On The 1974 World Cup

The following was written by David Miller of England for the 'Official Documentation of the Organizing Committee for the 1974 World Cup Football Tournament':

Did the best four teams reach the final two matches in 1974? On reflection I would say that the team which perhaps least deserved to be there were Brazil, three times former champions. In fact, had West Germany not lost to the East Germans in the first round, thereby going into Group A as expected instead of Group B, then Holland and West Germany would have qualified form Group A, to the exclusion of Brazil, and Poland and either Yugoslavia or Sweden from Group B.

There is little doubt in my mind that Yugoslavia were technically one of the best three teams. But like Holland in the final they forgot that the game is half about character. The Slavs all wanted to be great players. They, and others, could do well to listen to David Hay, who with Billy Bremner epitomised the Scottish attitude. “When we go on the field, we are ready to give blood for Scotland” said Hay. “If patriotism is silly, ok, we are silly. We’d like a lot of money, of course, but even without it we’ll play till we drop.”

The only two players in the Yugoslav team approaching this attitude were Acimovic, the burly, almost tubby little Red Star midfield man, and tall Surjak from Hajduk. Two more with the same mental stability as they, and I believe the Slavs could have radically altered the outcome of the tournament. As it was, Bogicevic, the midfield ‘sweeper’ who was equipped to be one of the great players of the finals, and Bajevic, a striker of inestimable talent, were both almost total failures, while Dzajic, once Europe’s number one winger, was way below form, after two years in the army.

Poland, having eliminated England with one of the surprise performances of history – and unbelievable luck at Wembley – shone a rainbow across the World Cup while others were more concerned with the crock of gold at its end. From the first few minutes against Argentina, their luck continued to hold, did so against Sweden and Yugoslavia in the second round, but deserted them against West Germany, but for which they might well have been in the final.

They gave to the competition, together with Scotland, that spirit of slightly reckless adventure, but, more than Scotland, they had striking power up front sufficient to frighten anyone. Gadocha and Lato emphasised the value of fast wingers playing wide, and Szarmach, appearing from nowhere, so to speak, became the competition’s second top scorer – after Lato. Gorgon, their craggy, blond centerhalf, had improved enormously since playing England, Szymanowski and Musial were among the most intelligent back-line players to be seen.

Deyna, in a quiet way, exerted an influence on the team from the middle of the field as great as Cruyff on Holland, with articulate supprt on the right flank from Kasperczak. Poland, it could certainly be said, were a pleasure to watch, not least the remarkable Tomaszewski, who as at Wembley continued to save shots with both ends of his body, often unwittingly, with an improbability which had its own special charm – if you were not on the other side.

Brazil are discussed at length elsewhere. They possessed probably the best back-line in the competition in Ze Maria, Luis Pereira, Mario Marinho, and Francisco Marinho, but were so obsessed with caution, ultimately shamefully aggressive, that they forfeited much of that unique prestige which they have earned in the past. It will take them a long time to live down their attitudes of 1974. As Dettmar Cramer, one of the world’s foremost coaches and a member of the FIFA technical committee, remarked in the first week: “It is a beautiful story, that Brazil has an endless supply of Pelés. The only trouble is, it is not true.”

The tournament was a disaster for the much publicised black Paulo Cesar, while Jairzinho was a shadow of the man who had adorned the game in Mexico. With Edu left out in the cold – the total contrast to a left winger to Zagalo himself – the other strikers who were used, Valdomiro, Mirandinha, Leivinha, Dirceu, were nothing more than average. When Brazil became ordinary, what prize football? Even Rivelino, their one remaining great attacking talent, was a devalued figure, trying to shoulder the midfield leadership for which he was not equipped.

Much has been written about Holland, but perhaps one may best again quote Dettmar Cramer: "Holland, and Cruyff, have shown us just how brilliant, how far ahead of his time, di Stéfano was with Real Madrid 20 years ago. He and Cruyff are in many ways identical. They operate over the whole length of the pitch, directing the start of attacks, yet being there to help conclude them. Cruyff has the same even temperament, yet like di Stéfano can be hard and brave, when it is necessary. A super player." Elaborating on the Dutch, Tomislav Ivic, one of Yugoslavia’s coaches and manager of Hajduk Split, explained: "A great team now needs five qualities, - technique, tactics, stamina, mental maturity and physical size. It is no coincidence that Holland, besides everything else, are one of the tallest and strongest teams here. Previously it has been enough to have one or two qualities. This is no longer so."

There is of course a sixth quality which is an inevitable product of the five – the ability to pace a match, to ‘coast’ in between periods of intense pressure. It was true of the Hungarians in 1954, of Brazil in 1958 and 1970, of the multinational Real Madrid and Barcelona in the late ‘50s, of the pre-Munich Manchester United. It was true of Holland – until, in a moment of insanity, they believed they could coast after only 60 seconds of the final. They would not have done that would they have been better judges of character – and history. Yet if the Germans snatched the trophy from Holland, nobody can take away the memory of their wonderfully fluent displays. Here was truly total football, a team attacking with 10 men, all players capable of playing in all positions as the movements developed.

"Will Holland play without a sweeper in the final?" I asked Rinus Michels at their Hiltrup lake-side camp. "We are an attacking side, but even Holland cannot play without a goalkeeper" Michels replied with a smile. There was truth in the joke. With Haan playing in front of Rijsbergen, it was Jongbloed’s responsibility to come out to clear the loose balls played in behind the backline. The secret of Holland’s system was to play without a central striker, leaving the whole front middle area clear, so that any player could break into it – Rensenbrink or Krol on the left flank, Rep or Suurbier on the right, or Neeskens, Jansen, Cruyff, van Hanegem and even Haan through the middle. Holland appeared to play in ‘packs’, always with three or more players within 15 yards of the ball, because of their elaboration of the ‘whirl theory’, in which the player passing the ball immediately runs to the point, to which he has just passed. The system swamped the Germans in the second half of the final, just as it had swamped others, but this time the goals would not come.

Germany, with tremendous strength of character in men like Bonhof and Vogts, not to mention the established stars, Beckenbauer, Breitner and Müller, took their chance with an opportunism which has characterised their World Cup record. Ever since they first appeared in the competition as ‘West’ Germany in 1954, they have performed if anything above rather than below the sum total of their component parts – with England, the best ‘competitors’ in the game. In 1974 they only just in time overcame their internal squabbling and friction – commonsense being forced upon them by the traumatic defeat at the hands of East Germany. That had a double effect, it kept them apart from Holland in the second round groups and as Helmut Schön admitted after the final: "It made all the players realise that they had to pull together, to get down to business."

They did so with a will, and now they have joined Uruguay and Italy in having won the World Cup twice, the others being Brazil, three times, and England, once. Of course, Germany had stars, some truly great players in men like Beckenbauer, Müller and Breitner. But had they a team? Of course, they would have a huge crowd at their back, and the Germans are traditionally fine match-players temperamentally, producing teams which do not readily accept defeat. This particular team had lost much of the exciting quality which had characterised the winning of the 1972 European Championship. The decline of Günter Netzer had meant a loss of that special three-dimensional quality which a player of his immense perception gives to any team – which Cruyff now gave to Holland. The fact that the muscular Bonhof, introduced against Yugoslavia in a remarkable upheaval of four changes, now represented the character of the team in midfield – a capacity for work rather than for inspired improvisation – was not something which sent neutrals rushing to put their money on Germany.

Of course, Müller was and still is the greatest ‘percentage’ close range finisher in the game, but would he get the chances even against a defense which scorned a sweeper, leaving its goalkeeper to clear up the loose ends on the edge of the box? Of course, too, Beckenbauer, by the simple deceit of wearing number 5, was the fluent instigator of more than half of Germany’s attacks, a fact which opposing sides seemed to ignore purely on account of the number on his back. And Breitner, with those powerful surges into the opposing half, was with Krol the most formidable full-back in the competition. Yet for all this had West Germany not made heavy weather of Chile and lost to East Germany, had they not looked occasionally vulnerable against Yugoslavia, Sweden and Poland?

There was no doubting their virility, but there were genuine doubts that they could even begin to scale the same technical and tactical heights as the Dutch. Holland, apart from 10 or 15 minutes in the first half against Brazil had never been in the slightest difficulty. While Germany were probably dependent on either Muller or Breitner to get their goals, Holland could look to at least five players as potential matchwinners – Cruyff, Neeskens, Rep, Jansen and Krol. Of the two stoppers, Rijsbergen and Schwarzenbeck, the one more likely to be exposed was Schwarzenbeck as Holland pushed any one of six men through the middle. The main speculation before the final centred on whether Bonhof or Vogts would be given the job of shadowing Cruyff in the attempt to achieve the impossible and nullify his uncomparable skills. Bonhof would be the best positioned, but the tough little Vogts had the speed. It was Vogts who got the job.

If one is looking for an insight into Germany’s own feelings about the game it comes from Beckenbauer, who said before the final: "Of course Cruyff is fantastic, but I must think of my own game not his. I think we are strong now, although before the game against Yugoslavia I feared we would not reach the final." West Germany beat the favorites to take the title for the second time in 20 years because they had the character, the mental tenacity to refuse to allow Holland to make fools of them. While a Dutch victory would have been a triumph for pure skill, there is no denying that Germany’s gritty but less than polished achievement was the spice of uncertainty which makes football such a fascinating game. I do not believe that Germany were a great team, certainly not one with the potential or flair of the Dutch, but then nor were England the best team, simply in terms of skill, in 1966.

 

Don't know how you could think I am interested in putting down the performances of Dutch football. Especially not this 1974 team, which ranks among my absolute favorite teams. I have all of their WC '74 games on DVD and can't help but adore this team. To me, their greatness - even among the historic classic teams - is still unchallenged.

Anyway this was written by an Englishman, not me. It's a vintage article from 1974. If you think it is putting down Holland 1974, you should direct your criticism to David Miller, the author. It however seems quite favorable of the Holland team. The author was probably looking for some kind of 'excuse' to explain how this supreme side could lose to a - quoting his words - 'not great team' like Germany 1974 and hence his solution was to get it down to a lack of character. All his words not mine - no need to fume, chill out Johanna.

This article is far more critical of the German team than of the Dutch one, thus my motives posting this could hardly be anti-Dutch. I found some of the tactical aspects worthy of reading, namely Michels' saying that they didn't need a field player as a sweeper because their goalkeeper was taking up that duty - which is a very 'modern' approach, in fact some of today's sports journalists (at least here in Germany) act as if the concept of the goalkeeper functioning as a quasi-libero (with good ball skills) is an entirely new concept (as well as attacking full backs - just read it today in my newspaper how attacking defenders are one of the characteristics of 'the modern game').

 

Once more:

1) "lack of character" was something Mr David Miller diagnosed the '74 Dutch of, not me. Wanting Mr Miller to apologise for that 34 years after he wrote it is somewhat irritating.

Actually, upon reading it again, Miller didn't even accuse them of "lack of character", as you put it, what he said was:

But like Holland in the final they forgot that the game is half about character.

...and....

They would not have done that would they have been better judges of character – and history.

What is said in the article is notably different to what you claim is said. I have no clue how you could get worked up like that about this.

2) I did not post this article to downgrade the Dutch team of 1974. To the contrary, the article is far more praising of that team than it is downgrading it.

3) How many other articles have I posted which are patronising to the Dutch team of 1974? And where can I find them? The only article dealing particularly with Holland 1974 that I remember having posted here was by Dutchman Ruud Doevedans of Planet World Cup, in which he posed the question whether Cruyff cost Holland 2 World Cups, because of his insistance not to have the - allegedly - best Dutch goalkeeper ever, Jan van Beveren, make the World Cup squads (out of personal animosity). Now even that critical article (by a Dutchman about Cruyff, not Holland) does not even remotely match your claims that I am obsessed with downgrading Holland of the 1970s.

 

The only part of that 1974 Brazil team that really did well was the defense. Look at the amount of goals they conceded. Luis Pereira certainly was rated among the best players defensively of that tournament. Francisco Marinho was a flashy left back, but I think he was oveshadowed by Breitner and Krol, as was Ze Maria by Suurbier (offensively) and Vogts (defensively) as right backs. Mario Marinho pretty solid, but so were other central defenders like Zmuda, Gorgon, Rijsbergen, Schwarzenbeck, Bransch etc.

Italy in 1974 also appeared to be a bit overaged. With Burgnich, Facchetti, Rivera and Mazzola four very instrumental players very past their peak (although Mazzola was voted into a "Best of 1973" team in a German book forecasting the 1974 World Cup, along with Zoff, Beckenbauer, Moore, Breitner, Netzer, Müller, Rivelino, Cruyff and a couple of other players).

2 years old in 1974? Sounds familiar to me!

 

'Blessing' people on internet message boards as if they were mentally disabled persons is a pretty patronising act. This coming from you - yourself complaining about being patronised as a Dutch person - leaves a tremendously self-righteous impression. Maybe Zippy judged you right after all?

 

From the same book, here is the report of German Walter Lutz, titled "Success of Moral" (how Johan's gonna sue me for that...)

It is safe to say that due to the diverse teams, styles, systems and conceptions we witnessed colourful and content-rich World Cup finals, a wide-ranging tournament on a generally good level and in good sportive spirit (with few exceptions), led by generally good referees unlike Chile 1962 and England 1966, tournaments that negated the spirit of football.

Germany ’74, with the Dutch team as main exponents, brought ‘total football’, the high-paced, all-purpose, athletic, in-shape player who was optimally trained and primed in direct duels as well. Germany '74 showed how important the hard-to-reach balance within a team is, the concurrence of the different lines, which, separated in attack and defense, have to coalesce. And Germany '74 also brought new developments in the organisation of a team and affirmed the importance of self- and team discipline.

The final itself taught us that the power, the force of battle, the dedication to the task and the steeliness of a team is playing a especially important role during a tournament, in which these components, described by the word “punch”, were tipping the scales.

In one point, the expectations of the experts did not fulfil: The trend towards the 4-4-2, introduced in England 1966, was not continued. The successful teams basically played with rather three than two forwards and most of the time they had occupied the wing positions. Yes, one could almost talk of a resurrection of wing play. Pacy, tricky forwards with shooting power and header ability have become important again. Poland – arguably the surprise of the tournament with their out-of-the-blue attacking style – did play foremost over the wings; the Germans only got better after they augmented their flanks and after placing the emphasis of their attack more on the wings; Holland, too, used the full width of the pitch and virtually played with two double-wings: Rep/Suurbier, Rensenbrink/Krol.

Certainly this World Cup saw beautiful and offensive football. Why then, people may ask, were fewer goals scored at a World Cup than ever before? As a start, the different levels of technique within teams has been reduced. Secondly, in contemporary football, there are no ‘passive’ players anymore, regardless of defending or attacking. There are no defenders-only or attackers-only anymore. Today, defenders attack and attackers defender. This means that forwards have to override more defenders.

The importance of outstanding personalities on the pitch, or ‘playmakers’, has increased. They shape the style of a team and decide their success. Take Beckenbauer out of the German team, Cruyff out of the Dutch, Deyna out of Poland’s, Bremner out of Scotland’s, Babington out of Argentina’s and Oblak (as long as he was not tired) out of Yugoslavia’s – and suddenly the prospect looks different for these teams. Interesintly, these playmakers all had a vital assistant: Overath for Beckenbauer, Neeskens for Cruyff, Kasperczak for Deyna …

But today, the “star” of a team can’t isolate himself anymore. The playmaker only can achieve full impact if he is serving his team, like every other player, he has to be athletically fit and be a fighter. This was the reason why a Rivera and a Netzer failed, and Rivelino did not become the all-important player of his side because he wanted to shine personally with his many tricks. Yet today the star has to work for his team.

The final confirmed an old football rule: The first prerequisite for a good performance and for success is the firm anchorage and good organisation of the defense. A team must be built on these fundaments. Otherwise a team will collapse. However if too many players are used for this safety, the team will be weakened in attack or midfield or both decisively, as was the case with Brazil. It is thus important to find the right measure and ideal synthesis of a functional balance. The German team who had won the 1972 European Championship and who benefitted of the footballing genius of Günter Netzer, at that time arguably in the form of his life, appeared to be playing more beautifully, more attractive and more elegant than the sober, functional World Cup team, who was stronger in fighting. However the latter team understood to raise the level of their performces from game to game. And it possessed of inlikely moral and battlesome qualities in the final. Quite a few other teams would have collapsed after being behind after 56 seconds due to a penalty. Just imagine: 0-1 in the final of a World Cup without a single German player getting his foot on the ball!

Perhaps the final was decided by the greater experience, especially in a hard tournament with its special characteristics which began anew in the second round. Admittedly the Dutch could have made it with a bit more routine and quick-wittedness. Their decisive mistake it seemed, was that they after the early 1-0 lead irritated themselves. Out of too much caution not to lose this effortlessly achieved 1-0 lead, they gave up their style. In spite of looking for the final killing punch – like in all previous games – to push the pace even more and to try to knock-out the groggy opponent, they began to calculate, to safe energy, until the opponent had regained his control.

Imposing were the Poles, who had in Lato and especially in Gadocha arguably the finest outside forwards of the competition, who could develop their game with long and wide assists from the depth of midfield into the free space with their acceleration and fitness. The Poles’ system did resemble a bit that of the Swiss team in 1954 and the French one in 1958. No wonder that these dynamic Poles managed to eliminate England and then the static-old-fashioned Italy, the Word Cup winner of 1966 and finalist of 1970.

 

It's a familiar situation to me, tried to give rep to some of your posts during recent months yet it's not working as I don't have enough rep power.

Thanks for your positive comments!

 

If I remember correctly it is from a book which I bought on a flea market about 20 years ago which was issued in 1974 and was multi-lingual presenting several articles by journalists, coaches and officials. I will have a look at the book later today.

 

I can't find the book anymore.

This book store seems to have it though:

http://www.schlick.ch/s/galerie/gal_fussball.php

26503 Organisationskomitee für die Fussball-Weltmeisterschaft 1974 (Hrsg.): World Cup 74 [2 Bände]. Das offizielle Dokumentarwerk des Organisationskomitees für die Fussball-Weltmeisterschaft 1974. The Official Documentation of the Organizing Committee for the 1974 World Cup Football Tournament. München: proSport 1974. 503 S., 23x30,5. OPpb.
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