Germany-Brazil 2002 Final

Brazil-Germany: the 2002 World Cup Final

A couple of weeks ago I rented a tape of the 2002 WC final and watched it again. I wanted to re-assess the performance of the team as a whole and the players individually. Also, I wanted to get a better sense of the tactical approach Germany took that day and how well it worked.

The Game

Let’s start with the lineup. Germany played a 3-5-2 (Kahn,-- Linke, Ramelow, Metzelder,-- Hamann, Jeremies,--Frings, Schneider, Bode, —Klose, Neuville. Ramelow marshaled the defence, positioned between Linke and Metzelder; Hamann and Jeremies were our defensive midfielders; Frings and Bode played on the wings, right and left sides respectively; Schneider played as a roving attacking midfielder; and Klose and Neuville were the strikers.

From the opening whistle, it looked as if the Germans were up to the challenge as they took the game to the Brazilians. They applied constant pressure on the ball carrier and the Brazilian midfield, not leaving the Brazilians much space in which to operate; this approached helped neutralize the Brazilian attack. Jeremies, Hamann, and, to a lesser extent, Ramelow clogged up the middle of the pitch making it difficult for the Brazilians to create a threatening rush. Bode and Frings were playing out wide to impede any potential attacks down the flanks. From Ronaldo, Ronaldinho, and Rivaldo not much was generated in the way of scoring opportunities.

While the run off play and percentage of ball possession was fairly even, Brazil did look the more dangerous of the two sides in attack. Watching the match, one gets the sense that it’s only a matter of time before Brazil scores. The Germans had only two or three—what could be called legitimate—scoring opportunities throughout the entire match. It’d be fair to characterize the Germans attack as limp. Schneider caused the Brazilian outside-backs some trouble with his ball control and inside, outside cut-ins. Neuville posed some problems with his ball trickery and speed. Aside from these two, the Brazilian defence never seemed troubled by German players individually or by the offence as a whole.

The German attack looked timid and incohesive. Only Schneider and Neuville were confident enough to run at and by defenders. The midfielders were too spread out from each other and from the two forwards that they weren’t able to put together more than two or three passes at a time. Hamann and Jeremies played so deep that Schneider was left alone up front with Neuville and Klose, up against four or five defenders. Bode and Frings played too far out wide and weren’t fast enough to cover much ground, making them spectators in rather than contributors to the attack. Germany never really posed a threat because the game-plan was focused on neutralizing Brazil.

Voeller’s Tactics

The reason for Rudi Voeller’s game-plan was obvious. Stop Brazil from scoring and you stand a better chance of winning. In a high-tempo, high-scoring match, you’re playing right into the hands of what the enemy does best, so best to avoid it.

It’s hard to argue with Voeller’s tactics and player selection that day. Ballack was suspended so he couldn’t play. There wasn’t anyone on the bench who deserved to be on the pitch more than the players Voeller selected. That being said, Voeller’s decision to leave Bode on so long after he tired was unwise. Ziege provided a spark when he was substituted in for Bode, and if the substitution hadn’t come so late, the Germans may well have generated a little more in the way of scoring chances down the left wing. Not that Bode wasn’t game, he just didn’t have the legs after 45 minutes. The same could be said of the late Bierhoff substitution.

Defensive game-plan Voeller adopted against Brazil was most prudent approach to take especially in Ballack’s absence. It was clear to me watching at the time, and it is just as clear now after having watched the match again that Brazil was by far the better team that day. The quality of their team as a whole and of the players individually far exceeded the quality of the German roster. Ronaldinhos, Ronaldos, and R. Carlos, and the Rivaldos were a cut above anyone on the Germany. Voeller’s approach was the right one to take.

Individual Performances

Neuville, Schneider, Linke, and, Ramelow turned in exceptional performances that day.

Neuville (2) was a monster; he was all over the pitch. Almost scored from a blistering free kick which hit the upright. His speed and trickery posed problems for the Brazilian defenders. He even helped out in defence in one occasions. He turned in a quality performance.

Schneider (2.5) too was quick and skillful enough to pose difficulties for the defense. Unfortunately, he didn’t get too much in the way of support from the defensive midfielders or from the wingers so his effectiveness in attack was limited.

Linke (2) was a rock in defense. On a couple of occasions he was faced with a Brazilian attacker coming straight down at him, but Linke was more than up to the challenge due to a high concentration level, excellent tackling, and anticipation skills.

Ramelow (2.5) did a fine job in marshalling the defense. He turned away any one-on-one challenges and moved the ball forward with skill and without hesitation. No bad passes or wasted clearances. (Why did he retire from the National Team so soon?)

Average performances:

Jeremies (3.5) Strong positional play. Always strong in the challenge, but nothing in the way of offense.

Bode (4) was all heart, but he just didn’t have the legs. His effectiveness was limited to 45 minutes. His role was to shut down attacks down his flank.

Frings (4) Nothing spectacular really. Never really had an impact

Metzelder (4) Got burned once, and seemed a little unsteady throughout the match. Moves forward well, though, with one-two passes.

Hamann (4) Made a bad pass which lead to the first goal. Never really seemed to force himself into the match.

Kahn (4) Badly misplayed Rivaldo’s shot.

Klose (4.5) Not much from him in the way of offense, but that can be excused considering he had virtually no support.

Lessons learned:

One, without Ballack, we don’t stand much of a chance in generating any offence or instilling a little fear into our opposition. Ballack is the brains behind the operation. He doesn’t dominate a match the way Ronaldinho does or the way Zidane or Nedved used to do, but he is good enough to score when he gets a half chance and that makes him dangerous.

Two, a compact defensive diamond, consisting of two defensive-midfielders and a center-back can be effective in thwarting the Brazilian attack.

Three, we need more speed in the team, especially on the wings, especially if we expect our wingers to push forward and defend.

Four, there was just too much space between the players, especially the midfielders. The midfielders need to be positioned closer together; there’s little chance that any meaningful offensive attack will come from a trio or quartet of players going up against four of five defenders. Their has to be more cohesion, confidence, and purpose in our offensive game. This is where we were lacking most against Brazil. It’s also an area which Klinsmann is trying to address.

Klinsmann’s offense vs. Voeller’s defense

The way I see it, we’ve got two distinct options: we can with Klinsmann’s offensive approach or we could revert to Voeller’s defensive game, which he employed against Brazil. Klinsi gets a lot of flak from the posters on this site for playing too many younger players and for expecting the boys to play an offensive game. My question to the faithful would be: What other choices does he have? We advanced as far as we did in Japan/Korea partly because the road to the final was dotted with suspect opponents. We never came up against a legitimate power, and when we did we lost.

 

The first goal was initiated not by a counter-attack but by a Hamann giveaway.