RABID
23 Mar 2006, 10:57 AM
I truely do not understand Klinsi's tactics for this game nor the failure to adjust to the US playing two defensive midfielders. First, Klinsi opens up in a 4-3-3 that basically gives Ballack no support whatsoever in midfield. Schneider is playing wide most of the early part of the game and Kehl is deep, so Ballack is primarily responsible for the entire central midfield. To top this off, you have Asamoah, who is a decent poacher but hasn't been able to really run in years, dropping back into the midfield where he can do little but hold the ball. He actually does a decent job at times pushing forward for a little bit of pressure, but his role is very limited given his complete lack of pace. It would seem the point of playing a 4-3-3 was to put pressure on the US defenders, but that tactic is inconsistent with having Asamoah hold up the ball. His presence was just inconsistent with the whole point of playing 3 up front.
Similarly, anyone that watches Cologne knows that this is the worst position for Podolski. He plays well upfront when there are two forwards, and he can do very well as a center forward that does not drop that far into midfield, but this system of expecting Asamoah and Podolski to drop into the midfield is one in which he always struggles. He is a forward, but he is young and struggles anytime that he is expected to be a link type player.
So the tactics just don't make sense. You have Ballack being the only true central midfielder, when the US has two defensive midfielders in the game (Mastroeni and Zavagnin), and you support him by dropping back a young player that has struggled anytime he has been asked to play a link position and then a poacher that can do little but hold the ball. Hence the entire offense relies entirely on Schneider penetrating deep down the right sideline and crossing into Klose, which system fails miserably when Schneider can't play one single decent cross. At best you have Freidrich and Lahm crashing forward after Asamoah has been holding the ball, but by that time the US has players behind the ball and the system produces one single cross from Freidrich in the entire first half.
The second half adjustments make sense. Bringing in Schwein brought another ballhandler into the midfield that freed up Ballack and instantly created more pressure. The US fouls Ballack within seconds of Schwein's arrival, as Ballack immediately recognizes that he can now crash forward. However, the team play doesn't really begin to hit form until Neuville and Borowski come in, with Neuville having the greatest impact. It isn't just the fact that Neuville can run and brings instant pace to the game, but that he doesn't hold the ball as Asamoah was doing. Every attack is designed to push forward and pressure the US defenders before they can recover and get numbers behind the ball. The individual defenders and their lack of speed are exposed.
So I understand the adjustments, but why wait until there are only 30 minutes left in the game? The team had 6 substitutions allowed, so it made no sense not to start making changes earlier in the game. The team got a lot of pressure in the first 10 minutes when the US opened up in a 3-5-2. There wasn't anybody getting back on their left side quickly enough. But Arena immediately adjusted with a solid back four staying behind the ball the rest of the first half. Klinis did nothing for the next 50 minutes, even though it was clear that the tactics weren't putting any pressure on the makeshift US defense.
The 4-1 scoreline is deceiving. This game was set up for Klinsi to throttle a depleted American lineup without its European based players. He succeeded in the second half, but his tactics in the first half are bewildering. Perhaps they just wanted to get an extending period of time to watch Asamoah, Kehl, and Schneider to guage what role if any they would have on the national team, but this was a game in which the team needed a positive result more than it needed more experimentation. Klinsi also wasted an opportunity to get Borowski extensive international experience, when it is clear given Deisler's injury that he is going to have a very big role in the World Cup. In the end, Klinsi got what he needed (a big win), but the team seems to be experimenting with tactics and personnel at a time when it should just be building confidence and making final preparations for June.
Similarly, anyone that watches Cologne knows that this is the worst position for Podolski. He plays well upfront when there are two forwards, and he can do very well as a center forward that does not drop that far into midfield, but this system of expecting Asamoah and Podolski to drop into the midfield is one in which he always struggles. He is a forward, but he is young and struggles anytime that he is expected to be a link type player.
So the tactics just don't make sense. You have Ballack being the only true central midfielder, when the US has two defensive midfielders in the game (Mastroeni and Zavagnin), and you support him by dropping back a young player that has struggled anytime he has been asked to play a link position and then a poacher that can do little but hold the ball. Hence the entire offense relies entirely on Schneider penetrating deep down the right sideline and crossing into Klose, which system fails miserably when Schneider can't play one single decent cross. At best you have Freidrich and Lahm crashing forward after Asamoah has been holding the ball, but by that time the US has players behind the ball and the system produces one single cross from Freidrich in the entire first half.
The second half adjustments make sense. Bringing in Schwein brought another ballhandler into the midfield that freed up Ballack and instantly created more pressure. The US fouls Ballack within seconds of Schwein's arrival, as Ballack immediately recognizes that he can now crash forward. However, the team play doesn't really begin to hit form until Neuville and Borowski come in, with Neuville having the greatest impact. It isn't just the fact that Neuville can run and brings instant pace to the game, but that he doesn't hold the ball as Asamoah was doing. Every attack is designed to push forward and pressure the US defenders before they can recover and get numbers behind the ball. The individual defenders and their lack of speed are exposed.
So I understand the adjustments, but why wait until there are only 30 minutes left in the game? The team had 6 substitutions allowed, so it made no sense not to start making changes earlier in the game. The team got a lot of pressure in the first 10 minutes when the US opened up in a 3-5-2. There wasn't anybody getting back on their left side quickly enough. But Arena immediately adjusted with a solid back four staying behind the ball the rest of the first half. Klinis did nothing for the next 50 minutes, even though it was clear that the tactics weren't putting any pressure on the makeshift US defense.
The 4-1 scoreline is deceiving. This game was set up for Klinsi to throttle a depleted American lineup without its European based players. He succeeded in the second half, but his tactics in the first half are bewildering. Perhaps they just wanted to get an extending period of time to watch Asamoah, Kehl, and Schneider to guage what role if any they would have on the national team, but this was a game in which the team needed a positive result more than it needed more experimentation. Klinsi also wasted an opportunity to get Borowski extensive international experience, when it is clear given Deisler's injury that he is going to have a very big role in the World Cup. In the end, Klinsi got what he needed (a big win), but the team seems to be experimenting with tactics and personnel at a time when it should just be building confidence and making final preparations for June.