Iranian Monitor
18 Apr 2006, 12:51 AM
Last year, when reviewing Iran's nuclear program, I noted an anamoly that suggested to me that Iran might have a clandestine enrichment program kept outside of the IAEA inspections. The anamoly relates to clear evidence that Iran had obtained designs for the P-2 centrifuges, conducted rather advanced reseach and tests to produce them, yet had built all of its declared enrichment facilities exclusively using the less advanced P-1 centrifuge. Iran's explanation for this anamoly was that beaucratic and scientific hurdles had basically made it discontinue work on the P-2 centrifuge.
While Iran's explanation may actually correspond to the facts, the weight of the evidence IMO suggests that Iran actually has access to the much more sophisticated P-2 centrifuges already. The issue is whether that access includes having secret sites where uranium is enriched using P-2 centrifuges. If Iran does have such clandestine sites, it will have take a wise step to insure the following:
1) To protect its nuclear program from any military strikes.
Unless the US knows where are Iran's facilities, it obviously cannot target them. That lack of knowledge, in turn, would further undermine the utility of any military strikes against Iran's facilities making such strikes less (not more) likely.
2) Speed up the time Iran attains surge capacity.
While Iran will be capable to enrich sufficient amounts of uranium to fuel nuclear reactors or to make a bomb even using the P-1 centrifuges in less than 3 years notwithstanding politicized estimates by the US showing a longer timetable, if Iran has sufficient quantities of P-2 centrifuges it will be able to reach that milestone much quicker (roughly 4 times faster). Indeed, in that event, the greater liklihood is that Iran already has surge capacity.
3) Lessen the negative effects of the suspension agreement previously entered into by Iran by the Khatami administration between 2003-2005.
The 'voluntary suspension' that Iran had maintained between 2003 and 2005 was totally counterproductive to Iranian interests, unless Iran had a parallel clandestine enrichment program outside of IAEA view and not made subject to the suspensions. Otherwise, the suspension agreement coupled with the instrusive inspections Iran was allowing, merely made the 'military option' more (not less) viable. At the same time, that suspension agreement would have taken a toll on both personel, machinery as well as research and technical expertise required for successfully implementing the goals of Iran's nuclear program.
In his speech declaring that Iran had joined the "nuclear club", President Ahamdinejad also mentioned that Iran had begun work on the more advanced P-2 centrifuges. That currently has made the IAEA and international experts trying to figure out the specifics behind that statement. If it turns out that Iran is already capable and has been producing P-2 centrifuges, it will be game, set and match for Iran. In that case, no doubt nothing will be able to stop Iran from building the bomb if it was so pushed in that direction.
While Iran's explanation may actually correspond to the facts, the weight of the evidence IMO suggests that Iran actually has access to the much more sophisticated P-2 centrifuges already. The issue is whether that access includes having secret sites where uranium is enriched using P-2 centrifuges. If Iran does have such clandestine sites, it will have take a wise step to insure the following:
1) To protect its nuclear program from any military strikes.
Unless the US knows where are Iran's facilities, it obviously cannot target them. That lack of knowledge, in turn, would further undermine the utility of any military strikes against Iran's facilities making such strikes less (not more) likely.
2) Speed up the time Iran attains surge capacity.
While Iran will be capable to enrich sufficient amounts of uranium to fuel nuclear reactors or to make a bomb even using the P-1 centrifuges in less than 3 years notwithstanding politicized estimates by the US showing a longer timetable, if Iran has sufficient quantities of P-2 centrifuges it will be able to reach that milestone much quicker (roughly 4 times faster). Indeed, in that event, the greater liklihood is that Iran already has surge capacity.
3) Lessen the negative effects of the suspension agreement previously entered into by Iran by the Khatami administration between 2003-2005.
The 'voluntary suspension' that Iran had maintained between 2003 and 2005 was totally counterproductive to Iranian interests, unless Iran had a parallel clandestine enrichment program outside of IAEA view and not made subject to the suspensions. Otherwise, the suspension agreement coupled with the instrusive inspections Iran was allowing, merely made the 'military option' more (not less) viable. At the same time, that suspension agreement would have taken a toll on both personel, machinery as well as research and technical expertise required for successfully implementing the goals of Iran's nuclear program.
In his speech declaring that Iran had joined the "nuclear club", President Ahamdinejad also mentioned that Iran had begun work on the more advanced P-2 centrifuges. That currently has made the IAEA and international experts trying to figure out the specifics behind that statement. If it turns out that Iran is already capable and has been producing P-2 centrifuges, it will be game, set and match for Iran. In that case, no doubt nothing will be able to stop Iran from building the bomb if it was so pushed in that direction.