The other thread on Bush's speech to the AEI has (typically) dropped into Neanderthal territory on the intelligent debate scale, so I thought I'd try a different tack in discussing it. I finally had the time yesterday to watch the Frontline show “The War Behind Closed Doors”, and what Bush’s speech at the AEI last night proved was that Frontline remains by far the best show on television. In the show, Bill Kristol, David Frum and a spokesperson for AEI all talk at length about the Wolfowitz foreign policy doctrine written in 1991 but later suppressed. Wolfowitz’s argued for pre-emptive action against rogue states like Iraq on the grounds that (a) containment was a failed action, and (b) attacking countries like Iraq and replacing Hussein with a democratically-elected government would stimulate a move toward more widespread democracy in the Middle East (specifically Egypt, Saudi, Syria, and Iran). If the Mid East was full of democracies, there would be less financial and tactical support for the Palestinian suicide bombers, and they’d be forced to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Israel. This was all in the show, and all of the interviews with Kristol, Frum and others were conducted on or before October 2001. So what does Bush II say to the AEI last night? Exactly the same thing that Wolfowitz was calling for twelve years ago – almost word-for-word, in fact. For weeks we have heard that containment is doomed to fail, regime change is necessary, preventive action is required – all words and phrases used first by Wolfowitz. By throwing in the spread-of-democracy angle, he has completed the Wolfowitz cycle. Will the plan work? I don’t know. It’s intriguing, and it maps out what would be a best-case scenario for US. But since it was written 12 years ago, it doesn't seem to accurately take into account the increasing role that fundamentalist Islamic theocracies have had in the region. (The Taliban, for example, wasn’t on the map in 1991.) Plus, our greatest threat comes not from the governments of Middle Eastern countries but from privately-financed militias that operate across borders. Finally, as the Venezuela issue shows, getting a democratic government does not necessarily mean a pro-US government; I can easily see Islamic parties taking power in several of these countries. And we have just as much a desire to keep economic channels open as expanding democracy, which could lead to policy conflicts here and abroad. But regardless, it seems like all Bush has done is change the date on the Wolfowitz report. The one other fascinating aspect of the Frontline show is it talked about how negatively Wolfowitz’s strategy was received by Bush I, and Cheney (then Sec of Defense) was told to re-write it. The revised version took out any mention of pre-emptive strikes and supported containment. Things have changed. Thoughts, comments?
"getting a democratic government does not necessarily mean a pro-US government" Obie, this is the most important part. The last time a legitimately elected government was chosen in a Muslim country it was overthrown by the French in Algeria. Is this what the US will be engaged in for the next decade? There seems to be no debate about the primary reason terrorism is around: poverty and lack of social justice. I'm sorry but this is exactly where the US has failed with its neoliberal development model.
This is the most intelligent thing Axis Alex has ever posted. Cossack has grasped one aspect of the reason for terrorism - lots of young men sitting around with no hope of bettering their poverty-stricken lives. It is one of the factors driving the suicide bombers in Israel. It is, of course, hardly the only factor, of course as there are also cultural, specifically religious, dimensions to the problem as well. After all, the 9/11 bombers were mostly from the uber-wealthy Kingdom of Saud and educated enough to fly jumbo jets. So the "battle of the peace" will have to be a subtle one "fought" on many "fronts". We're not just "fighting terrorists" as we are engaging an entire multi-national culture and attempting to transform it into our image. First world leaders are trying to turn a religious/tribal/communal society into a secular/pluralistic/hyper-individualistic one demanded by capitalism. It's a social engineering project of breath-taking scale. And it's not like the people on the receiving end of this first world, secular benevolence aren't perefectly aware of what is being proposed to be done with them, either. So far, only a small, elite portion of the Muslim countries have embraced secular capitalist consumerism as their mode of life and they are deeply resented by the majority of their countrymen because of it. The economic disparities caused by the First World's penchant for establishing a small elite of murderous dictators and their brutal cronies has only served to reinforce the resentment. The neoliberal globalizing policies favored by the leadership of the Amercian Right will only continue this trend, I fear. And I do not believe that the Bushies can successfully wage such a complex and multifaceted re-engineering of Muslim society even in the best of conditions and without all the ideolgical and social contradictions that will crop up in the attempt.
Thanks for sharing, dickhead. The thing that is not fully explained in the Wolfowitz strategy is how the despotic leaders of traditional US allies without democracy (Saudi being by far the biggest and most visible) are expected to adopt a democratic regime without the US forcing it on them like we plan to do in Iraq. Is King Fahd supposed to look at a democratic Iraq and say to himself for the first time ever, "hey, we need one of those systems"? Before there can be democracy, there has to be the removal of those who oppose it, and the people who are most likely to carry that out domestically are Islamic fundamentalists.
Do we really want democracy everywhere? Before I get slammed, democracy is great here and in western europe, because we have had centuries of good education and interactive government. The USA was "ready" for democracy back in the 1700s. Great Britain was as well, but even France had its problems with the emergence of democracy. Democracy without a solid foundation of education and responsibility often sends demagogues into leadership roles. And demagogues in the powderkeg that is the middle east does not necessarily appeal to me. Maybe I'm evil, but I think I prefer the King of Jordan to whoever would be elected to "repace" him...
You make a very good point. If Iraq becomes a democracy, they're going to suck at it for years to come. But they're never going to learn how to be a democracy under a dictator. Out of the frying pan and into the fire is a necessary philosophy.
Even if you agree with the Wolfowitz's premise, you have to agree that Bush the Younger is doing a terrible job of implementing it. At this rate, we will only be half way though dealing with Iraq and not at all with any other nation before his single term is up and a Democrat is put in charge. And in the mean time, the various delays, mistakes and tragedies will make the Wolfowitz plan even harder to carry out. If Bush was really serious about this, then on Sept 17 he should have said "We now know who the terrorists were and the nature of their philosophy. It is clear that the world is not a safe place. It is time to reshape it into one that matches the highest ideals of America and of Humanity." Then do it. If anyone asks to go to the UN, tell them "It is easer to ask forgiveness than permission".
You're very right. Democracy is likely overrated in general -- let's face it, not every voter makes an informed decision nowadays -- but in the Wolfowitz strategy, democracy is the ultimate goal all the time. Problem is that right now, the best-organized political parties are likely to come from mosques, which is something that Wolfowitz didn't think about at all in 1991.
Very good. This is of course the same argument put forward in the early '90's trying to explain why it was so hard to get liberal democracy to take root in Russian and Eastern Europe. It goes like this: Liberal democracy (which is neither, for you 8-grade level types, it is merely a term of art for, Wester-European style democracy) is the product of over 700 years European culture, beginning with the Renissance and continuing on through the Protestant Reformation and into the Enlightenment. It was during the latter period, in the 17th and 18th Centuries that the ideas of democracy and universal human rights really took hold birthing the reform of British government, the American Experiment(tm) and the First French Republic. Without all that cultural background it is argued, you have the work of generations in building the social foundation for what we would recognize as democracy. You can impose it from above e.g. as in Japan 1945. But we had to kick their army's ass, bomb them into the stone age, occupy their country, hang all their old leaders and make them accept a new constitution handed down by God (or Mac Aurthur, same difference in his eyes). Not a real viable option if you want to scale up the operation.
Maybe that is the price to pay. Iran tried it, they discovered that the mullahs didn't do a better job of filling the potholes or making the trains run on time, and now they're running in the opposite direction. (And frankly, if our government recognized that last thing, we could do a bang-up job cultivating a strong democratic ally in the Middle East that doesn't require a US occupation force.) Afghanistan tried it, and they weren't all that sorry to see the Taliban go -- at least, initially. If we stand for democracy, then we have to recognize that occasionally people will be elected that don't see eye-to-eye with us. And right now, the repression of those fundamentalist Islamic parties by the repressive governments that we back is one of the best recruiting tools that those parties have got. Make them a part of the establishment and suddenly, they're not as attractive to the "man in the street."
I think it took until now for Bush II to allow this reason for war to dominate the others. This is not to say that the strategy won't be successful. But you are correct that he has wasted time. He'll get another 4 years though if Iraq works out reasonably well.
I don't think many people thought the USA was "ready" for democracy in the late 18th century. Thus, the electoral college was conceived. I think this is precisely why the US has taken such a soft stance on Saudi Arabia to this point. Saudi Arabia's support of terrorism on global scale is a horrifying thing that should be dealt with. However, realistically, it presents significant problems. I am obviously for action on Iraq. However, I find the lack of Congressional discussion on post-war Iraq and how it might play out profoundly lacking. And I think this is a failure of both parties. Thanks for starting a worthwhile thread, by the way.
One of the problems, or alleged problems, with the idea that people in various places aren't "ready" for democracy is that we tend to define "democratic" as "pro-American." American foreign policy will be far better served if we learn to tolerate governments that don't like us a whole lot. Eventually, sooner than later, they will have to face the problems of potholes and such. Democracies tend to be not so keen on wars of extermination to keep the population distracted. In the short term, sure, a fully democratic Middle East might be a problem for Israel, if not us. But I'm convinced that sooner, rather than later, democratic governments will realize that war is bad for their economies. Especially the kinds of war where you get your asses kicked, which is the kind Israel tends to dish out. So they'll snarl and pass resolutions - they do that now. Calling a place "not ready for democracy" is usually shorthand for "we're not ready to stop screwing them over."
I agree with Dan on this, but for my own twisted reactionary reasons This will be a lot easier with no more Soviet Union for third-world democracies to play against us. Now, these governments will have to play ball with us, unless a a new USSR-like super power comes about, but I don't see China or France trying to establish their own world-wide empires. I would hope the GOP realizes this eventually, and that we should lay-off a little with these types of situations and take the high road (more flies with honey...).
I suppose if a democracy elects someone we don't like, we can always have the CIA intervene, a la Allende in Chile, Mousedeh in Iran, etc.
So I finally read the transcript of what Bush said. The LA Times focused on the thing I found most astounding. If we topple Saddam, then we'll help solve the Israel-Palestine situation. See, because, Saddam gives so much money to the families of suicide bombers, that without that money, there wouldn't be as many suicide bombers. *head has exploded three times already* How desperate for excuses is this administration, anyway? Does anyone, anywhere, buy this? If so, you have my pity. And scorn. Mostly scorn.
Dan: Read the Frontline transcript of interviews with some of the most informed insiders regarding this idea that ousting Saddam will lead to peace in Palestine. Richard Perle's statements address this probably the most thoroughly. It's still far-fetched IMO (pro-democracy Iranians will be motivated and rise up against the mullahs, thus starting a domino effect), but at least it's more thought out and coherent than Bush's argument. How all of this wonderful stuff happens without us eventually invading Saudi and Egypt remains beyond my comprehension.
Perle was the one who broached this subject in the program, too, and I would have loved to hear more about this idea, since it seems like that's what this administration is bent on pursuing. What I've heard so far doesn't fill me with confidence--I guess the nicest thing I can say is that I hope I'm wrong since it looks set to happen regardless. The problem I see with this reasoning is the unreflexive way they're talking about how the regime change might be perceived. Sure, he says "if we prosecute this war in the right way with the right result -- which is the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its replacement with a group of Iraqis who will move the country in the direction of a humane and open politics" but we've already got rampant speculation about the selected successors to Hussein and how they've been chosen by how they're aligned with US interests. This is a problem for the Perle-delineated plan given that he seems to expect much of the change to be motivated by new confidence (e.g.:"First, it will inspire the opponents of the regime in Iran. I have no doubt about that"). Most Arabs in the Middle East already perceive the US as acting like Israel's hired muscle, and the replacement, through US military intervention, of an anti-Israeli regime with a pro-Israeli (or at least pro-peace process) is supposed to set off a spontaneous chain reaction of grass roots movement in the region? Check out, also, Perle's response to this question: Q.: There's an opposite view, that they might not do this, that you might cause huge trouble. But also, how does it affect other problems down the line? How does this move affect this very difficult, complicated world? A: "I think when the United States acts decisively, it strengthens the influence of the United States. Secondly, I believe that much of the charge against the United States, in the current situation, that we are interested in dominating the Middle East, that we are interested in Iraqi oil, for example, much of the charge against us will be blown away by our behavior in the aftermath of the success. So one of the sources of anti-Americanism, which is this slander about our motives, will be decisively contradicted by our behavior. We're not going to steal Iraq's oil. It's going to go to the people of Iraq. We're not going to dominate the region. We're going to stay only long enough to permit Iraqis to achieve a stable government. And then we'll be gone. And the idea that is used to animate anti-American feeling -- that we are rapacious, that we are imperialist -- will have been demonstrated to be false. So in this one situation in Iraq, there is the potential both to transform the region and perceptions of the United States." Fine, let's play with this idea a little. For example, let's look at the first Gulf War. You could say that the liberation of Kuwait from Hussein's forces comes very close to fitting the profile outlined by Perle for the potential US treatment of Iraq. The US-led coalition removed Saddam from Kuwait, left Kuwait's oil alone, provided the added bonus of decimating Saddam's large and threatening (to other Arab nations) armed forces and, apart from policing the no-fly zones, left the same way they'd come. Besides Al Quaeda, what grass roots movements were spawned by that intervention? Based on that evidence alone, it's reasonable to worry that the thinking going on in the Bush administration might be simplistic. One potential counterpoint to this argument is that the first gulf war didn't add, as Perle suggests the second gulf war will add, a new democratic state to the region. Thus, one could argue, there has as yet been no chance for the example of free Iraqis exercising the rights and privileges of humane democracy to work its magic in the region, inspiring Iran, stimulating Egypt, catalyzing Saudi Arabia... But, if Iraq is going to be seen that way by the citizens of other Arab nations, wouldn't we already be hearing something similar from them about Afghanistan?
Did somebody say "Saudi Arabia"? http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-23.htm http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/231lukti.asp Iraq could be glassed tomorrow, and the Palestinian cause wouldn't feel it a bit.
There's that one phrase "We're not going to dominate the region" that bugs me. Fine, that works for me, I believe it. But I have (some) trust in American motives. The Arab street does not. Please tell me Perle and Wolfowitz aren't so naive as to believe that the post-Hussein American ruling of Iraq won't have Arab youth running to their closest Al-Qaeda recruiting office. Who cares how temporary it is, like Obie pointed out, the biggest threat to American national security is not from governments, but from the non-governmental terrorist organizations. If we can convince Mubarak and the House of Saud that our motives are pure, so what? That 16-year old living in the slums of Cairo doesn't give a rat's a$$ what Mubarak says. And six months from now that kid will be the one blowing himself up on the DC metro. Lovely.
More info, straight from the horse's mouth: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/politics/28COST.html "In his testimony, Mr. Wolfowitz ticked off several reasons why he believed a much smaller coalition peacekeeping force than General Shinseki envisioned would be sufficient to police and rebuild postwar Iraq. He said there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, as there was in Bosnia or Kosovo. He said Iraqi civilians would welcome an American-led liberation force that "stayed as long as necessary but left as soon as possible," but would oppose a long-term occupation force. And he said that nations that oppose war with Iraq would likely sign up to help rebuild it. "I would expect that even countries like France will have a strong interest in assisting Iraq in reconstruction," Mr. Wolfowitz said. He added that many Iraqi expatriates would likely return home to help. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, many nations agreed in advance of hostilities to help pay for a conflict that eventually cost about $61 billion. Mr. Wolfowitz said that this time around the administration was dealing with "countries that are quite frightened of their own shadows" in assembling a coalition to force President Saddam Hussein to disarm." The broader issue being addressed by the article is a disagreement over how many troops/how much cost will be needed in the hypothetical post-Saddam Iraq. It's interesting that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld are disagreeing with the generals, or vice-versa, since those two are the leading proponents of a plan that is built on extensive use of the US military.
As this whole scenario plays out, I believe it's important to keep our objectives in order, and understand them as relatively discrete items, though one may follow on from another. First, elminating WMDs from Iraq. Whether we get some sort of democratic government post Hussein or not, getting rid of WMDs has its own salutary effect. Second, regime change in Iraq. What sort of NEW regime will take the place of Hussein's? Well, it's going to be messy, no doubt about it. You've got the Kurds, you've got the Shiites, you've got the Sunni's who have wielded power for the past two decades, youi've got the exiles, you've got the Turks, etc. etc. I don't think anyone is minimizing the risks associated with this endeavor. Third -- and I address this item in VERY broad terms -- the general democratization of the Middle East. I think we will be successful with the first item. With respect to item #2, I think the odds of instituting a non-aggressive non depostic secular relatively democratic government in Iraq are pretty good. It is a state with a history of secular mercantilism, with a highly educated population. It's by no means a shoo-in and LOTs can go wrong, but it is definitely within the realm of the possible. The last item is very very problematic. There are scenarios where you can envision it happening, but there are possibilities where it simply doesn't happen. Iran has an ossified mullah ruling class and a vast strata of dissatisfied young people who want freedom and a vibrant economy, but are the mullahs going to allow TRUE reform? Meanwhile, THESE mullahs want nuclear weapons. Ugh. Then you've got Saudi Arabia, another country with an ossified ruling class and dynastic set up. Reforms will come VERY slowly there, if at all. Egypt and Syria have their own dynastic schemes in place, and Egypt has its peculiar strain of fundamentalist zealots causing trouble. Syria has gotten the message and is institituting some reforms, but absolute power is a tough thing to let go. I guess I am really conflicted about the Wolfowitz-Perle foreign policy vector. Everywhere I turn, I see problems, difficulties, and a general messiness. But on the other hand, if we DON'T make the effort to push/foster/lubricate a more secularized and broader democratic movement in the Middle East, then the region may remain a breeding ground for seething terrorism, along with the worst sort of theocratic fundamentalism, and despotism in general. The stakes are very high. My bias is toward action rather than passivity, but I have no illusions. And you know what? I bet the adminstration doesn't either. Remember, Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld, and George Bush present their arguments on a certain level for public consumption. I really believe that they are not SOOO naive that they don't understand the pitfalls.
I don't think you can point to syllogistic arguments like (1) Hussein supports suicide bombers (2) Hussein toppled, ergo (3) suicide bombers toppled. I think the argument is that freedom works like osmosis, so its best spread from the country right next door. Things like free press and increasing standards of living in Iraq, plus proof of U.S. good faith and willingness to be reasonably hands off after a couple of years could force a similar situation in Saudi Arabia. Or we might just stick in our own thug with a pro-corruption agenda and a calendar filled with back room meetings with Big Oil. Looks like Wolfowitz might get his chance to prove his salt.