chechnya a “war on terrorism.”[FONT=&quot][28][/FONT]
After defecting to the Moscow side during the second Chechen war, the Kadyrov clan, complete with its own militia, was put into power by Putin to contain the insurgent mess. After his father was assassinated (possibly by Russia), Ramzan Kadyrov was put in power of Chechnya, and today is its current President. He allegedly runs Chechnya as his own personal fiefdom and has sworn his allegiance to Putin and Moscow saying: “Putin is gorgeous. He thinks more about Chechnya than about any other republic.” [FONT=&quot][29][/FONT]
Chechnya has been rebuilt as a facade, and as an example of his pompous attitude and decadence, in 2011 Kadyrov paid for a pair of teams of global football superstars to come lose to a Chechen team in the new $280 million dollar stadium. Russia subsidizes Chechnya with $2.2 billion per year, but very little reaches the citizens where 50% remain unemployed.[FONT=&quot][30][/FONT] In fact, citizens were pulled out of work and school and forced to complete the stadium with no payment and no compensation for food or transportation. Kadyrov individually has a fleet of sports cars worth over $2 million.[FONT=&quot][31][/FONT]
On 14 March 2007, President Kadyrov said that human rights abuses were "a thing of the past" in his republic, rejected new charges of torture made by the Council of Europe, and vowed to end all remnants of insurgency in the region.[FONT=&quot][32][/FONT] He is considered to have great independence from Moscow in his power to eliminate insurgencies.
Grozny, once entirely burned to the ground, now features a new impressive Mosque to go with its stadium. Cranes are busy with construction and its physical appearance at least suggests a much-changed place. Physically the center of Grozny is completely rebuilt from the rubble of the bombings a decade earlier.[FONT=&quot][33][/FONT]

CHECHNYA’S POLITICAL STATUS​

Chechnya’s Constitution, giving it significant powers of self-government while remaining under the sovereign authority of Russia, was passed by referendum of an overwhelming majority of 95.5% of the voters in 2003.[FONT=&quot][34][/FONT] The vote did allow voters to use the Russian government structure to vote, and they allegedly chose to be subject to Russian sovereignty and not an independent Chechen Republic. International observers however have questioned the vote’s integrity as it was undertaken during Russian military occupation of the territory.[FONT=&quot][35][/FONT] It is recognized as a sham- occupying Russian soldiers also voted to approve the Constitution. Chechen voters likely voted yes in fear of retaliation for a no vote from the brutal occupants.[FONT=&quot][36][/FONT] Even a British report from the Guardian cast a vote in favour of the Constitution without being asked to show any identification.[FONT=&quot][37][/FONT] The chief negotiator regarding Chechen affairs for the Council of Europe, Lord Judd, resigned in protest prior to the election because of the proposed date of the election and Russia insistence on holding it that day.[FONT=&quot][38][/FONT]
Chechnya does have a limited representation in the Russian government as a minority voice.[FONT=&quot][39][/FONT] Russia has also allowed for local governing bodies to allow for “internal self-determination” under Russian sovereignty.[FONT=&quot][40][/FONT] Chechnya does not have enough support politically to leverage an actual Constitution secession from the Russian Federation and international law will not sanction a unilateral secession.[FONT=&quot][41][/FONT]
Kadyrov, while remaining loyal to Moscow, has perhaps overreached his independence. He has had political rivals killed in the streets of Moscow and has made seemingly mad declarations regarding Russian foreign policy with calls to invade and destroy Ukraine. According to the Kavkaz Center, Moscow may remove Kadyrov from power as the current status quo is not accomplishing the Kremlin agenda.[FONT=&quot][42][/FONT]
In December of 2010, Prime Minister Putin appointed himself as head of the Russian government’s commission for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus.[FONT=&quot][43][/FONT] Putin plans to invest significantly in the region over the next few years to develop the North Caucasus economically as the economy has not improved while the security situation has deteriorated further.[FONT=&quot][44][/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Moscow has been increasingly unable to appoint its own people to the separatist Republics, which is indicative of their lack of control over the region. The hope is that with economic influence they can make a more effective federal presence while simultaneously improving the use of federal money poured into the region (presumably less into the pockets of Kadyrov and his parade of football stars).[FONT=&quot][45][/FONT] Currently even the federal agencies branches are staffed with locals, intertwining the seperatist agenda with that of Moscow and the Kremlin is losing out. Dagestan has led the way in keeping Moscow out of its government.[/FONT]
Chechnya has remained in Moscow’s corner, as Kadyrov’s rule is so absolute that “it is plausible to suggest that hardly anyone could work successfully in the republic without the consent of its absolute ruler.”[FONT=&quot][46][/FONT] Even Chechnya’s own Human Rights Ombudsman is hostile to independent NGO intervention in Chechnya. [FONT=&quot][47][/FONT]
President Kadyrov acts without any Russian parliamentary scrutiny of his actions. He has created a cult of personality and an image of being all-powerful within Chechnya.[FONT=&quot][48][/FONT] Some Chechens respect his power and authority based on this image.[FONT=&quot][49][/FONT] His portrait is displayed throughout Grozny with his slogans of propaganda. His daily activities are the focus of broadcasts, highlighting his numerous achievements.[FONT=&quot][50][/FONT]
However there remains a pervasive atmosphere of fear and terror and the portrayal of stability is not the reality. Dissent is not possible and there is no political accountability. One Chechen human rights activist can sum up the political situation: “What the president says is law.”[FONT=&quot][51][/FONT] No direct criticism is made of President Kadyrov in any public discourse.
Kadyrov has imposed Sharia law and attempted to enforce certain Muslim practices. He has publically defended honor killings, saying in 2009 that “if a woman runs around and if a man runs around with her, both of them are killed.”[FONT=&quot][52][/FONT] In this instance, he was defending of seven women who were shot in the head and dumped by the roadside as those that deserved to die for their “loose morals.”

CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHECHNYA​

Russia’s counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya ended on April 16, 2009. Human right abuses have continued at the hands of Kadyrov, who in addition to being the President is the commander of his own perssonal security force, the Kadyrovtsie. His hometown of Tsentoroi is the home to the torture chambers according to victims and human right groups.[FONT=&quot][53][/FONT] Kadyrov allegedly keeps a list of 300 enemies to kill.[FONT=&quot][54][/FONT]
A rebel fighter, Umar Israilov who became a bodyguard of Kadyrov, described some extraordinary brutal acts by Kadyrov and his men. Among the allegations include reports that Kadyrov himself would beat and electrocute men for fun before ordering them executed.[FONT=&quot][55][/FONT] Israilov was beaten and tortured for months by Kadyrov, his agents, and even FSB officers to try to extract rebel information.[FONT=&quot][56][/FONT] Israilov recalled being tortured by Delimkhanov, who would go on to represent Chechnya in Parliament. Other witnesses for the New York Times have confirmed many of these allegations. Israilov was gunned down in a Vienna street and Austrian investigators found strong links connected the murder to Kadyrov.[FONT=&quot][57][/FONT]
A serious concern is the persecution of families of suspected rebels. Houses are burned and relatives of suspects are detained, tortured, or even killed. Kadyrov has publically declared that the relatives of Wahhabis should be destroyed.[FONT=&quot][58][/FONT] Kadyrov said on television: “If you don’t want to take responsibility for your children, then go to the Mosque and denounce them.”[FONT=&quot][59][/FONT] Kadyrov and his administration justifies such the acts as fighting small groups of terrorist who themselves are using brutal methods.
The PHRG has found that Chechen officials did not understand that counter-terrorism operations could have a detrimental effect on the population.[FONT=&quot][60][/FONT] There is a systematic problem in dealing with human rights violations as officials see them practically as impossible. If someone is killed, it is because he or she was a militant and that all operations are bound to make Chechnya a safer place. In fact, one official maintained that the number of claims against security forces was so small it was not even worth having a statistic for it.[FONT=&quot][61][/FONT] The systematic problem in redress and even awareness of a potential problem is staggering. Some Chechens are not able to even comprehend the concept of human rights violations.
Chechnya also has terrible treatment towards women. Women face humiliation, discrimination, and abuse.[FONT=&quot][62][/FONT] Chechnya features some of the more extreme aspects of Islamic law, including the encouragement of honor killings and the notion that women are the property of men. Sharia law and Chechen tradition do not allow women to exercise the rights offered by the Russian Constitution.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REST OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS​

Human rights in the areas surrounding Chechnya also fall below any acceptable European or Russian standard. In Dagestan the Russian state sponsored security forces have continued to engage in anti-insurgent tactics. The current practice is to circumvent the law entirely and abduct suspected insurgents.[FONT=&quot][63][/FONT] Suspected insurgents are usually those with real or feigned connection to fundamental Islam.[FONT=&quot][64][/FONT] There have been over 184 disappearances in tiny Ingushetia since 2002. The situation has led the Dagestani newspaper Chernovik to advise people on what to do when in danger: “If [some people] come to you and try to take you away with them without displaying an arrest order, without showing their ID’s, make noise.”[FONT=&quot][65][/FONT]
There is also very little freedom of the press in the region. The aforementioned Chernovik was suppressed by a court order.[FONT=&quot][66][/FONT] A blogger in Ingushetia, Aleksei Dudko, was arrested and his blog was closed. Internet service providers were ordered to cut off access to his blog that was on livejournal, but they were so frightened by the threat they cut off all blogs hosted by livejournal, including President Medvedev’s.
Human rights activists residing in Moscow but working on issues related to the North Caucasus are at risk. Natalya Estemirova, a well known Chechen rights activist, was killed in 2009. Estemirova’s murder has not been solved and some claim it has not even been investigated.[FONT=&quot][67][/FONT] Kadyrov himself has equated human rights activists and journalists as terrorists, striking fear in all as there is no doubt he will kills anyone he considers an enemy.[FONT=&quot][68][/FONT]
Kadyrov on the other hand is looking to have his day in court; he has brought libel charges against journalists who have reported on his abuses.
The Council of Europe in 2010 called the situation in the North Caucasus the most critical in terms of human rights violations in the entire geographical space of the Council of Europe.[FONT=&quot][69][/FONT] The judicial sector in the region does nothing regarding the security forces illicit activities, and Russian law enforcement agencies have impunity. In fact, it may be the government’s policy to allow for impunity.

CURRENT INSURGENCY VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS​

Despite Russia’s strong-armed militant attempts to stop the violence in the region and regain federal control, the North Caucasus is still facing significant insurgent violence bordering on civil war levels. Russia is growing increasingly fearful of the violence, which has worsened in the areas outside Chechnya as a result of Kadyrov’s attempt to violently stop the insurgency in his republic. Russia is particularly worried about the 2014 Sochi Olympics in nearby Sochi becoming in danger of the secessionist and jihadist violence and potential terrorist attacks.[FONT=&quot][70][/FONT]
Doku Umarov has proclaimed himself the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate and thus turned the Chechen resistance into a North Caucasus-wide movement. [FONT=&quot][71][/FONT] He has turned the insurgency into Jihad, and has claimed he is “building our little Chechen Kuwait in the Caucasus” in plans “ connected with the Quran and Sunnah.”[FONT=&quot][72][/FONT]
While Kadyrov has been able to somewhat lessen the violence in Chechnya at the cost of turning Chechnya into a personal dictatorial fiefdom, the insurgent violence it has spilled over into other regions. The rise of violence in Kabardino-Balkaria in 2010 resulted the rebel seizure and destruction of the Baksan hydroelectric plant.[FONT=&quot][73][/FONT] Local authorities can no longer guarantee the security of infrastructure, casting doubt on the Olympics and future economic growth in the region.
Violence in Dagestan is particularly bad, and is showing no signs of letting up, and the entire republic is always constant danger of bombings. As of late 2010, some form insurgent violence or terrorism was hitting Dagestan each day. [FONT=&quot][74][/FONT] Dagestan leadership and security forces are unable to contain the violence, and it has become a black mark for President Medvedev and a sign Russia is not stable and centralized.[FONT=&quot][75][/FONT] Russia has deployed interior ministry troops and armored military equipment to Dagestan to guard government buildings.[FONT=&quot][76][/FONT]
According to the Russian Deputy Prosecutor-General Ivan Sydoruk, in 2010 the number of terrorist acts committed in the North Caucasus Federal District rose 100 percent in comparison to 2009.[FONT=&quot][77][/FONT] Claims by local leaders that the situation has improved has been called by Medvedev to be lies and statistics show over 200 policeman and FSB officers were killed in 2010.[FONT=&quot][78][/FONT]

SOURCES OF RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW​

Russia has Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial guarantees for the rights of all people in the Russian Federation.
First and foremost is the 1993 Constitution. According to Article 15 of the Constitution, “the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force and direct effect, and shall be applicable throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation.”[FONT=&quot][79][/FONT] It is clearly law in all of Russia as the Supreme Court has ruled “the supreme legal force and direct effect of the Constitution means that all constitutional norms have priority over laws and subordinate legislative rules.”[FONT=&quot][80][/FONT]
The Russian Constitution contains both a list of rights, borrowed from the Human Rights Convention, and an explicit provision allowing citizens to complain to international judicial bodies.[FONT=&quot][81][/FONT] The Constitutional Court decisions are also a legitimate source of law.[FONT=&quot][82][/FONT]
The Constitution establishes both rights to fair judicial process and high standards for trials. Furthermore, the Constitution accepts as binding force the "generally recognized principles and norms of international law."[FONT=&quot][83][/FONT] Russia law therefore allows for the integration of of the European Court of Human Rights and the guidance it offers in the form of corrective action.
Article 2 of the Constitution proudly proclaims “individuals and their rights and freedoms are of supreme value. Recognition of, respect for and protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen is the duty of the state.”[FONT=&quot][84][/FONT] Chapter 2 of the constitution includes many human rights and freedoms including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights based on international human rights standards.[FONT=&quot][85][/FONT]
The Constitutional Court has recognized the value of international agreements in that the “decision of inter-state bodies may lead to the reconsideration of specific cases by the highest courts of the Russian Federation,” thus giving legitimacy to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.[FONT=&quot][86][/FONT] Furthermore, the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code allows for the reopening of a case on the basis of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.
Russia has also established an Ombudsman that oversees the Commission for Human Rights. The Commission receives complaints about human rights violations and tries to correct the violations.[FONT=&quot][87][/FONT] The Ombudsman has no formal power to issue binding decisions on state bodies.[FONT=&quot][88][/FONT]

RUSSIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS​

Russia signed the European Convention of Human Rights in 1996 with a list of obligations to be met. Significantly Russia was required to enact a moratorium on executions and eventually abolish the death penalty. While Yeltsin did decree an unofficial moratorium on executions, the Duma refused to ratify its abolition and the Constitutional Court has held that “in order for the death penalty to be applied in Russia, the accused must in every part of Russia have the right to a trial by jury.”[FONT=&quot][89][/FONT] As the evidence shows, however, since this moratorium countless individuals have been killed in the North Caucasus and they continue to be do so by the Kremlin-backed President of Chechnya himself, Kadyrov. Whereas Russia has not executed a convicted person, in Chechnya the families of non-convicted individuals are killed.
Putin’s presidency has brought a period of human rights reform in Russia, but they are not necessarily applicable to Chechnya. While jury trial has been installed throughout Russia, it has not in Chechnya.[FONT=&quot][90][/FONT] And while the Constitutional Court of Russia has begun to refer to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, it is practically a moot point for Russian citizens in the North Caucasus who have no access to legitimate justice and live in fear of reprisal. Chechnya, is of course the worst, featuring no judicial access and recourse being the most severely restricted in the region. In fact, it is possible that the average citizen do not understand the concepts of human rights and judicial review.
Russia today suffers from “tolerance of the climate of hate towards minorities and human rights defenders” and a “blind eye” turned towards the fight on extremism and terrorism.[FONT=&quot][91][/FONT]

EU PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA​

The European Union and Russia have held consultations on human rights twice a year since 2005.[FONT=&quot][92][/FONT] The consultations have been condemned as nearly useless, with the International Federation for Human Rights stating that since 2005 at least eight Russian human rights defenders have been assassinated.[FONT=&quot][93][/FONT] It is highly unlikely formal consultations will make a difference. Other methods used by the European Union to promote human rights in Russia have included the threat of sanctions and suspensions, declaratory diplomatic tools, and aid and assistance.[FONT=&quot][94][/FONT]
In the early 1990s during the first Chechen War, Russia was able to ignore EU conditions of improved human rights and sign an interim Agreement on Trade.[FONT=&quot][95][/FONT] Similarly during the second Chechen war, the EU condemned Russia’s action but most of the threats of sanctions and calls for improvement were lip service with no influence over Russia to improve their human rights record in the war.[FONT=&quot][96][/FONT] Putin ignored the claims and the EU backed down. When dealing with the EU, Russia has been defiant. Putin claimed in 2006, “It would be useless and wrong to try to force artificial standards [of common values] on each other.”[FONT=&quot][97][/FONT] The situation in the North Caucasus indicates that this statement is accurate.
Russia has publically expressed a need to improve human rights but done little to actually do it. Yeltsin often responded that any violations were in response to “undemocratic forces” and that Russia was facing “sustained” opposition.[FONT=&quot][98][/FONT] In 2010 it was reported that there has been no discernible change in the quality of human rights in Russia with Medvedev as President.[FONT=&quot][99][/FONT] Journalists continue to be harassed and intimidated. In fact, Ella Pamfilova who gave the report with this information at the annual EU human rights conference in March 2010, resigned in July 2010 after harassment by a group with close relations with the Presidential administration.[FONT=&quot][100][/FONT]
Despite these negative portrayals, the European Union provides significant funding to Russia for human rights. The Council of Europe joint Programme on Minorities in Russia has provided nearly 3 million euros for three years with the objective to help Russia ratify the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.[FONT=&quot][101][/FONT] It appears that the European Union is committed to the improvement of human rights in Russia, despite meeting resistance from Putin’s sphere of influence. Whether dialogue can improve will ultimately come down to the Russian government’s public realization and admission that their actions in the North Caucasus are unacceptable.

RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS​

The Council of Europe was established in 1949 to promote human rights and democratic principles. All members of the Council of Europe agree to accede to the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights requires its members to “secure the civil and political rights enumerate therein for their citizens.”[FONT=&quot][102][/FONT] States are also required to provide domestic remedies where a protected right is breached.[FONT=&quot][103][/FONT] Citizens of states in the Council of Europe can petition the European Court of Human Rights if their rights have been violated. Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998.[FONT=&quot][104][/FONT]
Russia is a controversial member as its human rights standards are not and seemingly will not become compatible with the Council of Europe.[FONT=&quot][105][/FONT] It is surprising that was Russia was invited to join during the first Chechen war, and that Russia was willing to inevitably accept compulsory judgments and pay compensation to successful victims.[FONT=&quot][106][/FONT]
Problematic in Russia’s case is the fact that citizens must exhaust all available domestic remedies before applying to the European Court of Human Rights. However because of the availability of a direct petition to the court, those with violated civil rights have succeeded in petitioning the court and winning judgment against Russia.
The first judgment against Russia was Burdov v. Russia in 2002 in which a Chernobyl victim was not compensated by Russia what was owed from a civil judgment.[FONT=&quot][107][/FONT] Russia failed to comply, leading to a second judgment from the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 in which Russia was scolded by the court and ordered to pay the damages. Also in the second judgment, the Court ordered Russia to set up “an effective domestic remedy” to offer redress for the non-enforcement of domestic judgments.[FONT=&quot][108][/FONT] Encouragingly, Russia responded with a bill that entered into force in May of 2010.[FONT=&quot][109][/FONT]
As of January 1, 2010, the Courts statistics show that there have been 862 judgments against Russia.[FONT=&quot][110][/FONT] There were 33,568 applications pending against Russia, out of a total of approximately 140,000 pending.[FONT=&quot][111][/FONT] And while Russia only ranks 15th out of 47 in terms of applications per the population size, it is very likely that many Russians never have the chance to apply.[FONT=&quot][112][/FONT] The Court is significantly overworked.
Russia has lost some very high-profile cases in the court. Gusinskiy v. Russia in particular condemned Russia for using the criminal justice system to force a commercial deal by arresting a television magnate.[FONT=&quot][113][/FONT] The result has been a freezing of relations between the Court and Russia, resulting in the Duma’s refusal to ratify Protocol 14, which needs to be ratified by all the members to come into force.[FONT=&quot][114][/FONT] Protocol 14, intended to streamline the backlogged courts, was not passed in defiance of the fact that Russia claimed the Council of Europe was using the platform “for attacks our country.”[FONT=&quot][115][/FONT] The refusal to ratify it was a “direct order from the Kremlin” and therefore a political decision by Putin to defy the Council of Europe.[FONT=&quot][116][/FONT] The Convention has gone on to condemn Russia’s behaviour.
While Russia appears to flagrantly violate the Convention, the influence of the Court of Human Rights is increasing. More lawyers are being trained in the principles and word is spread throughout Russia and its prison system about the Strasbourg outlet.[FONT=&quot][117][/FONT] More Russians each year see the Court as a way to protect their rights.[FONT=&quot][118][/FONT] The Constitutional Courts have taken note of the European Court of Human Right’s jurisprudence. The system is slow, there is a backlog, and there still must be improvement from Russia, but it is impossible to change an entire system with the signing of a Convention. And notably Russia has paid in full the orders of compensation it lost in Court, and it does lose most of its cases.[FONT=&quot][119][/FONT]
However Russia is increasingly fearful of the negative impact of losing countless cases and being reprimanded by Europe. Medvedev is worried that his (and by default Putin’s) administration which has maintained that they have brought law to Russia could be hurt by the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments against it which "undermine the legitimacy of the national position in the eyes of domestic constituents."[FONT=&quot][120][/FONT] As Russia does not allow an open media and legitimate discourse within its borders, legal and justified verdicts against it outside of its control could pose problems. While Russia puts pressure on its own courts which have become sporadically receptive jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, it is unable to do so when it comes to the Strasbourg Court.
It is also problematic that Medvedev considered that most of the complaints against Russia to be the result of technical deficiencies in the Russian judicial system.[FONT=&quot][121][/FONT] He is ready to transform the system to make it more effective, which ignores the reality of the human rights abuses that are occurring in the Federation's borders. The “vast majority” of the human rights violations are driven by his own political regime and the illegal practices of security agencies, and are not because of the ineffectiveness of the courts.[FONT=&quot][122][/FONT] To consider inefficiencies to be the major problem effecting individual rights is ignorant of the real problem and highlights the severe situation human rights in the North Caucasus face today. The power in Moscow that is working to centralize its control over the region does not even consider its illegal actions to be a problem. Rather than looking at the obvious and straightforward reality and wording of the judgments against it, Russia is looking for excuses, as perhaps the truth is grimmer than they can admit without losing their control over the regime.

CHECHNYA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS​

The situation in Chechnya is problematic in terms of Russia’s position in the Council of Europe and indicates that Russia is not ready to commit to human rights on the level required of the Council of Europe. However the European Court of Human Rights is likely the council of Europe’s only recourse to address the obvious human rights problem in the republic.[FONT=&quot][123][/FONT]
In 2006, the first judgment against Russia for its actions in Chechnya was rendered and the court found Russia in violation of the right to life and prohibition of torture.[FONT=&quot][124][/FONT] In Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia, the plaintiffs claimed that their relatives were tortured and killed by Russian soldiers.[FONT=&quot][125][/FONT] According to the Human Rights Watch report, witnesses saw the relatives being beaten in the custody of Russian soldiers.[FONT=&quot][126][/FONT] Russia’s singular defence to the claims was that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust domestic remedies prior to suing Russia in the European Court of Human Rights. While it was acknowledged that the court system in Chechnya was no longer functioning, it was pointed out the court in the nearby Republic of Ingushetia was still open.[FONT=&quot][127][/FONT]
The plaintiffs pointed out the more painful truth: government remedies were inadequate and ineffective, the Russian government directed and supported the campaign with full knowledge of the human rights abuses, and that illegal actions in the first Chechen war went entirely unpunished.[FONT=&quot][128][/FONT] Backed up by documentation, the Court ruled on the exhaustion of available remedies issue and came to the conclusion that ineffective remedies do not have to be exhausted. Overall context of the case should take first priority.[FONT=&quot][129][/FONT] The remedies attempted by Plaintiffs in no way accomplished justice. In the end, the Court found Russia in violation as Russia was responsible for the deaths and failed to properly investigate the deaths afterwards.[FONT=&quot][130][/FONT] The total award to both totalling less than a combined $50,000 in addition to litigation costs seems paltry compared to the situation and their struggle after the fact.
The first Chechen victim to be recognized as such in Europe has paved away for more rulings against Russia. Besides the killing, there is a problem in Chechnya with disappearances and there are evidentiary problems required to prove a disappearance in cases without definite knowledge of death. However, the Court has also addressed this issue and as of late 2009, thirty-two judgments have been issued finding Russia responsible for enforced disappearances of its citizens.[FONT=&quot][131][/FONT]
The first judgment on an enforced disappearance in Chechnya was issued on July 27, 2006, Bazorkina v. Russia.[FONT=&quot][132][/FONT] It involved the disappearance of a 25 year old Chechen, Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, captured by Russian federal forces on February 2, 2002.[FONT=&quot][133][/FONT] With the assistance of NGOs, his mother exhausted all available methods to locate her son. The sheer level of commitment to finding him is astonishing and included: “applying to prosecutors at local, Russian, and military levels; petitioning the Ministries of the Interior and Justice and other special representatives; personal attendance at detention centers; and lengthy correspondence with the relevant authorities.”[FONT=&quot][134][/FONT] The response to all these attempts was typical for the case of someone who disappeared – that there is no information available and to try somewhere else.[FONT=&quot][135][/FONT] After exhausting all domestic attempts to find her son, she was entitled to petition to the European Court of Human Rights.
Using the same logic as a Turkish disappearance case, Timurtas v. Turkey, the court held the victim can be assumed to be disappeared with “sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.”[FONT=&quot][136][/FONT] In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Yandiyev was detained and with no news from him and a plausible explanation from the Russian government, it can be presumed that he was killed. This case was particularly bolstered by a CNN broadcast team filming a Russian general ordering his execution and the fact that five male bodies were found near where Yandiyev was last seen alive, but the bodies and subsequent evidence were lost and no documents provided.[FONT=&quot][137][/FONT] It is a principle of the court that if someone disappears in custody, “it is incumbent upon the state to satisfactorily explain the situation.”[FONT=&quot][138][/FONT]
Other cases have subsequently faced problems with less clear evidence of a disappearance. In Luluyev v. Russia, Russia was found guilty of kidnapping and murdering a mother of four from a market in Grozny.[FONT=&quot][139][/FONT] Russia denied detaining the woman, and the court relied on the Russian admission that she in the vicinity of a “mopping-up operation.”[FONT=&quot][140][/FONT] This was considered ample evidence that Russia was responsible for her disappearance. She eventually was found in a mass grave near the Chechnya headquarters of the Russian military.[FONT=&quot][141][/FONT]
Imakayeva v. Russia dealt with the problem of no direct proof that state agencies were responsible for the disappearance. The Court used Russia’s failure to respond to a request for a copy of the relevant criminal investigation file as confirmation of the allegations, recognizing the severe danger in Chechnya of disappearing by unidentified personnel and no acknowledgement of a detainment or execution.[FONT=&quot][142][/FONT]
The Court’s liberal approach to allowing evidence for the disappearance is positive for the victims (and their representatives) in Chechnya. The Court does not require concrete facts, and if they did, there would not be any. The accusers must present a prima facie case and the burden then shifts on Russia to provide evidence to refute its responsibility.[FONT=&quot][143][/FONT] This shifted standard of burden offers Chechen victims their only hope of justice. The Russian government usually fails to have any type of productive record, and while this in itself is a breach, it also allows inferences to be made. Still, there are surely many instances where there is not enough evidence of disappearances to go forward in any capacity.
Still, it is very hard to exhaust all remedies prior to become eligible to petition to the European Court of Human Rights. And now the disappearances involve Kadyrov and his private militia, backed by Kremlin, Russia has created a sense of a buffer to the disappearances. While Kadyrov is surely responsible for the disappearances, the Kremlin is ultimately responsible as he is only in power at the whim of Putin. In a way, Russia is sanctioning the current violence for the hope of some sort of peace and federal control over the region. The political situation is so tense and authoritarian in Chechnya today that it is doubtful anyone could attempt to exhaust avenues domestically before disappearing himself. Furthermore, the increase in terrorism in the surrounding areas has given further justification for Russian federal responses to the violence. Despite Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe, the human rights in the region are not much better than when Stalin deported the Chechens to Kazakhstan during World War II.
It has been argued that the possibility of petitioning to the Court has provided a voice and a sense of justice to Russian citizens.[FONT=&quot][144][/FONT] However the sheer number of violations compared to judgments is indicative of the true power the Council of Europe can have over Russia. It has been suggested that Russia has tried to clean up the military with reforms in a response to the negative judgments, in terms of better guidelines, prosecution for unlawful killings, and better administration.[FONT=&quot][145][/FONT] It has also been suggested that the Kremlin is being fed up with Kadyrov’s independence and brutality without any progress in the North Caucasus.[FONT=&quot][146][/FONT] Whether the Council of Europe’s recognition of Chechnya as something other than a domestic matter or an issue of terrorism has anything to do with Russia’s policy, it is not known. But Russia cannot improve the record in Chechnya and surrounding areas overnight, as there is not only a military culture of brutality and impunity, but also a deep legacy of hatred, violence, destruction, and violence in the region. And the Kremlin is willing to do anything to centralize power and bring the region under full control of the sovereignty of the central government. So while the Council of Europe and the judgments against Russia are surely a step to recognize a problem which was ignored for too long, Russia’s human rights situation can only be improved with time.

CYCLE OF VIOLENCE​

On February 11, 2010 the Russian security services killed 22 alleged militants in a mountainous area between Ingushetia and Chechnya. It turned out that they were primarily civilians picking wild garlic, a local delicacy.[FONT=&quot][147][/FONT] The security forces allegedly killed them as instead of sending troops into the forests and risking their lives, the troops requested helicopter support that fired both civilians and militants in the area.[FONT=&quot][148][/FONT] The federal government has not acknowledged the mistake and it, like many actions in the area, are ignored in most of the media. However, these actions of security services towards Russian citizens clearly violate law on many levels.
The violence in the region has shown no signs of letting up. In early 2011 conflict in Dagestan approached the level of Civil War. Rebels are engaging in continuous and damaging suicide attacks across Russia. Islam has become central of the insurgency, in particular in Dagestan.[FONT=&quot][149][/FONT] In response to the violence, Russian nationalists have staged anti-Caucasian protests in Moscow.
Ethnic Russians are increasingly being alarmed by the continuous threat. Since the sole threat of terrorism in Russia appears to be coming from the North Caucasus, Russians are growing inpatient with the Russian government's inability to deal with the issue.[FONT=&quot][150][/FONT] The sense of mistrust between those in the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia is not only deeply rooted in the history of Russia, but is getting worse with each daily attack. As long as the attacks continue, so will the human rights violations of all people in the region. It is not a stretch to say that ethnic Russians have come to accept the human rights violations as not only a necessity, but that the Islamic insurgents are themselves responsible for the violations by wrecking psychologically havoc on Russia.
In the North Caucasus, the federal agents appear to have little influence over the local law-enforcement agencies. It is arguable that Russia is not capable of doing something to rectify the situation even if it consciously tried. Putin has attempted to bring the regions under the central power vertically from Moscow, but there still remains a clear battle for power in the North Caucasus. Russian policy seems to just be just to pretend everything is satisfactory and the humanitarian problem is non-existent. It is almost unfathomable that the area is in fact in the Council of Europe. The Kremlin is all aware of the severity of the issue despite its public assurances to the contrary. In late 2010 Medvedev criticized the security services in the North Caucasus Federal District for its utter failure to control the violent situation in 2010.[FONT=&quot][151][/FONT]
The cycle seems to be endlessly repeating as locally as the Kremlin attempts to counter the terrorism creates local animosity for Moscow. In 2010 159 Russian servicemen were killed in Dagastan, as the tit-for-tat cycle of violence gets worse.[FONT=&quot][152][/FONT] While the Russians are searching for insurgents, they face incredible hostility from all locals, which reflects poorly on the situation from all angles. Russia still remains steadfastly dedicated to an ever-increasing military resolution to the problem.
In Chechnya today, it is business as usual for Kadyrov. However he is trying to appear conciliatory with human rights activists in a front from Moscow, but does not permit any independent human right action in Chechnya.[FONT=&quot][153][/FONT] While this meshes well with the government’s policy to pretend that Chechnya is under control while limiting information, it does seem to indicate that Kadyrov is possibly on a tighter leash than he has been lending credence to reports that Moscow may be fed up with his wild independence. Nevertheless, he continues to torment human rights activists who are constantly arrested. Chechnya does remain less violent than Dagestan, which is truly becoming the center of violence in the North Caucasus.

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE​

As long as Russians receive impunity for human rights violations in the area, it appears nothing will change. The current Russian regime has followed the Soviet tradition by paying lip service to grandeur rights of man and citizens while simultaneously ignoring the violation of them. Human rights anywhere in Russia are not very good based on the Council of Europe standards; in the North Caucasus human rights are nonexistent. Every individual can be treated like a terrorist at the will of security officers.
The European Court of Human Rights offers some semblance of outlet for those in the region. At the very least, the judgments against Russia for action in Chechnya have showed Russian’s actions to be illegitimate and inhumane based on even the weakest international norms. Russia has violated the most severe right, the right to life, on numerous occasions. With the Kremlin controlling much of the media and trying to portray the North Caucasus as a region under control when it is anything but, the European Court of Human Rights has gone a long way into making public the grim reality. The Kremlin is at odds with the European Court of Human rights for busting their bubble and bringing the truth forward.
As much as it would be ideal for Russian courts to function properly, the courts in Russia are a part of public governance and judges have little incentive to disrupt the status quo.[FONT=&quot][154][/FONT] Many courts do not recognize the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and some top judges refuse to apply the standards setting a precedent of non-compliance.[FONT=&quot][155][/FONT] This is all a moot point however in Chechnya, in which a torture chamber is the judge and jury (Chechnya has no jury trials). Furthermore, the judiciary is not nearly as important as the executive and the judiciary is powerless in the North Caucasus. Medvedev has acknowledged that half of judicial decisions in noncriminal cases go unenforced.[FONT=&quot][156][/FONT]
When there is little hope for the judiciary in peaceful Russia, it is impossible to accomplish a system of equal rights in the North Caucasus. At this point the Kremlin should realize that Kadyrov experiment – to have an ethnic Chechen do the dirty work for the Russians – has failed. The region is not stable. Kadyrov is creating his own personal fiefdom and feeding the growing Islam hysteria in the region, as it is hard to even consider Chechnya a part of Russia. The only thing holding it to the federation is Kadyrov’s unwavering support for Putin, who put him on his throne.
Russia considers Chechnya a domestic matter and the international community have largely obliged to the request. With Chechnya in isolation, insurgency will grow as will the abuses and extrajudicial killings by government forces. Chechnya can remain in diplomatic isolation no longer.
It is positive that Russia may be acknowledging the problem, as there is an increasingly negative public portray of the situation and the appointment of new leadership in the North Caucasus. Putin rose to power on the back of his hard line in Chechnya, and with the situation in such terrible shape, perhaps he will do something about it. However, it is likely that officials do not see a freer society as one that will be safer and improve human rights. Even ethnic Chechens who have immigrated to Germany live in fear as Kadyrov is sending agents to rough up bring back Chechen’s abroad.

CONCLUSION​

The long standing Soviet tradition of passing legislation and ratifying agreements without concerns regarding the internal effects is continuing in Russia. Russia has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for refusing to cooperate with its obligations under the Convention despite giving assurances to the contrary.[FONT=&quot][157][/FONT] For the sake of everyone involved it is time for a new Russian policy in region. Chechnya has been destroyed time continually for the past two hundred years and the situation needs to be on a different path to be resolved. There is a hope that with the upcoming Sochi Olympics in the region and an the increased media spotlight on the North Caucasus, Russia will be forced to develop a functional and legitimate policy that will actually implement positive change in human rights for its own citizens.




[FONT=&quot][1][/FONT] Barry Renfrew, Chechnya, in Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know 68 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds. 1999).

[FONT=&quot][2][/FONT] [FONT=&quot]Lord Frank Judd & Jo Swinson, [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Parliamentary Human Rights Group (PHRG) Report, Chechnya Fact-Finding Mission [/FONT][FONT=&quot](June 10, 2010), [/FONT]http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/13831/.

[FONT=&quot][3][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][4][/FONT] Constitution of the Russian Federation, http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/ch1.html.

[FONT=&quot][5][/FONT] Council of Europe, Mission Statement, http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohes...on/02_mission_statement/MISSION STATEMENT.asp.

[FONT=&quot][6][/FONT] Tarik Abdel-Monem, The European Court of Human Rights: Chechnya’s Last Chance?, 28 VTLR 237 (2004), at 237.

[FONT=&quot][7][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Dagestan’s Increasing Backwardness Blamed on Insecurity and Corruption, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 2 (July 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36639&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1.

[FONT=&quot][8][/FONT] Judd & Swinson, supra.

[FONT=&quot][9][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, North Caucasus Human Rights Activists Introduce Counter-Measures to Thwart Illegal Detentions, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 4 (August 13, 2010). (July 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36758&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1. (Dzutsev I)

[FONT=&quot][10][/FONT] Conor Mulcahy, Pre-Determined: The March 23, 2003 Constitutional Referendum in Chechnya and its Relationship to the Law of Self-Determination,28 BCIC LR 179 (2005), at 192.

[FONT=&quot][11][/FONT] Judd & Swinson, supra.

[FONT=&quot][12][/FONT] North Caucasus, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Caucasus.

[FONT=&quot][13][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][14][/FONT] Abdel-Monem, supra at 239.

[FONT=&quot][15][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 181.

[FONT=&quot][16][/FONT] Abdel-Monem, supra at 239.

[FONT=&quot][17][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][18][/FONT] Id. at 240.

[FONT=&quot][19][/FONT] Id. at 241

[FONT=&quot][20][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 180.

[FONT=&quot][21][/FONT] Abdel-Monem, supra at 273.

[FONT=&quot][22][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 181.

[FONT=&quot][23][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][24][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][25][/FONT]Id.

[FONT=&quot][26][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][27][/FONT] Robert Young Pelton, The World’s Most Dangerous Places, http://comebackalive.com/.

[FONT=&quot][28][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 184.

[FONT=&quot][29][/FONT] News.ru (October 5 2005), http://www.newsru.com/russia/05oct2005/kadyrov.html.

[FONT=&quot][30][/FONT] Amina Umarova and Daisy Sindelar, In Chechnya, Kadyrov Spares No Expense In Making His Soccer Dreams Come True (May 12, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/chechnya_kadyrov_soccer_football_new_stadium/24098175.html.

[FONT=&quot][31][/FONT] Ramzan Kadyrov Cars (February 2009), http://paradoxoff.com/ramzan-kadyrov-cars.html.

[FONT=&quot][32][/FONT] Kadyrov sworn in as Chechnya's new Kremlin-backed president, International Herald Tribune (April 5, 2007).

[FONT=&quot][33][/FONT] Judd & Swinson, supra at 5.

[FONT=&quot][34][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 179.

[FONT=&quot][35][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][36][/FONT] Id. at 194.

[FONT=&quot][37][/FONT] Nick Paton Walsh, Weary Chechens Turn Out to Vote for Russian Peace Plan, GUARDIAN (London), March 24, 2003, at 17.

[FONT=&quot][38][/FONT] Nick Paton Walsh, Chechnya Talks Collapse, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 1, 2003, at 20.

[FONT=&quot][39][/FONT] Mulcahy, supra at 191.

[FONT=&quot][40][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][41][/FONT] Id. at 192.

[FONT=&quot][42][/FONT] Kavkaz Center, http://www.kavkazcenter.com.

[FONT=&quot][43][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Moscow Increases Its Focus on Solving the North Caucasus Riddle, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 11(December 6, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37251&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][44][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][45][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][46][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][47][/FONT] Judd & Swinson, supra at 2.

[FONT=&quot][48][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][49][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][50][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][51][/FONT] Lynn Berry, Chechen President Kadyrov Defends Honor Killings, The St. Petersburg Times (March 3, 2009), http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?story_id=28409&action_id=2.

[FONT=&quot][52][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][53][/FONT] C. J. Chivers, Slain Exile Detailed Cruelty of the Ruler of Chechnya, New York Times (January 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/world/europe/01torture.html?hp.

[FONT=&quot][54][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][55][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][56][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][57][/FONT] Nikolaus von Twickel, Austria Finds Strong Links to Kadyrov in Israilov's Murder, The Moscow Times (April 30, 2010), , http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/...ks-to-kadyrov-in-israilovs-murder/405165.html.

[FONT=&quot][58][/FONT] Judd & Swinson, supra at 26.

[FONT=&quot][59][/FONT] Id. at 23.

[FONT=&quot][60][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][61][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][62][/FONT] Id. at 26.

[FONT=&quot][63][/FONT] Dzutsev I, supra.

[FONT=&quot][64][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][65][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][66][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][67][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Human Rights Activists in the North Caucasus Continue to be Harassed and Attacked, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 1 (July 2, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36572&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][68][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][69][/FONT] Council of Europe, http://www.assembly.coe.int/defaultE.asp.

[FONT=&quot][70][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Moscow Grows Weary Over Kadyrov’s Excessive Independence, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 4 (August 13, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36759&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1. (Dzutsev II)

[FONT=&quot][71][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][72][/FONT] Jamestown Foundation, Pro-Rebel Website Posts Transcript of Interview with Doku Umarov (May 20, 2011), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37956&tx_ttnews[backPid]=514.

[FONT=&quot][73][/FONT] Dzutsev II, supra.

[FONT=&quot][74][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Violence in Dagestan Shows No Sign of Letting Up, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 10 (November 29, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37214&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][75][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Dagestani Leadership Unable to Control Situation in Republic, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 10(November 29, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37215&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][76][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][77][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Dagestani Leadership Unable to Control Situation in Republic, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 11(December 6, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37215&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][78][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][79][/FONT] William Burnham, Peter B. Maggs, and Gennady M. Danilenko, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation 10 (4th 2009). Burnham, supra

[FONT=&quot][80][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][81][/FONT] Alexei Trochev, All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? Unpacking the Impact of the European Court of Human Rights on Russia (Spring 2009), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200904/ai_n32128550/?tag=content;col1.

[FONT=&quot][82][/FONT] Burnham, supra at 18.

[FONT=&quot][83][/FONT] Trochev, supra.

[FONT=&quot][84][/FONT] Id. at 247.

[FONT=&quot][85][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][86][/FONT] Id. at 249.

[FONT=&quot][87][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][88][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][89][/FONT] Bill Bowring, Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites?, Birkbeck ePrints (2009), http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/785, at 46.

[FONT=&quot][90][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][91][/FONT] Heidi Hautala, Forward, EU Human Rights Policy, The EU-Russia Centre Review (November 2010), http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf at 4.

[FONT=&quot][92][/FONT] Fraser Cameron, The EU and Human Rights in the Global Context, EU Human Rights Policy, The EU-Russia Centre Review (November 2010), http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf at 11.

[FONT=&quot][93][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][94][/FONT] Sinikukka Saari , What went wrong with the EU’s Human Rights Policy in Russia, EU Human Rights Policy, The EU-Russia Centre Review (November 2010), http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf at 16.

[FONT=&quot][95][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][96][/FONT] Bill Bowring , EU Partners and their Responses to Russia, EU Human Rights Policy, The EU-Russia Centre Review (November 2010), http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf. (Bowring II)

[FONT=&quot][97][/FONT] Vladamir Putin, “Europe Has Nothing to Fear from Russia”. Financial Times, 22 November 2006.

[FONT=&quot][98][/FONT] Saari, supra at 20.

[FONT=&quot][99][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][100][/FONT] Id. at 21.

[FONT=&quot][101][/FONT] Bowring II, supra at 35.

[FONT=&quot][102][/FONT] Joseph Barrett, Chechnya’s Last Hope? Enforced Disappearances and the European Court of Human Rights, 22 HVHRJ 133 (2009).

[FONT=&quot][103][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][104][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][105][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][106][/FONT] Bowring II, supra at 32.

[FONT=&quot][107][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][108][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][109][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][110][/FONT] Id. at 34.

[FONT=&quot][111][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][112][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][113][/FONT] Bowring, supra at 49.

[FONT=&quot][114][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][115][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][116][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][117][/FONT] Bowring II, supra at 32.

[FONT=&quot][118][/FONT] Trochev, supra.

[FONT=&quot][119][/FONT] Bowring, supra at 54.

[FONT=&quot][120][/FONT] Trochev, supra.

[FONT=&quot][121][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][122][/FONT] Ella Paneyakh, Human Rights Discourse on Russia: Recipe for Failure, The EU-Russia Centre Review (November 2010), http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf at 36.

[FONT=&quot][123][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][124][/FONT] Tarik Abdel-Monem, Chechens Win First Claims in the European Court of Human Rights, 39 CNLILJ 171 (Winter 2006). (Abdel-Monem II).

[FONT=&quot][125][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][126][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][127][/FONT] Id. at 174.

[FONT=&quot][128][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][129][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][130][/FONT] Id. at 175.

[FONT=&quot][131][/FONT] Barrett, supra at 135.

[FONT=&quot][132][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][133][/FONT] Bazorkina v. Russia, App. no. 69481/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jul. 27, 2006).

[FONT=&quot][134][/FONT] Barrett, supra at 143.

[FONT=&quot][135][/FONT] Id. at 135.

[FONT=&quot][136][/FONT] Bazorkina, supra.

[FONT=&quot][137][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][138][/FONT] Barrett, supra at 136.

[FONT=&quot][139][/FONT] Id. at 137

[FONT=&quot][140][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][141][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][142][/FONT] Id. at 138.

[FONT=&quot][143][/FONT] Id. at 140.

[FONT=&quot][144][/FONT] Id. at 142.

[FONT=&quot][145][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][146][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Moscow Grows Weary Over Kadyrov’s Excessive Independence, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 4 (August 13, 2010), www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36759&tx_ttnews[backPid]=423&no_cache=1

[FONT=&quot][147][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Kadyrov and Rights Activists Struggle to Find Common Ground Amid Killings of Civilians, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 0 (September 27, 2010).

[FONT=&quot][148][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][149][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Conflict in Dagestan Approaches the Level of Civil War, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 12 Issue:4 (February 6, 2011).
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37518&tx_ttnews[backPid]=514

[FONT=&quot][150][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][151][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Ingush rights activists awarded as abuses in the republic persist, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 11 (December 6, 2010). www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37518&tx_ttnews[backPid]=514

[FONT=&quot][152][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Kremlin Counter-Insurgency Efforts Deepen Local Animosity in Dagestan, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 12 Issue: 10 (May 16, 2011).

[FONT=&quot][153][/FONT] Valery Dzutsev, Kadyrov and Rights Activists Struggle to Find Common Ground Amid Killings of Civilians, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 11 Issue: 0 (September 27, 2010).

[FONT=&quot][154][/FONT] Trochev, supra.

[FONT=&quot][155][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][156][/FONT] Id.

[FONT=&quot][157][/FONT] Bowring, supra at 50.

 

That is very true. Azerbaijan is building up its army, while Armenia is in between a rock and a hard place. Ultimately it will drive Armenia closer to Iran and Russia.

 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/14/road_rage_in_russia?page=0,0

 

People from Moscow tick me off, friggin' arrogant, snobbish jerks.

 

Yeah, so logically you should support a non Moscow team considering you have no ties to the place.

 

because you run into them so often?

 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/14/gridlock_and_gold_porsches

Picture slide of the gap between the rich and poor in Russia.

 

Ugh, your persistent ignorance on everything Russia is insane. Everyone ********ing knows that they look at everyone else as provincials, and think of themselves as cultured know it alls.

You really don't a thing about ex-Soviet saying or stereotypes.

 

Haha, unfortunately those traffic jams became a reality for me today on 101 North:

It usually only takes me 30 minutes to get to work on 101 driving from Blossom Hill Road to Brokaw Road (SJ Airport Exit), but 2 major accidents this morning meant that I was an hour late.

 

How come you're not a Rostov fan considering its where you have ties and you hate Moscow?