Could've it been sucessful? Operation BARBAROSSA

[DoyleG]

Could've Hitler been able to conquer Russia even if everything had gone according to plan?

Discuss.

[topcatcole]

I only have a few minutes right now, but yes, It could have worked. Hitler came very close to defeating the USSR in 1941 before they could regroup, retrain and reorganize. In addition, Stalin was just beginning to rebuild the Army after the devastating pogroms of the '30s. Russian industry was picked up and carried behind the Urals, but it was not instantly productive.
Additionally, had Hitler embraced the Ukrainians, Belorussians, etc that wanted out of the USSR he would have had a huge new source of men and materiel. Instead, he tried to kill them and unleashed one of the largest and most effective partisan organizations anywhere.

[Pauncho]

Got a very interesting variation on this theme: what do the rest of you think about the theory that the initial stages of Barbarossa were so successful because of an offensive deployment of the Red Army - bunched up too close together too close to the border, with no defense in depth, making those mass encirclements possible (i.e. Stalin secretly planned to attack Hitler and Hitler merely beat him to the punch by a short time)?

[nicephoras]

There was a very, very, VERY small chance of success. As recent books, including the excellent "Stalin's Folly", indicate, Stalin was preparing a pre-emptive attack himself. He had reached an agreement with Japan, and was already throwing some forces from the East back to the West. To that effect, he prepared his troops in an offensive formation on the border, but gave them the order NOT TO ENGAGE because he was worried about provocation. Half of the Russian air force was destroyed on the first day because all field commanders had the "do not engage" order. Stalin's command was also suicidal - his decision to push more men into the Smolensk pocket was insanely stupid. Once Zhukov devised the concentric lines to stop the blitz, the German offensive slowed down. The USSR was fortunate for Zhukov's experience due to his experience in the very first real armor engagements in Mongolia in the late 30s. Despite 99% of things going right for Hitler in the summer and fall of 1941, he still failed.
It should also be noted that by the time the Germans attacked the Russian military was in poor shape (especially from a communications standpoint), but in terms of materiel it was way ahead of the Gemans. The Russians actually had more tanks, and their T-34s were superior to anything the Germans could manage. Had Hitler just managed to capture Moscow before the snow fell in 41, its debateable how much of an effect it would have had. Most of the industry was beyond the Urals already, and it actually entered production fairly quickly. Much of Russia's industry was always in the Urals due to the proximity of natural resources.
Simple geography was working against Hitler, badly.
P.S. Hitler was also helped by the incredibly bad decision of Stalin to purge several outstanding generals (especially the brilliant Tukhachevsky and Blucher), leaving him with idiots like Budenny and Voroshilov in central command. Shaposhnikov, a competent general, was ill suited for the top post, and was too ill to continue after the beginning of the war anyway. One of the smartest things Stalin did in 41 was to rehabilitate Rokossovsky; one of the first rehabilitations he attempted.

[Karl K]

There was a very, very, VERY small chance of success. As recent books, including the excellent "Stalin's Folly", indicate, Stalin was preparing a pre-emptive attack himself. He had reached an agreement with Japan, and was already throwing some forces from the East back to the West. To that effect, he prepared his troops in an offensive formation on the border, but gave them the order NOT TO ENGAGE because he was worried about provocation. Half of the Russian air force was destroyed on the first day because all field commanders had the "do not engage" order. Stalin's command was also suicidal - his decision to push more men into the Smolensk pocket was insanely stupid. Once Zhukov devised the concentric lines to stop the blitz, the German offensive slowed down. The USSR was fortunate for Zhukov's experience due to his experience in the very first real armor engagements in Mongolia in the late 30s. Despite 99% of things going right for Hitler in the summer and fall of 1941, he still failed.
It should also be noted that by the time the Germans attacked the Russian military was in poor shape (especially from a communications standpoint), but in terms of materiel it was way ahead of the Gemans. The Russians actually had more tanks, and their T-34s were superior to anything the Germans could manage. Had Hitler just managed to capture Moscow before the snow fell in 41, its debateable how much of an effect it would have had. Most of the industry was beyond the Urals already, and it actually entered production fairly quickly. Much of Russia's industry was always in the Urals due to the proximity of natural resources.
Simple geography was working against Hitler, badly.
P.S. Hitler was also helped by the incredibly bad decision of Stalin to purge several outstanding generals (especially the brilliant Tukhachevsky and Blucher), leaving him with idiots like Budenny and Voroshilov in central command. Shaposhnikov, a competent general, was ill suited for the top post, and was too ill to continue after the beginning of the war anyway. One of the smartest things Stalin did in 41 was to rehabilitate Rokossovsky; one of the first rehabilitations he attempted.

You definitely know your Eastern Front history.

With Barbarossa, there were a lot of "ifs."

To me, one of the biggest "ifs" was the goofy decison by Hitler to get Guderian to turn south to Kiev when he was knocking on the door of Moscow.

And the corrollory 'if" was the sacking of Guderian, who, along with Rommel and Manstein, was among the more exceptional generals in the Wehrmacht. Had he given a guy like Guderian complete control over the theatre of operations, then the Germans might still have lost, but it would have been a lot tougher for the Russians to win.

[nicephoras]

You definitely know your Eastern Front history.

With Barbarossa, there were a lot of "ifs."

To me, one of the biggest "ifs" was the goofy decison by Hitler to get Guderian to turn south to Kiev when he was knocking on the door of Moscow.

And the corrollory 'if" was the sacking of Guderian, who, along with Rommel and Manstein, was among the more exceptional generals in the Wehrmacht. Had he given a guy like Guderian complete control over the theatre of operations, then the Germans might still have lost, but it would have been a lot tougher for the Russians to win.

Yeah, Hitler was hardly a tactical mastermind himself, which didn't help him. Although he may have believed (probably correctly) that the Ukraine was a more important strategic objective, as it contained so much of Russia's manpower and agricultural production. Moscow was more important from a morale point of view.
I've always been torn on the issue of Guderian. On one hand, he was an absolutely brilliant leader of panzers (and one of the very few in the German high command to come off as a human being after the war ended). On the other hand, I'm not sure how he would have done as the commander of an entire army group. Its one of those rising to one's level of incompetence issues. He was a panzer man at heart.

[topcatcole]

Yeah, Hitler was hardly a tactical mastermind himself, which didn't help him. Although he may have believed (probably correctly) that the Ukraine was a more important strategic objective, as it contained so much of Russia's manpower and agricultural production. Moscow was more important from a morale point of view.
I've always been torn on the issue of Guderian. On one hand, he was an absolutely brilliant leader of panzers (and one of the very few in the German high command to come off as a human being after the war ended). On the other hand, I'm not sure how he would have done as the commander of an entire army group. Its one of those rising to one's level of incompetence issues. He was a panzer man at heart.
Guderian was a brilliant mobile forces commander. I tend to agree that if he had been constrained by the German supply chain he would have probably wigged right out. It's easy to forget that the German logistics chain was primarily horse drawn (and hence very vulnerable to the weather) because so much of history emphasizes the armored forces.

[Sine Pari]

Had the Germans been a fully mechanized force, damn straight it could have worked

[Cannon]

The question for me has always been what could Hitler have done differently knowing what he did when he made the initial decision. It easy to poke holes in both the initial decision and ones taken following the invasion now.

Hitler saw a Soviet Union that had already absorbed half of Poland, the Baltic States and was attempting to expand further into Finland and Balkan states. In June of 1940, the Russians forced Rumania to cede two provinces. This threatened the adjacent oil fields at Ploesti, which were Germany’s main source of fuel throughout WWII. In July 1940, the German War economy and armaments office sent a memo to Hitler that told him that the Finland’s nickel exports were as important to the war effort as oil. Germany also depended on the Soviets directly for vital raw materials, fuel, and food. While the Soviets had continued shipments right up to the day of the invasion, Hitler feared that the Soviets would use their control of these resources to blackmail Germany. Russia had briefly halted grain and oil deliveries to Germany when the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway.

Hitler knew that the Russians were politically isolated. He saw the failure of an Anglo-French-Russian alliance to form in 1939 and the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations following its attack on Finland as evidence that the Soviets were isolated. He was facing a situation in which Germany faced no land fronts in Europe following Dunkirk, the collapse of France and the allied flight from Norway.

Hitler knew that the Red Army had been devastated by Stalin’s purges from 1937 onward. At least 30 thousand (out of a total of 80 thousand) Soviet officers were imprisoned or executed from 1937 until the invasion. Hitler saw the trouble that the Russians had against a much smaller and weaker Finnish force in 1939 and early 1940. He compared these failures to the triumphs of the German forces in their conquest of France and the Low Countries. Hitler knew that they Soviets had abandoned or weakened all of the defenses along the old Soviet-Polish border and had only just begun to build new defenses along the new border. Hitler had to feel that he knew the strength of the Red army with over 300 recon flights over Soviet Territory occurring before the invasion.

If he delayed the invasion, Germany would face an increasingly powerful threat from the USSR. The Soviet Union’s Red Army had increased in size dramatically from 1939. More than a million reserves were called up after Germany invaded Poland. The defenses along the new Soviet-Polish border were improving everyday. 800 Thousand reservists were called up in Spring 1941 and were just joining their units when the invasion was launched. In fact, Zhukov attempted to persuade Stalin to launch a preemptive attack on Germany in May 1941.

Then you have to look at all of things Hitler didn't know. Hitler did not know that the Russians had learned valuable lessons from their struggles against the Finns. Stalin reversed his earlier decision against large mechanized formations. Successful leaders were sent to other Red Army units to train them and eliminate ineffective leaders. While Hitler was right about the success of German recon to identify Russian units near the front, he did not know that they had missed large numbers of Russian forces further east. German intelligence was completely unaware of the extensive Red Army forces that remained in reserve away from the border area. They were not aware of the five reserve armies forming east of the Dnepr River. German Intelligence also underestimated the Russians ability to rapidly mobilize countless reserves. At the time of the invasion, Hitler had only 14 divisions in operational reserve while the Red Army had 133 divisions outside of the initial defense zone.

Hitler did not realize that his army had failed to learn some important lessons from their conquests in the West. Their panzers were used for strategic encirclements but the lack of sufficient numbers of mechanized infantry units to seal these circles had let enemy troops escape. The German infantry relied on their on feet and horse drawn carts for mobility. This would come back to hurt them during the invasion when massive numbers of Red Army troops escaped encirclements by simply leaving their heavy equipment behind and fleeing to the east. The Germans also failed to understand the impact that the difference in gauge between German and Soviet railroads would have on their ability to get supplies and troops to the front.

At the time the invasion decision was made, Hitler could not know that his invasion would rely on troops that he would be forced to use in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete in the early 1941. The Invasion of Crete had devastated parachute and air transport units. Hitler could not have known how successful the Russians would be in moving vital factories east of Moscow. He was also unaware of how successful the new KV and T34 Soviet tanks would turn out to be. These tanks and the very successfully Sturmovik ground attack airplane were just entering the Red Army when the decision to invade was made.

Hitler’s choice to invade the Soviet Union looks like a good decision to me given the situation facing Germany and the limitation of his knowledge at the time. Hitler understood it was a gamble since his plan required a quick victory rather than a prolonged struggle. His own letter explaining the decision to invade to Mussolini cited 1941 as the best time to invade because the Soviets would only gain in power as time went on.

Critics of the decision often ignore how successful the initial invasion was. In some border areas, 90% of all Red Army mechanized corps strength was lost. Russian’s losses in the first 4 weeks following the invasion were an order of magnitude (1 million casualties vs. 100k) greater than the German losses. It took about 4 years and massive assistance from the US and British for the Russians to reverse their losses in those first 4 weeks and defeat Germany. Contempory viewers saw the situation quite differently, in October of 1941 the British rated the Soviets chances as just “even”.

However, the implementation of the invasion decision was flawed both in preparing for the invasion and in the execution of the assault for the remainder of 1941. Hitler’s decision to conquer Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete prior to invading Russia, while somewhat forced upon him by the Italian invasion of Greece and the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia, hurt preparations and delayed the invasion. Hitler’s decision to redirect elements from Army Group Center to the Ukraine following the capture of Smolensk and thus delay the attack on Moscow for months was a disaster. The initial order to halt wasted 39 days of good weather and then the redirection south cost an additional 39 days which moved the attack into October-November and winter weather. If the Germans had captured Moscow they would have gained the advantage of holding the key railroad and communication hub in the Soviet Union. It is anyone's guess whether the Russians would have been able to recover from that type of blow and how the Allies would have proceeded following the loss of Moscow.

[yasik19]

I think it's a difficult question to answer, but i tend to agree with Nice that it would have been hard for Hitler no matter what hapenned in 1941.

I'm curious as to why nobody wonders how the war would have turned out if Rommel didn't spend most 1941-1943 in Africa, battling the English and helping the weak and pathetic Italians, and instead, commanded pantzer divisions in Soviet Union? Or how the war would have turned out if he was in charge of battle for Stalingrad instead of Paulus? From my reading on this matter, Rommel was much better strategist than Paulus.

[nicephoras]

I'm curious as to why nobody wonders how the war would have turned out if Rommel didn't spend most 1941-1943 in Africa, battling the English and helping the weak and pathetic Italians, and instead, commanded pantzer divisions in Soviet Union? Or how the war would have turned out if he was in charge of battle for Stalingrad instead of Paulus? From my reading on this matter, Rommel was much better strategist than Paulus.

Once the Germans failed to land the knockout blow, their loss was really inevitable due to the sheer amount of equipment and armanents the Russians could throw at the Germans. Stalingrad, in it of itself, is not a particularly vital point, you know.

[topcatcole]

Once the Germans failed to land the knockout blow, their loss was really inevitable due to the sheer amount of equipment and armanents the Russians could throw at the Germans. Stalingrad, in it of itself, is not a particularly vital point, you know. That brings up the question of why not bypass it?

It really was only important because of it's name and the resulting propaganda value. It's easily isolated, on one end of a plain as I recall.

[yasik19]

Once the Germans failed to land the knockout blow, their loss was really inevitable due to the sheer amount of equipment and armanents the Russians could throw at the Germans. Stalingrad, in it of itself, is not a particularly vital point, you know.

I agree on Stalingrad, but my main point was this: If Rommel was in charge of Pantzer divisions from the beginning of the invasion of USSR, things (perhaps) could have been worse for the Russians. Obviously, nobody could be clairvoyant enough at that time to see the outcome of certain events, but i thought i'd throw that idea out there.

[nicephoras]

But the panzer divisions weren't the problem - they mostly performed supberbly. Guderian was *the* Panzer general of note, and Mannstein actually beat him to Smolensk anyway.

[nicephoras]

That brings up the question of why not bypass it?

It really was only important because of it's name and the resulting propaganda value. It's easily isolated, on one end of a plain as I recall.

Right next to a river. It was in the way of the German push southeast. Leaving it there would have made a ridiculously perfect launching pad for Russian counter attacks.

[Pauncho]

And in the end Stalingrad was the key to enormous counterattacks: the point of the Stalingrad battle from the point of view of the Russians was to fix a large German army in a spot where they could be encircled. The Russian strategy throughout that whole ugly bloody mess was to hold on to Stalingrad without actually throwing the Germans back too far. Thanks to a deadly mixture of Hitler's stubborn stupidity, Goering's arrogance and a particularly nasty winter cutting the Germans off from resuply, it worked perfectly.

[Toon³]

If von Paulis had pulled his armour out of the city, where it was doing very little apart from providing a very big slow target, and positioned them out on the stepp the encirclement would have failed. This can be seen when the only Panzer Group on the stepp held up and them destroyed a Russian Tank Army. It was a simple and well used tactic in the German Army that von Paulis didn't use because of his desire to please Hitler. He admitted after the war that this was his biggest mistake.

[BillQ]

If Hitler hadn't delayed the start of it by a month, it would have.

[yasik19]

If Hitler hadn't delayed the start of it by a month, it would have.

what makes you say that?

[JBigjake]

If the Germans had captured Moscow they would have gained the advantage of holding the key railroad and communication hub in the Soviet Union. It is anyone's guess whether the Russians would have been able to recover from that type of blow and how the Allies would have proceeded following the loss of Moscow.
IMO, the Nazis would not have won under any circumstances. The Soviet scorched earth policy, combined with the willingness of Stalin to lose tens of millions of soldiers & civilians to kill millions of Germans meant eventual total destruction on both sides. Germany would at best have conquered a section of the USSR reduced to mud, which would be impossible to defend against guerilla attackers. Stalin would have regrouped further east & continued to fight. Both sides had an unstable (insane?) dictator who made political rather than pragmatic decisions. IMO, the Wehrmacht & Luftwaffe were designed for quick attacks & victories, not trench warfare & mutual slaughter. Several European countries were overwhelmed & capitulated. (The UK was not invaded & did not face this decision). The USSR could be defeated but not conquered. Soviet propaganda suceeded in conveying the "fight to the death" message. The Russian people were indoctrinated in & prepared for total warfare.
(Please, no comparisons to the current situations in Iraq, etc.)