Tactical Flexibility - our difference in 2002, our downfall since...

[Nutmeg]

For all my criticisms of Arena, the 2002 version of Arena was years ahead of Bradley when it came to tactical flexibility. He and his team did a good job of scouting opponents, and they adjusted how they played to account for their opponents.

He played 3-5-2, 4-4-2, multiple DMids, single DMids, Reyna on the right, Donovan at AMid, etc. Guessing Arena's lineup was always a bit of a crapshoot because you were never quite sure what type of lineup he was going to throw on the field.

In 2002, that flexibility paid off. Not saying Arena was perfect, but any reasonable person has to tip their hat to Arena for taking that team that far and taking Germany to the edge of elimination.

I'm not sure what happened after that, but at some point Arena decided that flexibility wasn't as cool as it used to be. He decided 6 months before the World Cup what our standard formation was going to be and who played where. He was nice enough to lay it out on a whiteboard for a South American radio show.

Bradley has picked up where Arena left off. Nowak is just as predictable. If you can't correctly guess 9 of the starting 11 for the Poland game and give a decent summary of the role each player will be playing, it's for one of two reasons:

you haven't been paying attention
you're hoping beyond reason that this will be the game Bradley shuffles things upI'll be the first to do a cartwheel if Bradley comes out with a lineup that shocks us all. I'm also willing to bet that 9 of these 11 players start in these positions:

--------- Dempsey - Johnson
Lewis --------------------- Donovan
--------- Bradley ------ Clark
Pearce - Benchanegra - Gooch - Dolo
---------------- Howard

You can see Bradley's gameplan from a mile away. I'd be more supportive of that approach if I thought we had the players to impose our game on the other team.

We don't.

[Maitreya]

Coaches of non-European teams seem to face a big problem when it comes to having all healthy players available for friendlies. In our case it is worse because of the size of the Atlantic Ocean and current MLS attitudes towards international dates. The whole player pool is rarely, if ever, available for games like this Poland game that would be perfect for experimentation. How can the coach experiment tactically when his hands are tied by the number and characteristics of the players available to him? Perhaps some of the conservatism we have seen from Bradley in terms of tactical decisions is because of this.

[MLSNHTOWN]

Didn't Arena also practically play a 4-4-2 in every game but the World cup?

I mean he did what he had to do to win in the World Cup and that flexibility paid huge dividends as you mentioned. But before and after the 2002 World cup, he showed very little tactical flexibility right?

[IndividualEleven]

Not only is BB not very flexible but his longball and attacking fullbacks tactics don't even fit the personnel he selects to start.

1. We don't have target forwards
2. We don't have bookend Roberto Carlos style fullbacks
3. Michael Bradley is not an adequate d-mid in the formation

Watching BB at the MetroStars and at Chivas he seemed enamored of molding the team to his set template rather than making best use of personnel and addressing weakenesses.

[Maximum Optimal]

One point I would make is that tactical flexibility isn't necessarily the same thing as changing personnel or formations. With the right players, it can be achieved within a game as well as from game to game.

For example, consider a situation where we play the following four as our main attacking players: Altidore, Adu, Dempsey, Donovan. With those four, only Altidore would have a set role. The other three are the types of players that would allow us to interchange unpredictably at will.

We could also switch tactics at will with this group. We can emphasize a short passing game. We can have the nominal wide players pinch to the middle. We can have them play wide. We can use Altidore's size and Donovan's speed to spice in some long balls. We can have one of the central mids make periodic deep runs into the box. We can look for isolation matchups against a particular defender we think is vulnerable. Having the right kinds of players on the field would give up an extensive tool kit of tactics from which to choose and emphasize.

I generally agree that Bradley has taken a sterile, predictable approach. I have been as frustrated as anyone about this. But I do think the personnel is being developed (in particular Adu and Altidore, maybe Rogers too) that will allow us to be more flexible and unpredictable on offense. The question is whether Bradley will take advantage of this. I am willing to keep an open mind given that some of the key components of this approach are just now being integrated into the senior team. We will know a lot more about Bradley as a coach after the England, Spain and Argentina friendlies.

[Mr Martin]

Yes, I would agree that Arena APPEARS to have been more tactically flexible than Bradley currently appears to be. Yes, he switched to a 3-5-2 in the middle of the 2002 Cup and he switched to a 4-5-1 prior to the 2006 Cup, even though he was traditionally a classic 4-4-2 (diamond midfield) guy.

Bradey has been very consistent so far with his 4-4-2 (flat midfield; or empty bucket as some like to call it).

But, let's not overplay the idea that Arena did these things with full foresight.

1. The 3-5-2 in 2002 was at least in part driven by injuries to Arena's backs. Cherundolo was on the roster, but hurt. Agoos was hurt. I think one other back had accumulated cards. The Sanneh-Pope-Berhalter 3-man backline was somewhat an emergency creation due to key players falling out. Had the US beaten Germany and gone to the semi's, I think Pope would also have been out due to cards, forcing Arena's hand further.

2. The 4-5-1 in 2006 was also a result of the dramatic loss of form to two key strikers -- Mathis and EJ -- and the key central mid -- O'Brien. Arena was partially forced into the tactical change because he was left with only McBride as a healthy, somewhat in-form striker. Ching wasn't the right kind of starting partner for McBride, Mathis wasn't even on the squad anymore, and EJ was in the middle of his 3-year slump. Donovan was needed in midfield because of O'Brien's health problems.

Arena did a reasonable job of trying to adjust to injuries and form-failures that were out of his hands.

Bradley has not had to deal with such a loss of form in key players during key tournaments. Would he adapt like Arena did? We just don't know.

[Marko72]

One point I would make is that tactical flexibility isn't necessarily the same thing as changing personnel or formations. With the right players, it can be achieved within a game as well as from game to game.

For example, consider a situation where we play the following four as our main attacking players: Altidore, Adu, Dempsey, Donovan. With those four, only Altidore would have a set role. The other three are the types of players that would allow us to interchange unpredictably at will.

We could also switch tactics at will with this group. We can emphasize a short passing game. We can have the nominal wide players pinch to the middle. We can have them play wide. We can use Altidore's size and Donovan's speed to spice in some long balls. We can have one of the central mids make periodic deep runs into the box. We can look for isolation matchups against a particular defender we think is vulnerable. Having the right kinds of players on the field would give up an extensive tool kit of tactics from which to choose and emphasize.

I generally agree that Bradley has taken a sterile, predictable approach. I have been as frustrated as anyone about this. But I do think the personnel is being developed (in particular Adu and Altidore, maybe Rogers too) that will allow us to be more flexible and unpredictable on offense. The question is whether Bradley will take advantage of this. I am willing to keep an open mind given that some of the key components of this approach are just now being integrated into the senior team. We will know a lot more about Bradley as a coach after the England, Spain and Argentina friendlies.

Good post. Actually, good posts all around this thread.

[QuakeAttack]

After 2002, opposing coaches actually started scouting the US. They figured out that the US was a high pressure, counter attacking team. This was independent of the formation being used by the US.

My biggest issues has been the inability of the US to change tactics within a game. Midfield clogged? Send a few long balls to stretch the defense. Opps, McBride is up front and this won't work. Get EJ on the field or move Donovan up front.

But, no.................We have to wait until 10-15 minutes until the end of the game to make the change. Bradley has the same problem. He tends to leave his son in the game too long.

Also, I would be careful with tactical flexibility and moving players around too much. Beasley on the right and Donovan playing three different positions doesn't help in my opinion.

[Adam Zebrowski]

BB is basically conservative, wants to control tempo and by controlling tempo get the ugly result...


given usa is a virtual lock to get to south africa via a conservative style, and the job is to get to south africa firstly, then the minimalist approach gets the job done...

the next aspect is the influx of a coming generation of player, highlighted by adu and altidore and their respective skills call for a more aggressive approach...

but they are kids, not men, and kids competing with men often get exposed, when pure skill is not the winning item, but minimizing mistakes made gets you thru...

i suspect bradley is more than aware of comments posted and has reasons for doing otherwise, i suspect the more brilliant posters can enter the mind of BB and clarify his approach....

[sidefootsitter]

Arena went a ManU 4-4-2 vs. Czechia (idiots at ESPN called it 4-5-1 but Donovan was playing a withdrawn forward/Rooney position ... the problem with that formation was that Donovan disappeared, Beasley was useless on the right, Brückner had the US pegged and Koller scored on the 5th minute, which allowed the Czechs to drop off and deny space).

He switched to 4-1-4-1 vs. Italy and it actually worked pretty well.

He went back to an odd 4-4-2 vs. Ghana with Reyna as a "destroyer" and Beasley in the middle.

I do think these formations were set well advance and Bruce was not being forthright with that South American interviewer about 4-5-1 but, unfortunately for the US, he had fiddled with the choice of suitable players and ended up with too many round pegs in square holes.

It's one thing to pen CRonaldo's name as your right winger; it's entirely another to do the same with DaMarcus Bealsey against a world class competition.

In that respect, it was a true coaching failure. The guy tried being not just flexible but surprising. He just made very poor choices (in addition to Pope, etc.) and his opposition had prepared for the US a lot better than in 2002.

His other failure, as MaximumOptimal has intimated, was the style (or lack thereof) of football that the US played. Arena's in-game adjustments were dismal but that was par for the course.

[QuakeAttack]

BB is basically conservative, wants to control tempo and by controlling tempo get the ugly result...


given usa is a virtual lock to get to south africa via a conservative style, and the job is to get to south africa firstly, then the minimalist approach gets the job done...

the next aspect is the influx of a coming generation of player, highlighted by adu and altidore and their respective skills call for a more aggressive approach...

but they are kids, not men, and kids competing with men often get exposed, when pure skill is not the winning item, but minimizing mistakes made gets you thru...

i suspect bradley is more than aware of comments posted and has reasons for doing otherwise, i suspect the more brilliant posters can enter the mind of BB and clarify his approach....

Yes. I keep thinking back to two years ago when Houston and Chivas played in the playoffs. I believe Chivas had won the first game at home 1-0 and looked in control. However, due either to injury or suspension, they were missing one of their forwards in the second leg. Rather than coming out with a positive approach (I.e. let's get a goal and try to win the game), he tried to control the tempo and not lose (to his credit Chivas almost scored early in the game). Houston, needing a goal, came out attacking without fear and got the goal.

Guess what? Do you think Chivas was able to change their momentum? Nope. Game over.

Just too conservative...

[casoccerdad47]

Yes, I would agree that Arena APPEARS to have been more tactically flexible than Bradley currently appears to be. Yes, he switched to a 3-5-2 in the middle of the 2002 Cup and he switched to a 4-5-1 prior to the 2006 Cup, even though he was traditionally a classic 4-4-2 (diamond midfield) guy.

Bradey has been very consistent so far with his 4-4-2 (flat midfield; or empty bucket as some like to call it).

But, let's not overplay the idea that Arena did these things with full foresight.

1. The 3-5-2 in 2002 was at least in part driven by injuries to Arena's backs. Cherundolo was on the roster, but hurt. Agoos was hurt. I think one other back had accumulated cards. The Sanneh-Pope-Berhalter 3-man backline was somewhat an emergency creation due to key players falling out. Had the US beaten Germany and gone to the semi's, I think Pope would also have been out due to cards, forcing Arena's hand further.

2. The 4-5-1 in 2006 was also a result of the dramatic loss of form to two key strikers -- Mathis and EJ -- and the key central mid -- O'Brien. Arena was partially forced into the tactical change because he was left with only McBride as a healthy, somewhat in-form striker. Ching wasn't the right kind of starting partner for McBride, Mathis wasn't even on the squad anymore, and EJ was in the middle of his 3-year slump. Donovan was needed in midfield because of O'Brien's health problems.

Arena did a reasonable job of trying to adjust to injuries and form-failures that were out of his hands.

Bradley has not had to deal with such a loss of form in key players during key tournaments. Would he adapt like Arena did? We just don't know.

I think you're making Nutmeg's point. Arena adapted to the players he had available. BB hasn't, e.g. Beasley is injured and Convey is still recovering from injury and trying to regain his form, so BB brings in soon to be 34 year old Eddie Lewis to make his system work. This would be an opportunity for him to experiment with a 3-5-2, dropping Spector into the middle with Gooch and Boca and using Dolo and Pearce on the wings. then you could play Donovan, Bradley and Clark in the center of the field and use whatever forward pairing you want. It would be an interesting experiment, but we won't see it. Unfortunately, in Bradley's system I doubt that we'll ever see Donovan or Adu in the center of the midfield on a consistent basis.

[Mr Martin]

I think you're making Nutmeg's point. Arena adapted to the players he had available. BB hasn't, e.g. Beasley is injured and Convey is still recovering from injury and trying to regain his form, so BB brings in soon to be 34 year old Eddie Lewis to make his system work. This would be an opportunity for him to experiment with a 3-5-2, dropping Spector into the middle with Gooch and Boca and using Dolo and Pearce on the wings. then you could play Donovan, Bradley and Clark in the center of the field and use whatever forward pairing you want. It would be an interesting experiment, but we won't see it. Unfortunately, in Bradley's system I doubt that we'll ever see Donovan or Adu in the center of the midfield on a consistent basis.

Bold added.

Yes and no. I think Nutmeg is giving Arena too much credit for being tactically flexible. His hands were forced into the tactical changes he made in 2002 and 2006. I think he is a very average coach, and he would not have made those changes were it not for the significant injury/form issues he faced with his player pool.

Bradley has really not been tested in anything close to the same circumstances as the World Cup. The only meaningfull tournament he has coached was the Gold Cup, and he had basically all his key players available for that, so he didn't need to be creative -- plus the "empty bucket" was still "innovative" ;) last summer at the Gold Cup, half a year into Bradley's tenure. The USSF made the Copa meaningless, so you cannot count that one.

I think both Arena and Bradley are very average coaches with a conservative bent. Arena was forced to think outside his 4-4-2 style due to crcumstances beyond his control. Bradley has yet to be forced into the same situation.

Nutmeg may ultimately be correct. Just not yet, based on his comparison. :D

[PhillyQuakesFan]

Watching BB at the MetroStars and at Chivas he seemed enamored of molding the team to his set template rather than making best use of personnel and addressing weakenesses.


I agree. And the thing is, you can get away with that on the club level because you can acquire players who fit your system and get rid of ones who don't. Dominic Kinnear is the best coach in MLS and he's as tactically inflexible as they come (which is why, as big a fan of his as I am, I didn't and don't want him anywhere near the national team job). At the national team level you're stuck with the players your country produces, and you have to come up with a system that fits their talents rather than vice versa.

[nobody]

Just wanna agree that the flexibility was a big help in 2002. It was fairly dramatic in that we never really used the same lineup, we were switching formations each game. It was really a contrast to the way most teams were approaching things. Sure, you see some variations all over the world. But, the degree of mixing things up was fairly unique in 2002. In 2006, we lost that element.

[diablodelsol]

With a completely healthy lineup, Arena would have changed as little in 2002 as he changed in 2006. And with a completely healthy lineup, Arena likely would only have had 3 games in 2002 as well.

[Maximum Optimal]

IAt the national team level you're stuck with the players your country produces, and you have to come up with a system that fits their talents rather than vice versa.

And the types of players you have can determine the amount of tactical flexibility that the coach has at his disposal. Smart, versatile players allow flexibility without changing personnel much. A diverse set of players allow flexibility but require tinkering with the formation and lineup. I would say in 2002, we had a diverse set of players that allowed this to happen. Much less so in 2006 because of injuries, loss of form, etc.

As I alluded to in my earlier post, we are developing some players that could allow us to be tactically flexible while staying with basically the same lineup. I'd like to think that Bradley has a vision for using those players in this way by 2010. It is important to use the upcoming friendlies and even some of the qualifiers to start playing this way. It won't work if we play empty bucket for the next two years and then decide to try something different in the spring of 2010. This is why I somewhat disagree with those who think it is acceptable to "qualify ugly" with the veterans because the kids might not be completely ready for the rigors of qualification.

[DLee]

Didn't a fluke ending to the Portugal - South Korea match save us from an embarassing exit after getting routed by previously pointless Poland?

I still think Bruce's 2002 run is the most overrated event in US Soccer history.

[IndividualEleven]

BB is basically conservative, wants to control tempo and by controlling tempo get the ugly result...


given usa is a virtual lock to get to south africa via a conservative style, and the job is to get to south africa firstly, then the minimalist approach gets the job done...

the next aspect is the influx of a coming generation of player, highlighted by adu and altidore and their respective skills call for a more aggressive approach...

but they are kids, not men, and kids competing with men often get exposed, when pure skill is not the winning item, but minimizing mistakes made gets you thru...

i suspect bradley is more than aware of comments posted and has reasons for doing otherwise, i suspect the more brilliant posters can enter the mind of BB and clarify his approach....

Your dogged defense of the man is certainly indefatigable is not particularly coherent.

i suspect bradley is more than aware of comments posted and has reasons for doing otherwise, i suspect the more brilliant posters can enter the mind of BB and clarify his approach...

There's a salient, personal element to it...

[Nutmeg]

OK - I think a lot of people here are missing the point. Was Arena forced into a lot of his flexibility? Yeah, probably. Instead of getting hung up on that, please consider the main point, which summarized, is this:

- We're better when we make adjustments to take advantage of our strengths and expose opponent weaknesses as we did (for whatever reason) in 2002

- Since that time, we have have made far fewer adjustments and are more rigid in our system and how we play. The result has been teams can easily scout us, know how we're going to play, gameplan for us, and often beat us*.


* Mexico excluded, because Mexico is still deluded enough to think they can trot 11 warm Mexicans out onto the field and beat us without any adjustments or gameplanning necessary.