'The Enigma Of Systems'

The following article was published in 'Fifa News' in 1977.

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THE ENIGMA OF SYSTEMS

A survery of 100 Years of World Soccer Tactics by Dr. Friedebert Becker


Nowadays nobody talks much about ‘systems’ although at one time this tactical question was the topic of animated discussions. Modern reporting tends to give the limelight far too frequently to interviews with the stars of professional football, even though this has been repeated a thousand times over. The fact is, however, that the firm contours of these rigid ‘systems’ are getting hazier every day. These days the tactical attacking formations of each team differ considerably, not only from one team to another, be it club or national team. Now even one team alone tends to apply first one system, then another, and yet another, all within the course of one match.

Years ago, up to the end of the ‘50s, each player was allotted a certain restricted space on the field, in which he was expected to carry out his own limited tactical taks. I remember the time when a player could be chided for playing a bad game position-wise, merely because as left back he ‘encroached’ onto the right side of the field, or as center half he entered the attack. Even in the 1930s the English newspapers devoted whole columns to the astounding tactics of the Arsenal half back Crayston, who, in the course of a game, tended occasionally to change places with his center forward teammate, a most extraordinary tactic at that time.

In the matches seen today, however, from the 1st Division to the junior categories, forwards, half backs and full backs are constantly milling about from front to back and from left to right.

A retrospective glance at the systems employed since the beginning of football’s evolution throws a clear light on the reasons for their decline. Only in the case of one player, the goalkeeper, do the laws of the game actually stipulate just where and how he has to operate. But as sure as football exists, all the others may move as they please.

It is astonishing that the evolution of the so-called ‘formation’ since the birth of football 100 years ago has occurred in retrograde. Traveling from the ultra-offensive formation round about 1860/70 to the ultra-defensive of the 1960s and 1970s and lastly the ‘super catenaccio’ cultivated initially by the famous Inter Milan team and conceived by Helenio Herrera.

More than 100 years ago, when football was still a purely solo game with all 10 players pursuing the ball on their own account, there were nine forwards and one defender. Tactical order only began to emerge when the English Football Association was founded, the first of its kind, in 1863. However with “only” eight forwards on the attack, one half back and one full back behind them forming the defense, the game could still really not be called a team game. It was only when the renowned and legendary Scottish team Queens Park Glasgow (which as an amateur club still owns the enormous Hampden Park stadium) came into being at the end of the 1870s that a system developed which finally marked the beginning of combination football. This became famous as the ‘Scottish style’ in which six forwards, two half backs and two full backs were used. This put the Scots way ahead of the English who reverted to a 1-2-7 when the pressure of international defeats in the following epoch against the more defensive Scots compelled them to re-plan their game. It is interesting that England only managed to win three of the 17 international matches played against Scotland from 1872 to 1880.

In terms of figures, therefore, we can see that the Scots played a 2-2-6, a formation which in the next decade developed into a 2-3-5 (two full backs, three half backs, five forwards), becoming THE formation throughout the entire world for the next half-century. This was brought about by England’s answer to the overwhelming Scottish 2-2-6, which was to pull deep one of the forwards into the half backs, thus giving birth to the classical center half. At last some sort of logical tactical balance had been achieved: five defensive players now confronted five offensive players. The first clubs to adopt this system in England with sensational success were Aston Villa, Preston North End and Sunderland, which dominated the football scene at the end of the last century.

This system did not die out until 50 years ago, at the time when a change to the Offside Law caused a true revolution in football in 1926. The jubilee of this dramatic turning point in modern football was really not celebrated in a fit manner last year. Up to 1925, it was the rule that the attackers had to have three defenders (the goalkeeper included) between them and the goal so as not to be offside. This situation was turned to account in Great Britain by tactically cunning defenders who laid offside ‘traps’ for their opponents, which had the result of gradually paralyzing the whole game. Consequently, the powerful International Football Association Board (the world body responsible for the laws) decided that to reduce offside there should in future be only two defenders between the attacker and the goal instead of three.

The diminished danger of being caught offside naturally encouraged the center forward and the outside forwards to advance farther upfield (it was not therefore the inside forwards who initially pulled back as is often maintained). The attacking ‘W’ therefore emerged and the epoch of prolific goals commenced, most of them being shot by the center forward and outside forwards. This meant that some counter-measure had to be conceived to thwart the unmolested onslaught of the center forward (like a ‘tank’) and the players on the wing who darted in from the flanks towards goal. It was then that Chapman, the ingenious Arsenal manager, was inspired with the idea of basically changing the tactical formation of the defense. He employed the formerly attacking center half to guard the opposing attacking center forward, thus leaving the full backs free to guard the wings. In order to balance this tactic and strengthen the attack, the outside halves were permitted to infiltrate farther forward into the opposing side, whose inside forwards, in an effort to guard them, therefore remained at the back as a natural consequence.

Without a doubt, it was a cardinal error to believe that WM, now firmly entrenched for many years, was over-defensive. Its magical ‘quadrilateral’, composed of wing halves and inside forwards, was even more offensive than the systems which were to succeed it, and in any case was as offensive as the 2-3-5 with the attacking center half. The London club Arsenal created a sensation everywhere with its new system: notwithstanding this, it was copied only reluctantly elsewhere.

It is amazing that in Europe, outside of Great Britain, it took practically a whole decade for the tactical consequences of the change in the law to be grasped. In 1934, under the influence of national team coach Nerz, who had thoroughly studied football in England, Germany followed Arsenal’s example. At this time I recommended in the Munich magazine published then under the name of ‘Fussball’ that this formation with its pulled-back center half (stopper/third back) be known as ‘WM’, the shape of the attack resembling a W and that of the defense an M. Supported by the predecessor of the present Parisian magazine ‘France Football’, this definition caught on everywhere in the course of time.

The other European countries took a long time to adopt this British and German pattern. In South America, the cult of the apparently indispensable ‘attacking center half’, almost amounting to idolatry, was so intense that the tactical rearrangement only occurred very much later, and then very surreptitiously.

The historical and splendid Arsenal WM formation of the 1930s, with which they becam league champions five times and F.A. Cup winners twice, truly deserves to be immortalized. The first stopper/third back in the world was called Roberts. The deeply-packed Hulme/Jack/Drake/James/Bastin won fame as the best WM attack of all time.

It was thanks to the WM that Germany, the first and only team playing ‘modern’ football at the World Championship in Italy in 1934, won thid place, a truly astonishing feat at that time. Even Austria’s famous ‘Wunderteam’ was nullified by this German WM, with the playmaker Szepan, the typical stopper/third back Münzenberg; Janes, whose role covering on the flanks led him to be a record international player; Conen (as ‘Tank’) the best center forward in the tournament and Lehner and Kobierski, the wing forwards, playing in the Hulme-Bastin tradition, formed the model WM team for Germany, unique on the European continent at the time. Even during the World Cup final in France in 19 38, there was still a confrontation of two attacking center halves, Italy andHungary, just like Italy and Czechoslovakia in 1934. Under the guidance of Pozzo, Italy won both times and the Italian attacking center halves, Monti and Andreolo, played a world-class game.

WM however gradually made a breakthrough on the Continent. The first country to invent a strategy to combat WM and the stopper was Switzerland. Their Viennese coach, Rappan, developed and nurtured for a good 20 years the system known as Verrou (‘Bolt’, ‘Riegel’) not to be confused with the Italian ‘catenaccio’. Traces of the old-style Verrou can still be seen today in certain tactical manoeuvres. Rappan did not dispense with the still popular attacking center half of the old school, but chose to pull deep the wing halves, who had operated on the offensive in the WM, into the defense zone, where they were set the task of marking the wings. He lined up the full backs one behind the other (just like in the pre-WM period), leaving the large area in front of them in command of the center half and an inside forward pulled back to form a midfield duet. This formation brought Rappan sensational successes in the 1930s, even against England, the strongest team at the time. Nobody was very quick to find a counter-remedy. Rappan did of course at that time have exceptionally talented players to carry out these special tasks: the attacking Vernati, a center half of world-class, commanding an enormous portion of the field; the world-class full back Minelli; the wing half Springer as well as the excellent shots, Abegglen and Amado, both inside forwards. The fact that Switzerland attacked with two ‘stormheads’ side-by-side confused the opposing stopper (third back). Moreover the deeply-packed citadel of the Verrou formations at the World Championship in Brazil in 1950, although somewhat ‘camouflaged’ by a ‘lop-sided’ half back line. The same formation, incidentally, was also used occasionally in Europe for the benefit of the spectators who were clamouring for attacking center halves. One of the two wing halves was simply pulled deep into the defensive enabling him to cover the ‘outside,’ and the ‘full back’ listed as such on the program was tacticly used as stopper (third back) in the defense zone. Player number 5, supposedly an attacking center half played together with his midfield colleague a wing half duet all of which exactly conformed to WM but went under a different name.

Uruguay became World Champion in 1950 using a variation of the Verrou. They knocked out the top-favorite Brazil in the last game, having only just managed to scrape through against Sweden (2-2) and Spain (3-2), whereas Brazil triumphantly wiped out the same two European teams (6-1, 7-1) in a euphoria of victory. Why then this sensational 1-2 defeat against Uruguay? During the intermediary rounds, Switzerland had caused a sensation with their 2-2 draw against Brazil, although not against the first team. Urugay was inspired by the Swiss Verrou and played on the defense with the full backs tightly packed at the back and the wing halves pulled back, although somewhat more to the center than the Swiss version. Brazil’s fantastic forwards were thwarted by this triangular defense formation where each player could ‘cover up’ for the other and even the almost invincible goalgetter Ademir, considered to be one of the most superb forwards of all times, found his equal in the pairs Varela-Andrade or Varela-Tejera. What is more, the colossal center half Varela still had the possibility of launching impetuously into the attack forging his way, like Vernati, far upfield. The famous Andrade, nephew of the great Andrade who won fame at the 1930 World Cup and the 1924 Olympics, developed this version of the Verrou into a veritable ‘Cage’, as it was named by Varela.

A fresh turning point for football came with the sensational international match England versus Hungary in 1953, when England suffered their first home loss to a non-British team in 90 years of football. The 6-3 victory of the Hungarians siginified the apparent end of the English-born WM. Hungary, incidentally, played according to a new system, traces of which were already visible at the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki. Under the leadership of the great coach and strategist Sebes, the new Hungarian ‘wunderteam’ was finally fomed in 1953. Hidegkuti, the former winger, later center forward, was pulled way back into midfield where he took on the role of playmaker. The two goalgetting inside forwards, the prolific scorers Puskas and Kocsis, were sent upfield along with the wingers. The English somewhat failed to notice this and even their important stopper (third back) remained glued to the spot in front of his goalkeeper. The two wing halves played without making the slightest contact with ‘their’ opponents Puskas and Kocsis up front, just as all three had always been accustomed to do in their league games. This left the way wide open for Hungary to shot six goals practically unhindered.

One year later, at the Final of the World Cup in Bern, the German coach Herberger demonstrated his tactial antidote in the game against the top-favorite Hungary, thus proving the superiority of his team’s system to that of Hungary’s. He established a flexible of marking by using Liebrich (stopper) and Mai (wing half) to guard the forwards Puskas and Kocsis way up front. Hidegkuti was rendered ineffective by the other wing half, Eckel. Bozsik, Hungary’s brilliant wing half, usually acting as pivot, was no match for Fritz Walter, the most brilliant playmaker of the whole tournament, who hung back on the left half. Germany gave England a good example of just how it was actually possible to beat the Hungarians 3-2 and keep them in check.

This was the start of the 4-2-4 or 4-3-3, first referred to as such many years later when Brazil created a sensation at the 1958 World Cup, not only by introducing their 17-year-old football prodigy Pelé, but also due to their new tactical formation. In actual fact, their 4-2-4 formula, now world-famous, was not much different to the Hungarian pattern witnessed in Bern. Instead of pulling back their playmaker, the inside forward, they pulled back the incomparable Didi who assumed a similar role to that of Fritz Walter. Behind a lineup of four forwards, Didi took command of the midfield together with the wing half Zito. They were supported from behind by a four-strong defense, composed of the brilliant defensive center half Bellini and the other wing half Orlando, played in between the two full backs Nilton Santos and De Sordi (later Djalma Santos).

The 4-2-4 became the fashion. But the Brazilians as world champions came up with yet another surprise in 1962, triumphing once again with a different variation, which pointed the direction which football throughout the world would take: the accent was on defense. In fact, Brazil no longer used their 4-2-4 but changed it to 4-3-3 by occasionally pulling back Zagalo the outside left, to join Didi and Zito in midfield.

Real Madrid, the leading team at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, operated with a system which once again, although bearing the individual stamp of their star players, Di Stéfano, Puskas, Gento and Santamaria, closely resembled the 4-3-3. Puskas attacked way up front like the ‘tank’ of the old-school, almost level with the wings (Gento, the star). Behind him was Di Stéfano, the football giant of our times, displaying his artistry in what was for those times an enormous operating space, sometimes cropping up right in the foremost ranks as a shooter, then the next minute springing to the assistance of his own goalkeeper. Del Sol, his midfield colleague, operated in front of Santamaria, who led the three or four-strong defense with absolute mastery. This Real formation, which although often copied has never been equalled, is difficult to define in numbers. It was a 4-2-4 in the attack, changing to 4-4-2 in defense. Incidentally, Benfica Lisbon with the celebrated forward, Eusebio, returned WM to favour when they won the title from Real using a variation of it and a 4-3-3 formation.

In 1964, when Real Madrid tried to make a comeback, their way was barred at the Euroepan Cup Final in Vienna by Internazionale Milan, using a system which had already became world-famous, or rather, in its crudest form, ‘super-catenaccio’, notorious. And although this system is applied in numerous versions and subject to manifold changes, its chief features can still be detected in most of the methods of football used today. Sometimes hovering toward attack, sometimes defense, Catenaccio found support. Translation of this Italian word should be avoided as it is in any case understood internationally, for in spite of its literal meaning, it has nothing to do with the old Bolt, Riegel, Verrou.

A frequent practice in many countries, that is, to occasionally draw back one man alone behind the chain of defense as ‘sweeper,’ became a basic principle of Inter Milan. The Italians logically called him ‘Libero’ (free man), a definition which has also become known internationally. Moreover, Inter even went to the extreme of pulling back, in front of him, four defenders and three midfield players, leaving only two forwards for the attack, the famous Mazzola and Jair. Thus emerged the 1-4-3-2 which was the cause of Real’s downfall in Vienna (1-3). The Inter full back, Facchetti, even at that time created a worldwide sensation with his typical solo breakthroughs as far as the opponent’s penalty area. This style of the attacking defender was imitated by more and more players and eventually led to not only one defender occasionally entering the attack, but the sweeper, in particular, fell to making amazing attacking sallies, advancing right up to the striking point, abandoning his purely defensive task which had virtually tied him to his own penalty area.

This pulling-deep of one single player as sweeper who did not have to guard any opponent in particular (therefore free-man) consequently left an opposing forward unguarded. This led to the introduction of another stopper who had to fill the stopper gap left by the sweeper; this extra stopper finally developed into the often socalled first stopper (Vorstopper), whose task was to guard the opposing forward nearest to the goal before the other stopper, now turned sweeper. Nowadays libero (sweeper) and catenaccio, generally practiced the world over, are expressions which need no translation. However catenaccio has gone from the sublime to the ridiculous, (for instance during the European Cup), particularly since the dethronement of the model catenaccio team Inter Milan by Celtic in 1967.

Whereas the classical WM started the tactic of man-to-man guarding; full back against outside forward, wing half against inside forward, stopper against center forward, its evolution into gradually more relaxed formations, from 4-2-4 to super catenaccio 1-5-2-2 or 1-5-3-1, the guarding of a certain space besides the man-to-man guarding returned to fashion. The sweeper developed into a defense and attack player, not only clearing up in the area near his goalkeeper, but sometimes pushing forward as striker and even shooting. Beckenbauer, in the meantime, has developed into the most typical representative of this style, a model of the modern sweeper. Under the guidance of Helmut Schön, Germany tried out this attacking sweeper style for the first time in Rio in 1968 against Brazil. Beckenbauer was already brilliant then in his new role.

The Final of the World Cup in England in 1966, England versus Germany (4-2 after extra-time) figures in today’s tactical manual as a fine example of how the stragetical basis of modern football is developing and detaching itself from the rigid formations of former times. England played under the guidance of Alf Ramsey, who was knighted for his success. The English played virtually without wingers, a 3-5-2, that is, three backs: Cohen, Jack Charlton and Wilson, five half backs sometimes attacking, sometimes defending: namely Ball, Stiles, Bobby Charlton, Moore and Peters and only two forwards, the strikers Hunt and Hurst, the latter alone succeeded in scoring three goals. Thanks to Helmut Schön, the Germans countered them with tactical intelligence using a 1-3-3-3, the defensive sweeper Schulz, the backs: Höttges, Weber and Schnellinger and a midfield trio composed of Haller, Beckenbauer and Overath (Beckenbauer played as a special cover to Bobby Charlton – a beautiful duet – and not yet as sweeper), and the forwards Seeler, Held and Emmerich.

But even then basic formations had broken loose to such an extent into mobile tactical operations that to define them in numbers was even at that time regarded as an almost strenuous effort to force tactics into stereotyped patterns. A typical sign of this was that the German goals were not scored by forwards, but by Haller and Weber, midfielder player and stopper (third back), respectively.

The 1970 World Cup seemed to prove the point for the catenaccio supporters. The Italians with their 1-4-3-2 formation managed to reach the quarterfinals scoring only one goal in three matches. They even got as far as the final itself, but were defeated outright by the Pelé-led offensive Brazilians 1-4.

The 1974 World Cup in Germany, however, gave the opponents of catenaccio a substantial upcurrent, giving rise to hope for a more offensive ‘Football 2000’. Above all, the successful Germans, Dutch and Poles showed drastically just how the era of the old ‘systems’ was a thing of the past. Now every player in the team is expected to be able to take on any task, apart from goalkeeping.

Football is so fast, the scope of each player has magnified so enormously – comprising virtually the whole field – that one can only refer to systems in the broadest of outlines. The Dutch team, although defeated in the final, showed impressively (for example in their match against former world champion Brazil) how each of the 10 field player can crop up literally everywhere. Their ‘double wing’ tactic was sensational, when the two defenders entered the attack together with their wings. The very fact that the headstrong playmaker, Johan Cruyff, disputed with his coach Weisweiler in Barcelona whether he were more effective as a midfield player or as striker just shows – as an example amongst hundreds – that rigid systems no longer exist.

In the 1974 World Cup, therefore, it was ironical that the Brazilians, the very team to become world champions in 1958, 1962 and 1970 with their offensive ballplay, should come to grief in 1974 due to their exaggerated defensive play enforced upon them by their coach, Zagalo, who had played outside left in the 1958 world champion team, the dominators of offensive play. The Brazilians played a similar game to the other South Americans from Uruguay and Argentina, that is, 1-4-4-1, one could almost go as far as to say 1-4-5-0. Even the influence of the defender, Francisco Marinho – along with Beckenbauer and Cruyff – the best player of the tournament, could not change things even with his excellent onslaughts right up to the opponents’ goalmouth. The fact that the apparently technically brilliant Uruguayans and Argentinians played a small role in 1974, in spite of their mainly stationary brilliant ball artistry, was simply because they were underdeveloped tacticians. They presumed – incorrectly – that they were ‘technially superior’. Alas, when the opponent exacted tempo and tackle it turned out that their technique was not enough. Many South Americans still do not wish to admit that ball artistry demonstrated on the spot, without the need for speed, is art for art’s sake and is more in place in a variety hall than on the football field.

This reminds me of an original truly South American-inspired manoeuvre of the Argentinians at the end of the 1950s. They too were preoccupied with the question of how to thwart the sweeper, the key figure at the time. They discovered the ‘spearhead system’, highly controversial at the time, by which the two inside forwards lined up one behind the other – instead of just one center forward – and attempted to overwhelm the sweeper. The defense was officially dominated by the still terrifically popular sweeper. A closer look showed however that the M of the WM formation was disguised by the socalled ‘lopsided half back line’ in which Rossi with just one wing half played in front of a three back lineup, in which the outside half (attacking half) Lombardo, had been unobtrusively pulled deep and Dellacha, officially listed as full back, acted as sweeper. This ‘spearhead’ was however ‘broken’ when the Argentinians, top favourite in 1958, were thrashed by Germany (1-3) and the Czechs (1-6). The German and Czech teams simply switched over an attacking half back to guard the second center forward, thoroughly demoralized the opponent with their close man-to-man covering, to which the South Americans were unaccustomed, thus producing many emotionally-caused fouls. I remember well a summit talk in Buenos Aires concerning formations when the admired guest from Germany, Herberger, demonstrated to the leading Argentinian coaches and players with peppermints on a billiard table how his tactical counter-strategy had managed to thwart the 4-2-4 or the spearhead system.

Herberger’s pupil, Dettmar Cramer, known throughout the world as FIFA’s only itinerant coach in all parts of the globe, demonstrates particularly forcibly with Bayern Munich just what has happened to the ‘systems’ of bygone days. The system which we understand as a tactical basic formation does not only change in relation to the special traits of the many different ways during a game. The course the game is taking and the score can cause it to vary just as much as the improvised moves of the opponent.

The downfall of rigid systems, subject to specific formations (for example, WM) or numbers (4-2-4 etc.) is engendered by the fate of the shirt numbers. Once upon a time they represented undoubtedly and irrevocably the position of a player and his usually narrowly restricted area of action. The full backs were numbered 2 and 3, the half backs 4, 5 and 6, 7 was only to be seen on the right wing and 11 on the left wing. Number 9 was a proud striking center forward ‘tank’. 8 and 10 were inside forwards operating from the rear. The Iron Curtain countries which had often emulated the systems and tactics of the West, or adapted them to their best players, introduced a new numbering order, logically allotting number 3 to the sweeper, the left back was no. 4. They thought it common sense to number the wing halves 5 and 6 whereas up to the present time in the rest of the world no. 5 is in fact usually the number given to the center half, stopper or sweeper.

‘Formations’ nowadays reveal virtually nothing about the role of the player. What is more confusing, they are at the most only referred to as defenders, midfield players and attackers. Nobody is surprised anymore when ‘11’ turns up in the defense and a ‘2’ as stormhead forward. Perhaps in future, with the exception of the goalkeeper, the players will only be identified by the letters of the alphabet.

 

It was published in English in 1977 in "Fifa News". Certainly Dr. Becker wrote it down in German and then someone translated it for him. I don't know if it was published somewhere else before (in German). I only have the article from "Fifa News".

 

Hey thanks! I just noticed your e-mail! Cheers