Amazingly, I find that I agree with almost everything Scowcroft says here, and he says it pretty well, I might add: concise and persuasive. (Actually, he does too casually refer to the vague "war on terror" as if he really does believe it IS a war, and not the police action that it is, but oh well) It's particularly interesting to read this after having just watched the Frontline show about the internal struggles between Scowcroft/Powell and Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld. This piece totally fits into that conflict. By now, however, Powell seems to have been dragged to the dark side, and Scowcroft's pull in the administration probably isn't very huge. So this likely won't have the effect that his last major editorial did as described in the show tonight.
Scowcroft is not even in the administration, so he has no pull. So, you're internal "struggles" should have been grouped as follows: Scowcroft (sitting on his couch, opposed) Powell/Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld (in the administration, in favor)
I can see why my post might confuse you if you didn't watch tonight. Much of it was about the internal stuggle from the first Bush admin, which is what I was referring to. And that's why I note Scowcroft's diminished pull (though to say a two time Republican National Security Adviser has "no pull" seems a bit naive). I think he can still cause a stir or two.
You're not suggesting that Ian might make a blanket statement about an issue on which he's not informed, are you?
It's a reasoned argument by Scowcroft, but the one aspect of the argument that troubles me is this: "He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs." Well, he's got the WMDs now, and it STILL isn't deterring us. In fact, if you want to take it to the logical conclusion, HAVING those WMDs is in fact giving us the perfectly CONVENIENT excuse TO topple him. As a result, those weapons aren't acting as a deterrent, but actually as a lubricant to our intervention. By this logic, he should readily give them all up. But why hasn't he?? The implication througout Scowcroft's article is that Saddam is just engaging in some realpolitik. But in my view, he wants WMDs because he simply thinks he can GET AWAY WITH HAVING THEM, and can use them (or maybe have others use them) at a time and place that he sees fit. THIS is what makes him so sinister.
Interesting article. I think he makes a few good points but I disagree with some of his arguments and his conclusion. I agree with his highlighting the Israel-Palestine issue. Bush has certainly dropped the ball on that one and it does hurt us on the Iraq and terrorism issues. I wonder if we could pursue another peace initiative prior to the attack on Iraq. I know that the Palestinians will want to resist coming to the table with the attack pending but we may be able to get them to come if we appear to be moving away from Bush's noninvolvement and hands off approach to Israel's handling of the situation. Of course we could make it more attractive by connecting it to aid. This could reduce the ability of the Islamic community to paint us as anti-Islam. Even a "failed" attempt could help us if we really make it clear that we are now engaged again and if we can set a schedule for future discussions. Thus Bush could invite both sides to new discussions in the US to occur immediately if they are willing or within a few months when the war should be wrapping up. I certainly don't think it would hurt us to try this tactic. I think he is wrong about the impact of this war on the terrorism issue. Even countries that oppose this war have made it clear that they want to continue working with us on the terrorism problem. I think Scowcroft ignores this fact. He also focuses on the short term surge of anti-American sentiment without a good consideration of the alternatives. Scowcroft admits that we will want to take out Saddam eventually but argues that now is not the time. He ignores the fact that we are already fairly commited to taking him out and that it would be very difficult to try this action again if we back away from it now. We'd be making a tacit argument that Saddam's actions over the last decade aren't sufficient reason to go to war. Thus we would need much larger violations in the future to attempt this again. Such future violations would have to be very serious such as demonstration of nuclear capability, use of WMD again, invasion of another state, a massive genocide campaign against the Kurds and/or Shia moslems in the south. He ignores the fact that allowing Saddam to reach this point would force us to face a stronger Saddam and/or already have paid the price for inaction. He also ignores the fact that Moslems are likely to have a similar reaction to any future attack as they do now (although if he is killing off massive numbers of Moslems, this effect will be offset). Finally, he does not address the impact that letting Saddam get away with his actions will have on future counterproliferation issues, perception of our credible commitments, and the value of the UN. In discussing Saddam's links to terrorism, he ignore Iraq's historical ties to terrorist groups. He focuses on Al Qaeda alone (probably because Bush has stupidly done the same) and 9/11. He also downplays the area of agreement between Saddam and terrorists. While admiting that we stand in the way of each of them achieving their goals, Scowcroft glosses over the obvious next logical possibility, namely that they may agree to work together to hurt us. Scowcroft also exagerates the military impact that a war with Iraq will have on operations in the war on terrorism. The forces used in a conventional campaign to invade and conquer a state have limited overlap with those needed to pursue and defeat terror networks. He actually advocates waiting to attack until we get confirmation that Saddam has nukes. That has got to be one of the worst arguments I've ever seen. He says this after playing up the potential for serious civilian casualties from Saddam's current WMD weapons. The irony appears to escape him completely.