By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
  1. Dan Loney

    Dan Loney BigSoccer Supporter

    Mar 10, 2000
    Cincilluminati
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    Los Angeles Sol
    Country:
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    #1 Dan Loney, Sep 14, 2017
    Last edited: Sep 18, 2017

    Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

    By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
    Sometimes even a word as simple as “the” can show that a report can have deep, foundational flaws owing to a complete absence of effort.

    For example:

    Closer to home, the MLS generated c.46% of the transfer income earned by Mexico’s Liga MX in 2015/16. Sweden’s 16 team domestic top-tier (Allsvenkan), represents the closest competitor to MLS by transfer income in the chart above.

    I mean...for crying out loud. Deloitte switches from “the MLS” to plain “MLS” in the same paragraph.

    Section 5.3, “Player related implications,” covers, in order, (1) transfer fees, (2) player salaries, and (3) player development. The argument is that promotion and relegation inspires better (3) player development, which lets clubs in promotion/relegation leagues receive higher (1) transfer fees when they sell players, despite the downside of having to pay higher (2) player salaries.

    So DeloitteUK decided to arrange its argument in nearly reverse order. I assume second drafts cost extra.

    If someday you find yourself working for a giant accounting firm and a media billionaire asks you to prove something that you assume is true but is resisting facts? Here’s a handy tip. If the topic is, “European leagues spend a lot more on transfer fees than MLS, and it’s because of promotion and relegation” - no one’s really going to argue about the first part.

    But these reports don’t pad themselves. In order to prove that European clubs sell more players than MLS, Deloitte takes a difficult chart from the seventh UEFA benchmarking report:

    UEFA transfer.PNG

    And converts it into, one assumes, a proprietary .garbage format:

    Deloitte transfer.PNG

    And we are now dazzled by how much Portuguese teams made in player sales in fiscal year 2014. How does Portugal do it?

    Currently the US club soccer pyramid system does not appear to be achieving meaningful success in this area, potentially suggesting that in the context of the global soccer player market, the MLS/NASL/USL are not developing players to a standard in keeping with the US’s ambitions. Equally this lack of player development (explored from a sporting perspective later) means that the US club business model is missing out.

    Well, 185 million euros is a lot of money. Of course, if we scroll down one page in the UEFA report, we learn that 85 million of that came from one club - Benfica.

    It’s at this point one must turn to Wikipedia, for convenience if nothing else. If you want to laugh at my laziness, well, I’m still putting in a lot more work than Deloitte did. Here are the relevant winter and summer 2014 charts.

    Out of that 85 million, 81.5 million was due to Benfica selling selling all of six players. (Liverpool fans may want to skip ahead a few paragraphs, there might be some unpleasant memories dredged up.) Nemanja Matić completed his Portuguese holiday and returned to Chelsea for 25 million donuts. Jan Oblak left for Atletico for 16 million. Ezekiel Garay was exiled to Russia for 6 million. Oscar Cardozo was sold to Trabzonspor for 5 million. Alan Kardec returned to Brazil for 4.5 million. And Lazar Marković ended up at Hull City for 25 million.

    Meanwhile that fiscal year, Porto hauled in 51 million from cashing out Fernando, Juan Iturbe, Nicolás Otamendi, Steven Defour and Castro. Sporting received 20 million for Marcos Rojo, and 12 million for Elias, Eric Deier and Fabián Rinaudo.

    That brings us up to 164,500,000 euros.

    One of those players is Portuguese - Castro. Porto got 3 million for him.

    Just for perspective, also that fiscal year, Seattle sold Fredy Montero to Sporting for 2.5 million euros.

    Call me a stickler, but I don’t see a lot of that occurring because of player development. Rojo spent two seasons at Sporting. Marković spent one season at Benfica. We can - and brothers and sisters, we shall - debate whether promotion and relegation helps player development. But even assuming that wacky transfer fun is a benefit or a detriment, there’s nothing that says promotion and relegation have to be involved.

    Maybe Benfica, Porto and Sporting take these raw, unfinished youths and hone them in the pressure cooker of European high-stakes pro/rel death matches...but, um, Liverpool and Manchester City play in a pro/rel league, too. It’s almost as if Portuguese teams that go to the Champions League are able to exploit flaws in the transfer system that over-value youth.

    But apparently it’s promotion and relegation that prevents MLS from taking part in such day-trading. MLS players, we are told, are hot sweaty garbage because they don’t play with the same kind of intensity as a Marković or an Iturbe. Deloitte proves this by...quoting an offhand remark on team salaries.

    An argument could be made that a comparative lack of player sales is representative of successful retention of talent rather than being indicative of limited amount of internationally appealing quality players. However the global nature of the player labour markets and the salary constraints of US club soccer (i.e. salary cap), makes this unlikely, "there are twenty leagues in Europe that pay higher average salaries than the MLS, including the Romanian league. Globally there are probably more than thirty professional leagues that pay more."

    It’s hard to think of a more unanimously cherished belief, or one with as much glorious potential for proof, as “MLS players suck.” Deloitte decided to defend this, and screwed it up.

    England, Spain, Italy, France, Germany and several others pay much, much higher salaries than MLS, and field much, much better teams. So do Mexico, Argentina and Brazil.

    And so do Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which examples take the premise that salaries equal quality, and launches it into the sun. Only the least charitable would claim MLS had worse teams than those leagues. The Chinese Super League hasn’t completed its journey from powerhouse to punchline, so it’s probably unfair to include them in this particular disproof. But if you didn’t have the CSL pegged as the NASL of the new millennium early on, that’s on you, pal.

    In any case, accepting the implied premise of salary equalling quality is not necessary. There are not twenty leagues in Europe which pay more than MLS, and Romania is not among them. Deloitte does not cite the easily available MLS Player Union salaries, nor does it refer back to the UEFA benchmarking report it used for Portuguese transfer storytelling. Instead, their source was soccernomician Stefan Szymanski in a book published in 2015 called “Money and Soccer” or “Money and Football,” depending on your fetish.

    Had they checked with Szymanski, he would have informed Deloitte that, despite the 2015 publishing date and the present tense of the quote, he was not using 2015 figures to make that conclusion. Or 2014 figures. Or 2013 figures. The last authoritative, more or less, study of European league wages was for fiscal year 2012, where UEFA compiled revenues and percentage of revenue spent on wages, and invited math to draw conclusions.

    So, naturally, Szymanski used 2012 MLS wage data, rather than more up-to-date figures. To be fair.

    The sixth UEFA report gave Szymanski, and us, the knowledge that the clubs in the Romanian league made 6 million euros in revenue, paid 60% of that in wages, leaving us with an average per Romanian club salary of 3,600,000 euros.

    Lamentably, the MLSPU site no longer goes back to 2012, but this very site does! Thank you, site!

    Through dividing $90 million whatever with 20 teams, $4,499,976.85. (I didn’t count the pool players.)

    Dividing the MLS figure by the Romanian figure gives us 1.25 rounding up - which is almost exactly the exchange rate of dollars to euros on August 1, 2012.

    So we might conclude that whether Szymanski was right about 2012 salary comparisons depends literally on the exchange rate day-to-day. If the dollar was weaker than 1.25 to the Euro, Romania paid more. If not, not.

    I think, since Szymanski clearly implied that Romania paid more, and not nearly the damn same, this puts him slightly in the wrong. However, he’s actually slightly more wrong. On page 66 of the UEFA report, we learn that UEFA counted wages as “total employee benefit expense. This includes all wages, salaries, bonuses and social charges paid by the club.” Also on page 66, we see a little box telling us that “79% of wages were attributable to players and 21% to technical staff and other employees.”

    Before one smugly breaks out the calculator, we don’t know whether that exact percentage applies to the Romanian league. Maybe every coach, director and ticket agent is a volunteer. Or pays to work there. We simply don’t have the information. So Szymanski didn’t take any percentage off his calculations. Undoubtedly he wanted to be fair.

    Which is why he included all personnel salary in Europe vs. player-only salary in MLS, but didn’t go beyond 2012. Was that a fair decision? I can’t decide for Szymanski. All I can do is use data that was available to Szymanski and point out that MLS salaries per club went up to $5.57 million per club in 2014.

    Szymanski’s book, despite the 2015 publishing date, was sent to press in 2014. So it’s unfair to use 2015 and 2016 figures against him.

    But it’s not unfair to use 2015 and 2016 figures against Deloitte. The seventh UEFA benchmarking report downgraded Romania’s per club salary to 3,200,000 Euros. Oh, and you really gotta squint to see it on page 64, but that whole wages including coaches, administrators, mascots and sergeants-at-arms? Still applicable.

    Did Deloitte have this information? Since they used the transfer information for Portugal from that same report, I’m gonna go with “probably.”

    MLS salaries per club, by the way, went up to $7.59 million per club in 2015.

    And then up to $8.21 million per club in 2016. Which is a mere 6.90 million in UEFA bucks. That’s only double what Romania pays...every single employee...plus a half million euros for walking-around money.

    You’d think an accounting firm would be a little less cavalier about being off by 217%. But Deloitte obviously wasn’t being paid to think.

    “But wait,” you may be saying to yourself at this point, “doesn’t MLS go out of their way to keep salaries low?”

    Sure - just read in the next section. MLS keeps salaries low by not having promotion and relegation.

    The MLS Players Union probably could have suggested one or two other ways that MLS keeps player salaries low, but we’re on a trip that makes Willy Wonka’s boat ride look like the bus route from Des Moines to West Des Moines.

    DeloitteUK did not invent the premise that promotion and relegation lead to higher wages than closed leagues. That was Roger Noll of Stanford back in 2002, which Deloitte did not link to but I will because I’m super-helpful.

    Noll’s abstract addresses the question of whether teams in leagues with promotion and relegation pay higher wages than teams in leagues with stable membership.

    EDIT - maybe I should be super-helpful and include Deloitte's Noll quote:

    Looking specifically at the introduction of promotion and relegation, it has been suggested that this can have an upward effect on costs: "The adoption of a promotion/relegation system will increase the wages of players as long as the world supply of professional soccer players is not perfectly elastic. This effect is not due solely to the possibility that promotion/relegation may increase demand, but is a consequence of the fact that expenditures on players today are an investment in that they are a cost of gaining entry into a better league (or of avoiding demotion to a lower league), which causes this year’s players to have greater value than they would without promotion and relegation." With more at stake for owners in an open league, it follows that the importance (and therefore cost) of playing talent may likely also increase.

    So Noll examined whether Real Madrid pays higher wages than otherwise because of the threat of Getafe being promoted. Whether Bayern Munich is forced to pay higher player salaries because 1860 faces relegation. Whether Celtic pays a premium due to the lingering desperation of St. Johnstone to make and attain first division status. Whether Juve pays monstrous wages to see off the threat of Lecce.

    Because if Real, Bayern, and Celtic were in a closed league, then they would not face the pressure from lower level teams constantly moving up divisions. They would have a life of pressure-free, low-budget ease, like the Tampa Bay Buccaneers (2003 Super Bowl Champions), the Anaheim Angels (2002 World Series Champions), and the Los Angeles Lakers (2002 NBA Finals winners).

    Sometimes to state the question is to answer it.

    In total fairness, the 2001-2002 Premiership winners were Arsenal, who have since tumbled down to the ninth division (to hear their fans tell it) - and the last place team that year was Leicester City, who ended up putting their broken lives back together.

    In equally total fairness, in the 2001-2002 NBA season, the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Golden State Warriors had fifty wins. Combined. They both finished fourteenth in their respective conferences. The Cavaliers were 23 games behind the New Jersey Nets. The Warriors were 40 games behind the Sacramento Kings. For those of you who don’t follow basketball particularly closely, this basically boils down to Matthew 20:16.

    Noll didn’t consider the possibility that last place teams in what he calls “monopolistic” leagues are in a stronger position than new arrivals in first division soccer leagues.

    Noll also didn’t consider - or didn’t care - that as late as 1961, English football had a maximum wage.

    So the premise was disproven forty-one years before Noll’s paper was released, and fifty-six years before DeloitteUK extensively quoted him. There’s nothing about promotion and relegation that increases player power - something something Liga MX Gentleman’s Agreement - and there’s nothing about “monopolistic” leagues that depress wages - something something Brock Osweiler.

    Should DeloitteUK have been so quick to cite as an authority an abstract that describes how the National Football League could establish promotion and relegation with the World League of American Football? Who can say. Oh, wait. I can. No. They should not have.

    For some reason, after carefully crafting a section around Noll’s premise that promotion and relegation push wages ever upward, Deloitte sums up their argument by firing Chekhov’s Gun at Williams’ Glass Menagerie:

    Also, if structured correctly, costs can be aligned with promotion and relegation. The inclusion of relegation and promotion clauses stipulating different salary levels according to what division the team is playing in within player contracts is an increasing part of clubs’ business planning, and there is no reason why this principle could not be effectively deployed or indeed mandated within the US club soccer pyramid.

    Agree or disagree, “Promotion and relegation will inevitably force global wages up, unless some bureaucracy steps in” wasn’t exactly Noll’s point.

    I also invite the reader to picture US Soccer forcing such a mandate on MLS, and the league then imposing this on the Players Union. Dozens of lawyers. Hundreds of boat payments.

    There is, in fact, a handy real-world model of an extremely competitive and lucrative series of athletic competitions where wages are artificially depressed. It’s called college athletics. Leave it to Deloitte to propose combining the most useless aspects of international soccer with the worst American sports has to offer.

    In part five, we learn that promotion and relegation lead to better players! We don’t learn how, mind you, we just learn it. It’s like a cargo cult without the island paradise.

    EDIT - nothing important, some clarification cleanups, that's it, I promise.

    EDIT EDIT - ugh, meant "paragraph" and not "sentence" in the cheap shot at the top.
     

Comments

Discussion in 'Articles' started by Dan Loney, Sep 14, 2017.

    1. tigersoccer2005

      tigersoccer2005 Member+

      Dec 1, 2003
      North Bergen, NJ
      Club:
      New York Red Bulls
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      So much fail in one report that it takes 5 parts of analysis to break it down--it truly boggles the mind. :coffee:
       
    2. AndyMead

      AndyMead Homo Sapien

      Nov 2, 1999
      Seat 12A
      Club:
      Sporting Kansas City

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Which part of the DeloitteUK report covers the part pro/rel played in the Hillsborough disaster?
       
    3. Elninho

      Elninho Member+

      Oct 30, 2000
      Sacramento, CA
      Club:
      Los Angeles Galaxy
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Not to mention... if it were the pressure of relegation battles that developed players, then how did almost 90% of the league's total transfer proceeds go to the three clubs that finished in the top three spots in 2013/14, all three of which were mathematically assured of avoiding relegation by early February, and which held positions 1, 2, and 3 in some order or another from early October onward?
       
    4. Dignan

      Dignan Member+

      Nov 29, 1999
      Granada
      Club:
      FC Dallas
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      The only decent argument for pro/rel is really just plain old tradition. And thats not a very good one, but it has its merits.

      Please tell me there will be a part 5!!!
       
      AndyMead repped this.
    5. USRufnex

      USRufnex Member+

      Tulsa Athletic / Sheffield United
      United States
      Jul 15, 2000
      Tulsa, OK
      Club:
      --other--
      #6 USRufnex, Sep 16, 2017
      Last edited: Sep 16, 2017

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Where's your heavy hitting piece on CS&L feasibility studies for potential MLS cities?

      Hello.....Bigsoccer? Where is the counterpoint to this heavy handed anti-Pro/Rel nonsense?

      Typical partisan hack hatchet job by twitter spamming Dan Loney, the obsessed anti-Pro/Rel clown prince of Bigsoccer.
       
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    6. AndyMead

      AndyMead Homo Sapien

      Nov 2, 1999
      Seat 12A
      Club:
      Sporting Kansas City

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Is it possible for you to post without pejoratives and insults? I guess you're just interested preaching to the choir and have no interest in actually putting forward an argument to sway anyone -even those without an opinion on the issue- to your perspective.

      I thought the "counterpoint" was the DeloitteUK report.
       
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    7. Kejsare

      Kejsare Member+

      Mar 10, 2010
      Stafford, VA
      Club:
      Portland Timbers
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Apparently the Deloitte report was supposed to be a respectable report to combat the "anti-pro/rel hacks."

      It was a failure as evidenced by this critique. It is not written to be a scholarly critique, but a critique it is.
       
      barroldinho repped this.
    8. X@V!3R

      X@V!3R Member

      Apr 6, 1999
      Land of the Lost

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Perhaps chasing the Euro bucks that come with "promotion" to the Champions League. Or spending to stay on said merry-go-round.

      The Swiss Ramble
       
      AndyMead repped this.
    9. mschofield

      mschofield Member+

      May 16, 2000
      DC
      Club:
      Union Berlin
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Just a quick note: for most of 2016, after the tumble of the euro, the $8.21 m average on salaries would have meant more like $7.9m (euro dipped to $1.03, hung out at $1.05 for quite a while). This was because I was moving back to the states, so converting euro to usd. As I'm moving back, the euro is climbing again.
       
    10. barroldinho

      barroldinho Member+

      Aug 13, 2007
      Ex-pat in HB, CA
      Club:
      Manchester United FC
      Country:
      England

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Three teams that have never so much as sniffed relegation in their entire existence, and who between them have won all but two of the league championships contested to date.

      How precisely, does anything about them relate to pro/rel?
       
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    11. Martininho

      Martininho Member+

      Feb 13, 2007
      Chicago
      Club:
      --other--
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      You went way beyond his pay grade with that last sentence.
       
      AndyMead repped this.
    12. USRufnex

      USRufnex Member+

      Tulsa Athletic / Sheffield United
      United States
      Jul 15, 2000
      Tulsa, OK
      Club:
      --other--
      #13 USRufnex, Sep 19, 2017
      Last edited: Sep 19, 2017

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Says the very same guy who just fantasized on BS about Kartik Krishnaiyer having no soul. :rolleyes:

      I'm interested in reading a bigsoccer blog post that offers an even-handed opinion on this report, or at the very least a contrasting response to the spewings of a virulent Bigsoccer anti-Pro/rel jackass like Dan Loney who's for years had well documented anti-Pro/Rel fits on twitter that bookend his bizarre habit of tweet spamming people he disagrees with.

      The DeloitteUK report is little more than a well researched and documented sales pitch done for people who want to highlight the strengths of Pro/Rel.

      It is completely unsurprising that Dan Loney would try as hard as he could to trash the report. But it is a bit surprising that he still needed to resort to four parts of partisan hackery to do it.

      Once again: Compare this to a typical Conventions, Sports & Leisure feasibility study for MLS (that is, if you can find one?).

      Shampoo. Rinse. Repeat.
       
    13. USRufnex

      USRufnex Member+

      Tulsa Athletic / Sheffield United
      United States
      Jul 15, 2000
      Tulsa, OK
      Club:
      --other--

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      If Bigsoccer allows me the space on their blog, I'll write a four part report on why Dan Loney is full of shit.

      Make. My. Day.
       
    14. X@V!3R

      X@V!3R Member

      Apr 6, 1999
      Land of the Lost

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Some interesting context on the infamous Article 9 direct from the FIFA site ...

      Protecting the promotion and relegation system for clubs


      Basically, Article 9 was a direct response to the shenanigans taking place, most notably, in Spain. It was not intended to force this model on the existing "closed" systems.
       
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    15. barroldinho

      barroldinho Member+

      Aug 13, 2007
      Ex-pat in HB, CA
      Club:
      Manchester United FC
      Country:
      England

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Well if you don't want to post it on this domain, blogspot and WordPress are still free.
       
    16. barroldinho

      barroldinho Member+

      Aug 13, 2007
      Ex-pat in HB, CA
      Club:
      Manchester United FC
      Country:
      England

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Well he didn't have to try very hard. The Portuguese example was catastrophic.

      As someone who has worked directly with Deloitte on a number of occasions, I know they're better than this.

      The whole thing feels like a low-priority puff piece that someone took on as a favour and hammered out in a couple of lunch breaks.
       
      JulesMIA repped this.
    17. Martininho

      Martininho Member+

      Feb 13, 2007
      Chicago
      Club:
      --other--
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Wow, thick-headed and thin-skinned, that's quite the combo. You must be a hit at parties.
       
    18. Dan Loney

      Dan Loney BigSoccer Supporter

      Mar 10, 2000
      Cincilluminati
      Club:
      Los Angeles Sol
      Country:
      Philippines

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Let alone mine
       
      JulesMIA repped this.
    19. Kejsare

      Kejsare Member+

      Mar 10, 2010
      Stafford, VA
      Club:
      Portland Timbers
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      barroldinho repped this.
    20. SUDano

      SUDano Member+

      Jan 18, 2003
      Rochester, NY

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Well Researched ?! I think its pretty easy to see some simple points and numbers were far from well researched.
      Bottom line to Pro/Reller conspiracy theorists is that they forget or purposefully ignore the Relegation part of the equation.
      They read Pro/Rel as if its Promotion/Promotion. Every positive point of a team being Promoted is equally negated by those same number of teams being Relegated. Its simple math. And a reasonable argument can be made that the net result of having a Colorado or LAGalaxy and their 15K and 21K fans per game would make it a significant negative impact if they are replaced by Miami 5400 or Louisville's 8800? What would be the net impact of those 4 teams being promoted and relegated?
      Maybe Pro/Rel can cure cancer or solve the Kennedy assassination but it won't solve the lack of soccer culture throughout the US.
       
      mosca, Martininho, JulesMIA and 2 others repped this.
    21. Coyote89

      Coyote89 Member

      Atlanta United
      United States
      May 18, 2017
      #22 Coyote89, Sep 27, 2017
      Last edited: Sep 27, 2017

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Is it possible that pro-rel works for (or at least can be tolerated by) well-established soccer federations with large, reliable revenue streams, but not so well for a young, expanding league that still makes only $90 million per year on all three of its TV deals combined? Consider also that MLS clubs are collectively investing billions right now in soccer-specific stadiums, training facilities, and developmental academies and therefore need predictable revenue streams to pay down all that debt.

      The bottom line for MLS is that they need a LOT more TV revenue to achieve any of their long-term goals (domestic and global relevance, overall quality of play, performance in international competitions, widespread financial viability, and especially domestic player development which comes from a pure cost-center, not a revenue-generating entity.)

      Meanwhile, maximizing TV dollars means you need stability, you need to foster recognizable brands, and you need to expand the national footprint to include most, if not all, of the largest media markets in the US and Canada. During this critical phase of evolution, it would be devastating to lose clubs like the LA Galaxy and DC United to relegation and replace them with clubs like Real Monarchs or Reno 1868 FC, yet that's exactly what would happen if pro-rel were in place today.

      In short, everything has its time and now is simply NOT the time to introduce that level of volatility into US soccer. Both MLS and USL are just starting to gain momentum and critical mass by following a model that worked brilliantly over the last 40 years for both the NFL and NBA. And by the way, MLS may not be on the level of the Big 5 European leagues, but it's moving up the table faster than just about any other league in the world. Just stay the course.
       
      Kejsare and Martininho repped this.
    22. AndyMead

      AndyMead Homo Sapien

      Nov 2, 1999
      Seat 12A
      Club:
      Sporting Kansas City

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      It's not directly a broadcast revenue problem. It's a demo-geographic problem and a supply and demand problem.
       
    23. Paul Berry

      Paul Berry Member+

      Notts County and NYCFC
      England
      Apr 18, 2015
      A mile from Yankee Stadium
      Country:
      United States

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      Does the report mention that Benfica are €336m in debt?
       
    24. Dan Loney

      Dan Loney BigSoccer Supporter

      Mar 10, 2000
      Cincilluminati
      Club:
      Los Angeles Sol
      Country:
      Philippines

      Deloitte UK's Promotion and Relegation Report - Part 4

      By Dan Loney on Sep 14, 2017 at 1:36 PM
      That's a fascinating slideshow. I'm trying to put it in context of a real world economy, but I'm stumped. Is Manchester United a better risk than Exxon, a worse risk, or the same?
       

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