Best football players of all time

Yes I think Guerin Sportivo (their own journalists) was the best of Italy . Maybe even slightly ahead of Gazzetta dello Sport, the daily newspaper, because they discussed angles and topics that Gazzetta didn't do. I also bought certain issues from certain years to check who they regarded as 'the best' and whether they regarded certain years or periods as 'weaker' so to speak.

Also how some of them were regarded past their 'window' so to speak.

In 1983 and 1984 Cruijff played a couple of serious matches against Italian club teams, with goals and assists, which brought them to call him still "fuoriclasse" and write an article.
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/fuoriclasse
https://www.bigsoccer.com/threads/best-ever-veteran-player-35-36-years.1998876/page-3#post-34183998

 

That is a good question but I think especially in case of Matthews a difficult one.

Since Di Stefano is mentioned; in 1960 a study recorded his running. He ran 4.3 kilometer (in the same study Hamrin 4.1, Del Sol 4.9km, Zagallo 4.0, Garrincha 2.8, Sivori 2.4). Fast forward 15 years later and Keegan (2nd in 1976 PFA, 1st in 1977 PFA) is on no less than 6 kilometers (in South America, heat, humid). Few thought of the idea he's in absolute terms a better player than Di Stefano. On the contrary, he was seen as someone who "used his talent to the max" and "a late blossomer who worked hard." Virtually no one would see him as the inherently/intrinsically the better player. This type of data was also published in Shoot!.

With Matthews I think a problem is his footage was recorded when he was well past his prime. At the 'Matthews final' he was 38. Many say "class is permanent" but that is not entirely true and certainly not with the equipment he got to play with (this is often forgotten: in 1953 Hungary had superior equipment, and the Germans in turn got their 'screw boots' legalized and had superior equipment in 1954 to the Hungarians - so England was despite the fitness in other regards some way behind). Whether at that age and with that equipment Robben would look as Keegan to Di Stefano - don't know.

Treatments and books who deal with the "Matthews final myth" mention that also from a skills point of view he was past his prime, and the circumstances were not ideal to applicate his skills. Which is another thing: current hyper-commercialized football is very homogeneous.

This is a somewhat inconclusive and evading answer, but most of all those have to be seen relative to their era. Which is for Matthews not easy and it might be the post-WWII worldwide appreciation came courtesy of other factors at play, rather than him having outstanding abilities at this point. The 1945 - 1953 period is the most difficult one to get a feeling for.

(maybe I'm forgetting over overlooking something now - I have that uncomfortable feeling)

 

As an aside, I think Zidane his legacy might be standing for a while now it seems France has opted for sheer physicality. There are some discussions at places (also at pesstatsdatabase and football manager I saw) where the overwhelming consensus is that Mbappe, Kante, O. Dembele and to a lesser extent Pogba are technically not all that good, as well as their new crop of wingers (Martial, Coman) compared to Ribery. Now I don't want to sound overly harsh because they aren't the only premier team but in this way Zidane will be standing tall for a while. Also Xavi and Iniesta will look good if Pogba or a similar guy emerges as the new utterly dominant midfielder (be it as part of a pair at turbocharged ManUnited or not). For some they already do if Kroos is regarded as that guy who can do it at NT and club level (Modric is maybe too obscure in a way to be fully and universally recognized as the foremost midfielder in the world - it is at least a handicap).

 

Sorry for not responding to this earlier. It is a reasonable question which deserves a thorough explanation.

Ok, we have to split this question in two halves, the Di Stefano and his career in South America and the one in Europe.

The man in South America particularly in Argentina was considered an excellent forward, but not spoken of as someone prodigious from an early age. In Argentina he was considered a superb athlete, fast, an eye for goal, but limited with few weapons in his arsenal. He struggled in the aerial game, had only one profile in attack: to go to his right. At that time he was not the total footballer yet.

In Colombia his game starts to evolve and in Europe it reaches its total evolution: he becomes the anchor of the team, the total footballer. Any weaknesses in his game became less apparent and concealed. His discipline and dedication to want to improve is regarded by many as his greatest strength to his success.

With Moreno the story is completely different. He was viewed as a precocious young talent, athletically blessed, without technical weaknesses. His arsenal was unlimited. Powerful in the air, two footed, could play in many positions, was a two-way player, a fearless competitor that had the natural gene of being a leader.

For the NT, which was the ultimate badge of honor to represent the country, Moreno was the greatest representative of his time in the view of those that lived it. At club level where ever he went he was admired. But he did not benefit because he never featured in a WC, from not playing abroad and from being a prewar player.

So to get to the point of the question. El Grafico had the chance to form their views based on what they witnessed. They lived the entire career of Moreno up close but only could experience the beginning of Di Stefano's career at Huracan and River Plate. At Millonarios he did play with other Argentine players that were qualified to aid El Grafico with their views of him but the legend of him is generally associated with his time in Spain.

How much of what El Grafico covered of Di Stefano abroad is limited. They did have some correspondents from time to time cover some important matches but it was not like on a weekly bases.

Retrospectively I strongly believe Di Stefano received strong considerations over other Argentinian forwards due to what he represented for Argentinian football abroad and to Western Europe that had a major influence in media terms. If he had been judged solely for what he produced in Argentina, he would have been viewed below the likes of Boyé, Puecelle, Garcia, Mendez, etc. Ofc, they played their entire careers at home.

He was not like a Maradona, a prodigious young talent that was already being ranked amongst the best players in Argentinian history by the age of 20. Alfredo had to work his way up the ranks.

Bottom line: there were probably superior talents in Argentina that had fabulous careers but none had the world transcendence of Alfredo. Then again, I don't think Argentinian players viewed playing in Spain as an honour, they viewed their country superior in footballing terms. But as a global figure Alfredo became the flag that represented Argentinian football across the world and I think that alone was sufficiently enough to honor him as one of the greatest Argentine players in history.

 

Wonderful write up. Where did you get all these sources?

 

Thanks mate. I own many collections of magazines/ newspapers and digital archives from those decades that provide insight of how these players were viewed.

Also a good source to follow the evolution of Di Stefano through the years is in this thread that I created: https://www.bigsoccer.com/threads/alfredo-di-stéfano-career-match-reports.1994303/

 

In the other thread I wrote this (and you repped that idea)

This in part informs a few questions/ideas;

Were there players of about the same age as Di Stefano who were considered better than him? Not e.g. Pedernera who was 8 years his senior and Moreno who was 10 years his senior.

Is it possible that the faster European game (also in Spain) suited Di Stefano well? His all-action style was his strength. Rather than being a player who played multiple positions he was above all a dominant all-action attacker who bagged goals and an assist here and there (about three times fewer assists than goals). His quick football brain was a pre-requisite for the (slightly) faster Spanish football.

Finally; Frank Lampard became a better player than Joe Cole and Michael Owen. Michael Ballack better than Ricken and Deisler. Had Lampard and Ballack left their country at the age of 23, to a foggy mist...

 

Here is something by AdS himself in the "Real Madrid book of football"

"
Football to me is not a more or less uncomfortable profession, but a wonderful and unequalled hobby. I say that in the full knowledge that I am 34 years of age and have had, as the Americans say, the 'best of it' throughout my career, success and honours, awards and privileges. You must take my word for it that, had I remained a humble player in Buenos Aires, my joy in the game would not have been less.
It has been said that my seven years with Real Madrid coincided with the club's greatest period of success in its history. If I have played a part in that success, I have only repaid a group of wonderful employers and team-fellows. And my contribution is as nothing, beside the memorable moments, the rich colours that life as a Real Madrid player have provided me.
I came to this great club humbly, aware of its traditions, and the many great players who had gone before - goalkeeper Ricardo Zamora, full-back Jacinto Quincoces, centre-forward Gasper Rubio and inside-forward Luis Molowny, to name but a few.
And in my time in Madrid, there has been the unceasing pleasure of playing beside men of superb skill, intelligence and comradeship. In quick succession arrived such as Gento, Santamaria, Kopa, Del Sol, Puskas, and many others. One could never feel the "undergraduate" at any time with such a team; but rather, as a member of a highly successful faculty of professors. Men who gave as much as they took in the complex passions of match-play.
In Britain, it is quite common for good players to continue their careers until rising 40 years of age - and, of course, in Stanley Matthews you have a dedicated and wonderful player able to break even that age barrier, yet remain a challenging figure. Matthews performance may yet have made him the invaluable ally of all ageing stars, everywhere! He has proved that if a man takes care of himself, and if his art be of high quality, he himself is the best judge of when he should retire.
Much though I love the enthusiasm of Spanish football supporters, there is no denying they are capricious, on this point of age. They tend to tire more quickly of their idols than in Britain. When a player reaches 30, they take the attitude that he is finished, and should he continue, then he is playing extra time. I like to think my own case, and indeed that of my friend Ferenc Puskas, will help to change their minds.

Perhaps, impishly, I try to make this point when our own Real supporters come to watch us train. My own zest for the game is undiminished, and I will train as heartily as any man, and enjoy doing so. As one gets older, one realises the full value of retaining perfect physical condition, and taking care of oneself in private life. To make that enthusiasm evident I am often the last to leave the training field.
Before doing so, I will try all sorts of tricks with the ball, using the instep, heel, knee, indeed all parts of the body. Invariably, in training, my tongue is showing, in a wide grin; quite natural, this, and just another expression of my joy in having chosen football as my profession. I will even go between the goals, and it is no secret that I shall not mind ever called upon to show my goal-keeping prowess in an emergency!
My friend Bobby Charlton of Manchester United takes similar pleasure in being a goalkeeper in training sessions. Perhaps he imagines himself a Frank Swift, just as I imagine myself a Zamora! It is harmless fun - nothing so serious as the clown wanting to play Hamlet. And none can know if these private "hobby positions" may not one day become useful, in an emergency.
At all events, those few watchers of our training can have no doubts about my enthusiasm, and staying power. Should I not undergo serious injury, and in that way I have been lucky in my career, and further, if it does not offend those gentlemen eternally forecasting my retirement, I think I can play for at least two, three, maybe four years yet.
One thing I am sure about. Should Spain qualify for the 1962 World Cup Finals in Chile, I shall be there, working hard for a first-team place. We should be an experienced blend by then, well capable of adjusting to South American playing conditions, and I am sure Spain can do well.
Of course, as now, there will be critics crying that I am 'over the top'. They say it each season about Real Madrid, with unfailing regularity, and are just as often proved wrong. Perhaps when we were at last beaten on an aggregate of four goals to three by Barcelona in the European Cup they considered their "forecast" a success at last. Well, within a week or two we won a League match 5:3 at Barcelona, to open up at that time a four-point lead in the Spanish League Championship. Was that the performance of a finished team?
Barcelona are a strong and talented side, and when a rivalry such as theirs with Real Madrid has lasted so long it was, I suppose, inevitable they should have their turn! We Real Madrid players did not begrudge them their chance of winning the European Cup. We wished them well, in the best interests of Spanish football. For ourselves, we buckled down with determination to winning the Spanish Championship, and so re-qualifying for our favourite competition!

Frankly, Real Madrid rises like the phoenix each season from the ashes made of it by the critics the season before. We are never, it seems, really 'too old... unable to lift our own boots'; we come again, strenuously, to new successes. In fact, I think this Real Madrid team is as strong now as five years ago. Perhaps even stronger, for to me the quality of our football always seems to be improving.
Nowadays, it is easy, harmonic, well-linked - having the semblance of exhibition football, but at the same time deadly efficient. Those pessimists who have hung their woeful forecasts on us these last few years must by now have bitten their finger nails down to the raw flesh. Yet the strength of our football is clear for them to see, however dark and forceful their new presentiments of our failure!
When I mentioned our determination to win the Spanish Championship, and re-qualify for the European Cup, I chose my word carefully: determination - and hard work, the two go together. Real players have never considered it enough to be simply virtuosos. Pride in club, responsibility, courage, and ability to work - these things are just as important.
Every professional player owes maximum effort to his club. To hold anything back, even for a single moment, for the sake of comfort or convenience is a deception on his employers. It is a betrayal of the supporters who trust him. I can never understand non-triers. If they have no natural eagerness to play football, let them try something else, rather than mock the game.
This is a point I have always felt strongly about. In my seven years with Real, I myself have probably missed less than half-a-dozen matches, through injuries. Many a time, even once or twice when I have been running a temperature, I have still convinced the managers to let me play. Football is a great game, and when one is with a great club it should be a privilege to play and give one's best, a privilege hard to sacrifice.
My greatest pleasure is in hitting goals! For five of my seven seasons with Real I was the leading goal-scorer, but came second to that dynamic left foot of my good friend Puskas last season. Goals are the final accomplishment in football, the sweet "breath of relief" which comes after a clever build-up. Whatever one's joy in the swift intricacies of midfield play, it is surpassed by that sudden, catching moment in the penalty area when one shoots for goal!
My son Alfredo, now five years old, is clearly acquiring his father's tastes. I help him a lot with his ball control, and he loves every moment of it. But he will often run away from me, just for the sheer pleasure of kicking the ball into a goal-net, and following on all fours to retrieve it! There are obvious signs there of his future bent. In fact, his command of a football already astonishes me - and others, too, at the Estadio Bernabeu when I take young Alfredo with me for a half-hour's fun.

What will I have to tell him, as he grows older? Certainly I would not prevent him following me into professional football, if I think his ability and enthusiasm warrant him taking the plunge. If he has that enthusiasm, he will not need me to tell him how satisfying a game football can be. Nor that each match is an essay in brain, instinct and skill. If he does not recognize such things for himself, he is not the material for professional football.
But perhaps I can take him by the hand, and with firmness tell him that one has to devote oneself entirely to the game. One has to be wholehearted, for the capricious footballer never makes a consistently good one. Anything prejudicial to one's football, anything superfluous to one's career, must be avoided. One must never become bored with training and match-preparation, however great a burden it may seem at times.
If a move is not mastered easily, then hours of work must follow, and be accepted happily, until it is perfect. I know that natural ability for the game is the first requirement. But it is even more essential to be properly trained, properly rehearsed in the tactics of the team, and properly briefed in all details, however small. Ability is one thing, but how many recognize that behind the easy flow of a particularly good Real Madrid performance are many hours of work, and painstaking care for detail?
Every player makes mistakes, but every player does not need to repeat those mistakes. With will and hard work, almost anything can be achieved in football. It is fatal to sit back, and be proud of our strengths; it is professional, and wise, to constantly bend ourselves to our shortcomings. Players are too often judged by their mistakes rather than their successes; but it is up to them to correct those mistakes, and so better themselves in the general opinion.
Whatever a player's class, he is never master of everything. Even at my age, I continue to experiment with new moves every day - a new, more difficult method of passing a ball, an original trick in shooting. It prevents me from getting bored, and improves my game. There is always something to learn. A player who thinks otherwise, and ceases to take care of himself, will never remain a star, even should he have become one. One has to work, work and work.
Work will always produce the result wanted. A move on the pitch, to the crowd, can look a stroke of genius, as if the men concerned had spontaneously plucked that particular moment direct from Heaven. The impression is that it must be awfully difficult, impossible to equal, or even repeat. By and large, it is not so - far from it!
Usually it will have been the product of patient work in training. Possibly, in the first few disastrous attempts at that movement, it might well have seemed impossible. We may feel as small and inadequate as a child practising his first violin solo. Yet, like that child, if we do not become bored and discouraged, the movement will be mastered, and even become easy of accomplishment - a new, facile trick for our repertoire.
Because of these demands by football's technical side, some players only half-develop their ability. Because some trainers are not perceptive or knowledgeable enough, they do nothing about this stunted growth. They get used to the player as he is, and lose sight of what he might become. The inadequacy, in this way, of player and trainer alike is virtually a crime against football, for it is the duty of professional football to make the very best of its assets, for the sake of the public who make professional football possible.
Many players, for instance, master the ball only with one foot. One has to rank exceptionally high, like a Puskas or Gento for instance, not to badly need the other foot. Even these two have worked hard to master the ball with their 'silly leg', as we call it, and can do so when required. It should be the target of every player to be two-footed, irrespective of whether one will always remain stronger than the other.

South American players are usually gifted ball-players. Control of a football comes easily to them, it is almost a gift of their environment. But they are careless of physical condition, and even resentful of putting hard work into that sort of training. Careers are generally shorter, and they like to romance with the game, rather than approach it with a thoroughly professional determination.
Europe, though technique seems to be improving each year, still does not pay sufficient attention to mastery of the ball, which in my opinion is the eternal key to efficient football. Europeans, and they include in particular the English, are preoccupied with speed and physical condition, vital elements both, but by no means an end in themselves. The very mention of weight-training, as practised in some European countries, upsets me. Are we turning out machine tools, or football artists who achieve efficiency in the only possible way, by mastery of the ball?
In spite of this, I do not support the view that English dominance of world football is at an end. Many of we Real Madrid players, in conversation, are agreed that England has all the elements required in a great footballing nation. My own feeling is that the gravest weakness in match-play by English sides has been among the forwards. Their moves are repetitive and monotonous, almost naive.
The 'WM' system used to be, and continues to be, sound enough, for defence as well as attack. But football is constantly evolving new styles and tactics, particularly at the highest level, and it is there where many English sides are 'found out'. An English player should never pursue set runs throughout a match, for that simplifies the job of the man marking him. There is no element of the unpredictable, so vital in a successful side.
As a centre-forward, I am always on the move - up, back, and across - trying not to be fixed in one position, and so allowing the defence to see too much of me. Or I may be trying to avoid 'bunching' with other forwards. Or I may be reading what is to come, and be moving quickly to help the next man on the ball. Or I may be moving with no attacking purpose whatsoever!
For forwards should accept it is part of their job that they should help the defence. When the opposition is in possession, you obviously are out of the game. What do you do? Just accept that position, while the defence tries to come through a difficult time? If the Real defence fails, the forward's job becomes much harder - he has to score more goals! So the obvious thing is to get back quickly and help the defence. It eases your own job over the whole game.
I think nothing of popping up at centre-half or full-back, to cover a colleague who has had to leave his position. We are all footballers, and as such should be able to perform competently in all 11 positions. The number on one's back does not mean a thing. Forget it, and play the game as you read it - were it not for their convenience to supporters, we could do without numbers altogether.

When we beat England 3:0 in Madrid in May, 1960, the Englishmen defended extremely well, and though we finished with a flourish we had to work hard for the victory. Had the ground been dry, instead of in poor condition because of rain, we may have won by a bigger margin. In that match, I was disappointed with the England forwards, for they showed little flair and initiative.
At Wembley, on another poor pitch, we lost 4:2 the following October. There was no doubting that the win was well-earned by England. I could barely believe these were the same forwards, with the exception of the strong centre-forward Bobby Smith, who had shown comparatively little in Madrid a few months before. England played with courage and skill, and could clearly train on to a very useful team indeed.
None had improved more than the Chelsea inside-right, Jimmy Greaves, quick and elusive, almost dominating on the ball, and terribly dangerous anywhere near the goal. He took my eye, as did Bobby Charlton - whom I put among the English players I have liked most. Some others were Billy Wright, Tom Finney, Stanley Matthews, and the late Duncan Edwards.
Edwards was in the Manchester United side we beat in the European Cup, after two fine matches. The Manchester team made a magnificent impression on me. They had colourful and outstanding individual players, and as a team were as powerful as any we have ever met in the European Cup. What a sad day it was for me when our Treasurer, Don Raimundo Saporta, telephoned my home with news of their disaster at Munich. None deserved more the fullness of a great career.
My good friend Matt Busby will, I am sure, produce another great team - but how quickly will the atmosphere of British football be ready to receive another great team properly? In Spain, the social rank of a good-class player is very high, and he is paid sufficiently well to live up to that rank. At Real Madrid, one is taught to be something more than a more-or-less celebrated football player, i.e. to live and behave in a proper manner.
We feel under a moral obligation to do so. Supporters and critics are intelligent. They know when to praise, be silent, or protest. Football is a way of life having a special dignity, and to let these people down is unforgivable. The more so now that Spain has world-ranking as a football power, and we have heavy international commitments.
In Spain, one sees every day the greater attention being paid young players, and the high-quality material that is resulting. For Spanish lads learn fast and in Chile, and subsequent World Cups, I hope my adopted, beloved country will show all this. There is no finer game than this one, which these youngsters, in their turn, will hold in trust...
"


Piece of him from 1966

 

There's also a famous 1976 study from Reilly and Thomas observing Everton at all their home games and those ran 8.0 to 8.5 kilometers per game, with 20-21% at 'cruise speed' and 11-12% at 'sprint'. Those finished 11th that year in the First Division.

I'll look what I can find back. I had once a nice table saved somewhere that lists all of those studies, including some top sides. The Di Stefano metres come from Palfai et al. (1970, 1961).

Also asked to one of the journalists about Netzer his placing (and that he sticks out relative to other BuLi players). I received an interesting justification back. Will try to return to this.


Returning briefly to Matthews; I remember now that PDG1978 listed Faas Wilkes around #10 in his 'best dribblers' list and that conceivably he just might be somewhere in the top 30. Without being biased, I have to say his dribbling indeed looks more sophisticated, especially for a man 1.90 metres tall, than Matthews around that point in time. There are some good solo goals of him at Inter for example (which PDG also showed to me back then). This is no knock on Matthews, he was almost 8.5 years older than him (1915 vs 1923).

 

This part of the write up provides the framework, the reference to depart. There's always an assumption to build on.

"Netzer is a playmaker with considerable insight in the game and a silky kick of the ball. He has moreover the natural look and feel of a leader. Netzer also likes to have an opinion. As a television pundit that came in handy, but during his career this wasn't always appreciated and it probably cost him a number of national team games. Franz Beckenbauer can do without this. The cruising star, later strolling captain, of West Germany prefers to match his game to the reliable worker Overath over the flamboyant and more creative Netzer. Given his attacking playing style and impulse to the teams he played for it isn't strange the German would later reveal himself as a reliable and big advocate of the so called 'Dutch School'."


The things that came to the fore when asking for this (first PM on twitter, later mail). In italics things I self checked or looked up.


This is subjective. Anyone who claims otherwise isn't honest.

'Skill' in their own time matters. Some players their skill level are today forgotten (Gullit, Charlton).

Europe wide fame and appreciation at someone's peak (in his case age 25 - 30) is a consideration. This is inevitable for previous generation players. To whom are they compared by serious sources.

Most of his weaknesses (except his 'opinions') wouldn't have been an issue in any of the great South American and Italian teams. A team with two Didi's, three Maradona's, four Messi's wouldn't work at all. His mobility was still superior over Didi or Gerson. His strengths come with a weakness, that's normal.

The already good teams he played for (national team and Monchengladbach) reached a creative level they didn't before or after. Against opponents of comparable level. At high level teams he found a margin to improve on this level.

His numbers set him apart from an Overath, Pirlo, Giresse. Even Matthaus. He was not quite a "masterful servant". Overath better retainer of the ball though.

His pre-1970 national team games are surprisingly good.

He took the challenge to play outside his comfort zone and try new things (Real Madrid). This was a difficult environment and a tough league to shine in as evidenced by e.g. Cunningham, Breitner, Simonsen, Schuster, Rep, Maradona.

From 1965 to 1970 he is second only to Beckenbauer, Vogts, defenders and the goalkeepers in both the kicker rating and team of the week selections. Made the team of the season in all five seasons (this I looked up myself). As soon as tiny Monchengladbach got to play in Europe and he was regularly selected for the national team, he received the WK-recognition. In this 1970 - 1974 period (aged 25 - 30) all of the top stars were at one or multiple points downgraded to 'international class' or lower.

He's not Zico or perhaps Charlton (other high-exposure, high-marketed national teams) but those also received their peak recognition past the age of 25.

Place #30 is maybe on the upper end of what is possible. Rossi is at #29 because many have nowadays a wrong conception of his career (one of the best players in 1978, later with Platini not a poacher at all) and see 1982 as representative of his ability.




This is a proper summary, paraphrasing and reflection I think.

 

Haven't watched it yet but someone (a reader, follower on FB) referred to this attempt.

 

It is interesting because at that time during the 1940s I don't think players were literally being compared.

But I don't think there was a better 21 year old centreforward in 1947. He was the revelation of the league that season. Some seasons later Juan José Pizzuti made the headlines as a 21 year old that scored 26 league goals for Banfield. I think this may have been more impressive because he did not have the supporting cast that Alfredo had at River Plate.

It was said that Di Stefano was very intelligent in adapting to any style of football and even as he evolved he was able to incorporate his own ideas to Real Madrid.

Upon his arrival in Spain football was played In one manner, after Di Stefano settled in different forms of ideas were introduced.

In Spain Alfredo was the type of player that demanded others to play to his tune, he was not a cog of the team, but the engine that ran it. He was the commander in chief.

This is what Pepe Pena, Financier, former player, adviser to players, reporter, and manager, who followed Di Stefano’s career closely in Argentina, Colombia and Europe, said about this:

"When he arrived at Madrid the entire world was blasting the ball anywhere. The midfielders would receive the ball with their chest, and instead of killing the ball, they would rebound it. So they would not have the ball under control, and it would fall into the zone of dispute. And that’s where the ball would get blasted. High, strong and far. Di Stefano could not stay up front waiting for balls to spray over his head. He would start to withdraw back into his own half close to his box to ask for the ball. He would yell, “Look at me. Here I am. Don’t kick it…” Instead of blasting the ball they would look at him and give it. They started to gain confidence in him because they realized that Di Stefano, besides resolving problems of handling the ball at the back, he was also going to shield it. How wasn’t he going to shield it if it was the only way to obtain it! It was the only way to go forward in attack! At the same time, those defenders started feeling more as players. Now they weren’t only there to blast the ball forward, but to collaborate in the game of the team. They respected and idolized that man that was teaching them to play. I’ve seen the players of Madrid do incredible things, in material of strength and fight, in order to respond to Di Stefano’s demands."

 

Thank you.

To me it isn't still totally strange because we have seen this with other high placed players. The Zidane of the French First Division is a different Zidane as the one of his second season in Italy (1997-98) when he soon became talked about as the leading midfielder in the world game. And he always was a technically accomplished player.

As often mentioned, the problem with Moreno and Pedernera remains the world war (which was literally a 'world war', not only in Europe) and the isolation of Argentina. That was their choice. Brazil and Uruguay were in the 1940s, I think, not as strong as they had been in the 1930s and 1920s (in case of Uruguay). Brazil would make a gigantic leapfrog in the 1950s. The Elo rating is not perfect but it backs up this idea. During the 1940s Uruguay has a winning record of less than 45%, which is not great.

Once Argentina stopped with their isolation, they received a couple of sobering hammerings at world level. It is well known how the 1958 World Cup resulted in more defensive, mundane and rugged conceptions of the sport. Although by this point they were probably, indeed, not as 'talented' as they had been before, I do strongly think this only added to the legend of La Maquina, Pedernera and Moreno.

 

For ex. Jonathan Wilson (who is not perfect and without flaws, and can be imbalanced towards certain nations) has done his research.

"The world to which Maschio returned [in 1966] was very different from the one he had left, Argentinean's sense of football superiority shattered in the aftermath of the 1958 World Cup."

But also;
"The turn to antifutbol after 1958 can be seen as a rejection of idealism, an embrace of (in some cases, extreme) pragmatism against a backdrop of coups, economic chaos and military intervention [in football]."


And:

 

Also looked yesterday in those old lists. This is from the Tyler and Soar (1973) book. Noticed as well a comment that kicker awarded retrospectively the world class rating for his full 1970 year.


(again, not saying I agree with VI)

As for changing faces/standards/nature/patterns of the game, the 'soccernostalgia' website posted recently this interesting profile from 'Mondial', February 1977.




[also here: not saying all of this is without option for discussion. E.g. Jimmy Hill ("never afraid to dive in where it hurts"), Rodney Marsh, Sports Illustrated highlighting how 'brave' JC14 was, also while playing deeper]

 

Laporta claims that JC14 also saw Messi as the best in history.

https://www.theguardian.com/footbal...elona-board-resign-pep-guardiola-lionel-messi

Don't know if true. In the sport media there are always so many false reports and fake news around (this for ex. is clearly false - as e.g. proven by the 2014 documentary).

 

Indeed by 1958 the quality of talent had dried up in comparison to the previous decades. But many things were improperly handled. The players that were chosen to play in Sweden were basically assigned by what the journalists demanded. The manager Stabile was a puppet and folded under pressure. But they were also out of touch with the rest of the world and everything was a mayham.

The Europeans were adopting to 4-2-4 formations while Argentina were still using a 2-3-5 formation. Tactically they were living in the past and their opponents plucked holes all over them. They didn't even scout their opponents and knew very little to nothing about them. They never settled in Sweden and internally there were fights between the players and coaching staff.

Their match vs Czechoslovakia was like the current Real Madrid side vs a B side. Argentina were simply out of touch with the evolution of the game. The Czechs played at another pace while Argentina seemed like turtles.

 

Adding the DBS Calcio top 3 final placings for Italian, Spanish and German top leagues for 2016/17 too now (and as they are available and might be especially interesting for this season France and Netherlands too):

Italy
1 - Dries Mertens (Napoli/Belgium)
2 - Andrea Belotti (Torino/Italy)
3 - Alejandro Gomez (Atalanta/Argentina)

Spain
1 - Lionel Messi (Barcelona/Argentina)
2 - Isco (Real Madrid/Spain)
3 - Luis Suarez (Barcelona/Uruguay)

Germany
1- Arjen Robben (Bayern Munich/Netherlands)
2 - Timo Horn (Cologne/Germany)
3 - Robert Lewandowski (Bayern Munich/Poland)

France
1 - Thomas Lemar (Monaco/France)
2 - Marco Verratti (Paris St Germain/Italy)
3 - Jean Seri (Nice/Ivory Coast)

Netherlands
1 - Karim El Ahmadi (Feyenoord/Morocco)
2 - Jens Toornstra (Feyenoord/Netherlands)
3 - Lasse Schone (Ajax/Denmark)

 

Thing to me is that Argentina saw themselves as vastly superior. El Grafico regarded Sivori and Maschio as by far better as any European player. They regarded themselves as single most pre tournament favorite and - as usual - even large sections of Europe bought into this narrative and got dreaming about the exoticism.
Above section by Pepe Pena is (again) a reflection of this. After searching his name I figured out he was an Argentine journalist, and also a close "amigo" of Di Stefano himself.

Stabile was uninterrupted national team manager from 1939 to 1958. So he was in charge throughout the so called 'Golden Age' and when La Nuestra was supposedly supreme. He was in charge (or the "puppet") when the charismatic Moreno and Pedernera achieved all of their national team successes.

The 1958 World Cup was with 3.6 goals per game not exactly a defensive tournament, yet the attacking 'La Nuestra' was brutally exposed. It already was when Superga weakened Italy beat them 2-0 in the early 1950s, after which AFA decided to not play European teams for five years. This evasion is the reality.

At hindsight it is always easy to pinpoint at faults, rather than think about whether this approach was before tournament perceived as a strength and an evolution of the old ways. The Northern Ireland midfielder Jimmy McIlroy described the Argentina players as a "relaxed approach" with "a lot of little fat men with stomachs, smiling at us and waving at girls in the crowd." And yet for these type of eating and drinking habits was Moreno mythologized and applauded. On his belly and daily drinking of alcohol he said "don't come telling me to drink milk: the time I drank milk I played badly." It was something that indirectly added to his standing and having a firm belly was a sign of wealth and class.

La Maquina, the Golden Age, resonated so well because you don't impose scouting, play with fewer than five forwards (nominally on a line), or a powerful manager to shackle and restrict the natural and improvising 'geniuses'. They stand above the manager. You don't restrict Moreno and the five instinctive forwards with scouting insight. The manager is a puppet and so should he be. Jonathan Wilson concludes in his tactics book that 'La Maquina' - looking beyond the mythology - was in fact not a system while Europe and slightly later Brazil (late 1940s) had moved beyond this. It are those instinctive and unbounded 'geniuses' that are so often liked.

Given that the world was at war and Brazil and Uruguay not as strong as they had been in the 1930s and 1920s, I think Moreno in the top 30 all-time of any list, and by far the highest of his generation, is already pretty generous. If the actual best player was a Dane or so (successor of Middelboe) he would have been forgotten by now.

Here some more excerpts:

"The public in Argentina, conditioned by the apparent strength of their league and by propaganda telling them this was the best football in the world, generally believed they went to the World Cup as favorites. For half an hour, Argentina's self confidence seemed justified."

On that player selection:

"Stabile was sacked and the nation began to question every footballing principle it held dear. If la nuestra wasn't the answer, what was? And if a belief in Argentina's superiority was a lie, what else was?
Part of that complacency was the way Argentina's selectors handicapped themselves by refusing to pick any of the carasucias. A myth has developed that because Maschio, Sivori and Angelillo had moved to Italy they were no longer eligible to play for Argentina, but that is nonsense. They changed affiliation because Argentina did not want them.
The assumption was that football in Argentina was so strong, the Argentinean league so rich in talented players, that it could afford to spurn those who had left, and it was a similar mentality that led to a belief that Argentina could simply play their game [la nuestra] without needing to worry too much about opponents. Scouting was, at best, rudimentary."

This makes it even more understandable why they (El Grafico) might judge Di Stefano in different terms later on. Instead of in 1960 or 1980. Same for a Sivori that isn't needed in 1958.

As well as changing ideas on martyrdom, patriotism and ignorance of the actual credible threat Mussollini imposed.

Anyway, I don't have the illusion that this will change views of others (for this e.g. Dearman is too poisoned, others with too many vested interests and with water in their eyes whenever La Maquina is brought up). I just wanted to show to others the logical reasoning and the assumptions of mine.

 

I dont really know how it was before, but I have read many times that that feeling of superiority was, if not originated, then greatly enhanced by the 1957 SA tournament Argentina won. The team went there pretty much like the one in 1958 went to Sweden: it was an improvised team that just went to play without preparation. The fact that they won regardless, and in remarkable fashion, fueled a false feeling of invincibility.
I have read in Mundo Deportivo about that WC. If I remember correctly, they did count Argentina among the contenders and were rather curious about whether Argentina and its players were going to do justice to their fame. Then as the tournament took place, they spoke of Argentina as an unorganized lazy team, but always praised the technical prowess of the individuals.

 

As far as I understand, that 1957 SA win came as a pleasant surprise, that they would win was not expected from them. They were a bunch of talented young guys up front that may not have properly prepared to tackle the tournament, but did not have much pressure on them either. And they happened to click. It is true they were eligible for the 1958 WC. At least that is what Maschio said in an interview. They were not part of the delegation simply becaused they were not called. And the story was different in 1958 in the way that now the team was under pressure to win. Expectations had rocketed. Unfortunately, also had that feeling of superiority. So, preparation was none-existing. And they ended up making fools of themselves, not without the aid of a significant shortage of good luck. All champions need a little of that too.