Football Tactics

I agree with you. The Dutch are incredibly pedantic when it comes to tactics, they think they know it all. Anyone who does not agree with their point of view is condemned for not playing proper football. It's ridiculous. More roads lead to Rome, so to speak. Football is about winning, and how you win is up to each and every individual team. Dutch coaches have this habit of starting out with a tactical concept rather than looking at the strengths of their team first, and I for one think that is wrong. You should devise a tactical concept around your players, not the other way round.

And I'm Dutch by the way, and what I just told you does not make me a popular poster on this here Dutch board.

 

no more teams are moving toward 3-5-2 , 3-5-1-1 or 3-4-1-2 or 3-4-3 not 4-3-3

 

I don't disagree at all that the Dutch have played and continue to play a leading role in tactics. Dutch football has produced a wealth of excellent coaches for a good reason. Our kids learn about tactics from a very early age, I'd almost argue that tactical intelligence has been at the very root of our success in international football.

What I disagree with is the Dutch notion that only attacking football, preferably in a 4-3-3 system, is 'proper' football. This looking down your nose at defensive systems is ridiculous and snobbish. When in your team you haven't got any proper wingers, but do have mediocre defenders who don't dare to play with space behind them to keep the pitch small, a classic 4-3-3 is the most pointless system you can devise. We've seen it all before in Dutch football; this sometimes obsessive clinging on to 4-3-3 has done Dutch football more harm than good over the past decade.

 

No, it was the foundation of the Feyenoord team under Happel and Cruijff made Rinus Michels adopt it very quickly after they were dominated by the 3 man midfield consisting of van Hanegem, Hasil and Jansen. After that Ajax dominated in the 70 ies.

 

Not really. 3 Man Backline is dead apart from only in Italy where they dont have proper Wingbacks who can defend and who dont have proper wingers who give width and can attack

 

barca played it and few other clubs are experimetign with it

 

Heracles Almelo plays with 3 defenders practically all the time. Ajax does it whenever they play against a team that plays 4-4-2.

 

Barca played a 3-4-3, Juventus played a 3-5-2. The formations are different. Ajax played a 3-4-3 too.

In Ajax's case they have good wingers to give width who are supported by Wing-Backs.

In Barca's case they dont have World Class Wingers, Villa/Pedro are more inside forwards, Iniesta is No.10 who plays wide. Fortunately Alves-Alba are more like pseudo wingers who have pace,skill and creativity. So that means the width comes from them.

However in say Juventus's 3-5-2, these formation come more when there is a lack of quality wingers with pace,skills,tricks,technique and also Full-Backs who can both attach and defend well. Nowadays you get Maggio/Marcelo like Wing-Backs who are Very Good in Attack and very average in defence. That, a lack of great wingers and the decreasing quality of Wingers has meant formations like 3-5-2 has risen back.

 

no t is not do to quality but do to introducing libero/sweeper again to world football. reason why juve is not good defensivly now is because their libero is out chielini. they have great wingers in linhstiner and asamoah

 

No, We respect everybody with an opinion, even if that differs from our own. What makes you impopular is the way you twist and distort others opinions and mis represent what others posted to further your opinion. Why is it that you start to play Calimero for foreign new comers to our Dutch threads and immediately start to lie about you and the rest of us.

 

yes it is and other reason is juve uses regista rather then number 10 so it makes sense to have 5 midfield so he can pass the ball and have more options. chielini plays sweepers

 

Guardiola's tactics are fine in my opinion....but it has to be excuted with a faster pace than FCBayern did last evening. That's the only way to tear down a wall built by the likes of Chelsea and Real.

 

Sorry for the late reply but why did 4-3-3 work for Barcelona in their heyday do you think?

 

From a commercial point of view it was maybe not a bad investment. Signing Neymar has solidified their position as most popular club team in Brazil, even ahead of domestic club teams (there are statistics about that). Such signings can help from a commercial and long-term strategic point of view.

Many clubs and leagues try to 'conquer' the Indian market right now. Big bucks signings (from fancied and popular countries) can be a help.

 

I found this in another thread, a very interesting read about the changing number 10:

Adios Riquelme - The End of The Classic Trequartista
Juan Roman Riquelme's retirement signifies the end of a special type of player which we can only look back on with nostalgia
While the role may have evolved and not died, there is no doubt in my mind that the Riquelme type playmaker will not be seen at the top levels of the game again.
“His type is an endangered species. Something special will be lost from football if they die out altogether.” Tim Vickery


In many countries, notably in South America, yet also in Holland and Italy - the number 10 is a cult figure. He is iconic. This is the most important position on the pitch. This player is seen romantically as an artist, a man who can produce moments of brilliance. The No.10 shirt carries a sense of expectation and responsibility, especially true in Argentina where Diego Maradona became a god-like figure to the nation.
At the turn of the 21st century the number 10, the trequartista, was a dominant force in the world of football. In fact it was a golden era for this type of player. The creative brilliance of trequartista's like Francesco Totti, Rivaldo, Jari Litmanen, Alessandro Del Piero, Zinedine Zidane, Rui Costa, Dennis Bergkamp, Gianfranco Zola and Juan Roman Riquelme were lighting up the game. These players were the ‘classic’ 10, playing between the forward line and midfield, controlling games and dictating play. They all possessed skill, creativity, and vision. They were the geniuses of their sides.
English football didn't seem to value the playmaking 10 yet other nations seemed to value this role and player a lot more. I remember in my teenage years playing Championship Manager 2000/2001 and coming across this player called Juan Roman Riquelme playing at Boca Juniors. His stats were incredible and I made sure I purchased him for Aston Villa on every new managerial run (he helped me conquer Europe!) He was sublime and became a favourite of mine without actually ever seeing him play. He became an icon for me.
Now for all the similarities with him and Maradona – the club, the shirt, the expectation of Argentinians – these two players couldn’t be more different. Maradona was energy, he was a dribbler, he was the man who took on the whole team both on and off the pitch. He was how we view Lionel Messi today, and this type of player may never cease to exist. Riquelme however differed in physique, personality and style to Diego. The fans thought they had found the ‘second coming’ yet in fact this was different breed of player. Yet whereas Diego Maradona could well have played in any era, there is a sense that Riquelme was suited to a particular era in football.

Being valued can make the difference
A move to Barcelona in 2002 meant Riquleme would be following Diego once again. However this was not to be an enjoyable experience for the player. The manager at the time Louis van Gaal sighted ‘political’ reasons for the signing and used him sparingly. When he did play he put him out wide. This was a player who was built to play central. He was the ‘classic 10’, yet was wasted by van Gaal.
The hope of seeing this creative playmaker playing in Europe, of him lighting up the Champions League and becoming a major player in European football never materialised at Camp Nou. However it would be the move to Villareal would which enable Europe to truly see the wonder and splendour of Riquelme. The key for the player was that the team was built and revolved around him.
There was a consensus in his home country that Riquelme requires complete control of the team in order to feel motivated enough to play. If not, then he will often retreat and play with almost no interest. As well as this character issue, many argued that he was too slow and unaccommodating, that he would only play only at his own pace. At Villareal he found a team where he could lead, where he was in control, where he was loved. And from there he dictated the pace of the game, and thrived.
2005/2006 would be his greatest year, his ‘coming out’ season as crazy as that sounds considering he was 27 years old. Under Riquelme’s creative talent Villareal would go all the way to the Champions League semi-final’s where they would meet Arsenal. Under coach Manuel Pellegrini Villareal’s magical season should have seem them reach the final to play Barcelona. Although 1-0 down from the first leg they were incredible in the second leg and should have scored 3-4 goals. They won a penalty in the final minutes of the game and up stepped the star man Riquelme, the man who had become regarded as Europe's best playmaker that season. And yet his shot was saved. The dream was over for the Yellow Submarine.
Riquelme had risen to become one of Europe’s finest playmakers, and in the 2006 World Cup his coach José Pekerman gave Riquelme the Number 10 shirt for the first time ever. It was a statement from the coach that Riquelme was to be the leader of the team. It is interesting to note here that Pekerman had chosen to omit Juan Sebastian Veron from the squad at this tournament. This is important because Veron had been the previous ‘creative leader’ of the national team, especially under Marcelo Bielsa in the 2002 World Cup. On this occasion Pekerman decided Riquelme would be Argentina’s best hope.
Let us just consider Veron for a second, because there is a certain trend between these Argentinian playmakers, which is important to assess when we consider their impact on games. When he moved to Man Utd he was regarded as one of the best playmakers of the time. And his move to Manchester could have been great yet it ended up being seen as a flop . The fact that his time at Manchester United did not work was, in part, due to the difficulties United’s midfield had in adapting to a new style. For so long they were used to a four man flat midfield. Veron couldn’t fit in and they could not adapt to him. Veron was expected to play in the centre with Roy Keane, but the two proved incompatible. Keane was not like Simeone, he was a box-to-box midfielder who importantly led and organised the side. He would not acquiesce to Veron’s wish to be his worker, allowing Veron to control games. For his previous clubs and country Veron was used to controlling games and was often afforded a free role where he would roam and dictate the play. Keane would not permit him this role and Veron could not adapt to what was expected of him.
Many will argue that the pace and intensity of the Premier League was an issue yet it was more about his ability to govern games and set the tempo. Under Marcelo Bielsa, for Argentina, Veron excelled because he was given the freedom to control the team. Under Bielsa’s high tempo attacking style Veron would be the playmaker that exposed sides with his long range and creative passing. Veron had all the ability and intelligence to be regarded as one of the best playmakers in the game however his move to Manchester United was undermined by bad timing and a failure to build a side around him.
This is the same as what has been seen with Riquelme. However in that 2006 World Cup the world witnessed the splendour of what Riquleme could do when the team was in his control. He was a genius, a maestro, the dictator of games. In the 6-0 demolition of Serbia Argentina were incredible, and Riquelme was the one pulling the strings.

A special talent who needs to feel special
Now this type of player is a special breed, Riquelme and Veron were players who chose how to play to the game, they decided the tempo, the direction and sought to make the game theirs. As Jorge Valdano, a member of Argentina's World Cup-winning team of 1986 says of Riquelme, 'When the ball reaches him it has to stop. The rhythm and direction of play will depend, to a great degree, on Riquelme's level of inspiration.” This inspiration has shown to come from his feeling of being loved, adored and wanted by his team, coach and fans. The more control on the game he has, the better Riquelme becomes.
Argentina looked like they would go on to win the tournament. They appeared the stand out best side there and with Riquelme working his creative magic it seemed Argentina’s hopes of winning the World Cup once again were to be met. And yet, in the quarter finals against hosts Germany Pekerman made one of the craziest and most ludicrous decisions in World Cup history. Argentina were winning 1-0 after a Riquelme corner set up Ayala to score. And then on 72 minutes Riquelme was replaced by Cambiasso. Pekerman was looking to kill the game off and win 1-0. Eight minutes later Miroslav Klose equalised and the match would ultimately go to penalties in which Germany would progress. The tournament which seemed built for Riquelme to take his side all the way, was over, and he was left to watch over 50 minutes of that final game on the bench. It could have been his greatest moment, instead Argentina’s best chance for success was taken away by a terrible tactical decision.
After that tournament Riquelme stayed at Villareal for 18 months yet the club or himself never recaptured the form of that 2005/2006 season. He would return to Boca Juniors in 2007 and remain there till 2014, winning the Premier Division twice, the Copa Libertadores and the Copa Argentina.

The evolving role of the playmaker
At the turn of the century Riquelme personified what the ‘10’ was about for Argentinians and purists of the game; technically brilliant, creative, self-regulating, languid and… rigid. Riquelme, for all his talent, wasn’t the most athletic or hardworking of playmakers, yet in possession he was magnificent. His game was built on playing between the lines and, when he was afforded the time and space to exploit he was magnificent.
As the 2000’s progressed, tactics changed and the 10 position required a player with more dynamism. We started to see players like Kaka and Gerrard excel. It appeared that Riquelme’s lack of mobility and zip prevented him shifting his game to meet more contemporary needs. In 2006 it appeared we were seeing the closing stages of the ‘classic playmaker’. 2006 – the year where Riquleme had come so close for both club and country, the year in which Bergkamp and Zidane would retire from football. Del Piero's final World Cup. Was this the passing of the baton? The treqaurtista’s swan song before a new era was to emerge?

During the 1990’s and early 2000’s the No.10 would take up a position between the opposition’s defence and midfield and seek to run the game in this area. For many years this worked and these players became masters on the pitch… however the 4-2-3-1 effectively closed off this space. As coaches sought to stifle the space which the 10 liked to operate in - with the introduction of the defensive midfielder - the 10 had to change how they played. No longer could the 10 simply stay ‘in the hole’ between the defence and midfield, because many sides were now plugging that space with defensive midfielders. The introduction of two holding midfielders was introduced to near guarantee that the space for the ‘10’ was shut off entirely. The spaces which the trequartista loved to exploit had been taken away. Coaches therefore needed to adapt their playmaker’s role.

Instead of playing ‘in the hole’ they now sought to make their 10’s more lateral in their movement, to play wider in order to create space for both themselves and others. The reasoning was that this creative player could find more space and time to create for the team, or that if the defensive midfielder was instructed to stay close to the playmaker, then their movement away from central areas would open space centrally for others to exploit.

During the mid-2000’s, as the game became more physical and athletic, it was evident that the 10 had evolved to become more of a strong midfielder who would possess not just skill but athleticism too. And yet just as the athletically powerful ‘10’ was prospering, a new type was coming through, one which was set to dominate football and change the course of
the future game more than any other.
If the turn of the century was the ‘era of the trequartista’ with the rise of the ‘athletic 10’ then the Barcelona era was most certainly the era of the ‘fluid 10’. We were now seeing players who roamed into wide areas in order to create the time and space to expose the opposition.
When Barcelona lifted the Champions League in 2006 it was a sign of things to come. Although Ronaldinho and Samuel Eto’o would steal the spotlight the success that night pointed to where the game was going; players like Xavi and Deco highlighted the new type of playmaking midfielder (and also Andres Iniesta’s arrival in the second half changed the balance of the game in Barca’s favour)
Deco had previously conquered Europe with Porto under Jose Mourinho in 2004,
showing his brilliance in the ‘10’ role. He was a sign of things to come. The 2006 success pointed towards something special growing in Cataluña and with the burgeoning talent of Andrés Iniesta and the young, but brilliant, Lionel Messi it appeared that Barcelona were on the cusp of greatness. The core of Xavi, Iniesta and Messi became synonymous with Barca’s style as well and these players were seen as the modern playmakers. They possessed skill, poise, craft, vision, intelligence and they were all ‘small’.

In this golden age for Spanish football, football was now facing a revolution in terms of style and type of player. At the 2008 Euros, Spain faced Germany in the final. Their 1-0 success proved that height, physicality and strength were no longer essential for success. The signs were showing that in the modern game dynamic technicians were needed.

Spain’s coach in 2008, Luis Aragonés, saw that possession-based football was what Spain was built for and they would prosper from embracing it. He put his faith in Xavi Hernandez at the 2008 Euros - seeing in the midfielder the ability to lead and control games. Xavi’s growing influence and impact for Spain and Barcelona turned him into the best midfielder of his generation. His ability to control games was unprecedented. Aragonés and Guardiola had embraced his talent and brought out the best in him.

Xavi’s midfield partner would be Andrés Iniesta, arguably the greatest playmaker of the 21st century. Barcelona and Spain would dominate games with his skill, poise, and control. As Alex Ferguson said, prior to the 2009 Champions League final, “I’m not obsessed with Messi, Iniesta is the danger. He’s fantastic. He makes the team work. The way he finds passes, his movement and his ability to create space is incredible. He’s so important for Barcelona.” Xavi and Iniesta, a perfect combination, technicians ideally suited to the contemporary game and its needs.
In the modern world of football, with restricted space and time, the importance of players finding and exploiting space and possessing excellent technical ability, poise and intelligence was now fundamental. It wasn’t like the trequartista had died, only now it had evolved to something more, a player with more variety.

The classic 10 remains – just
While Barcelona were displaying the playmaker’s evolution, Jose Mourinho, ever the
antithesis to Pep Guardiola, was seeking to prove that the classic trequartista could still ‘work’ in the modern game.

In 2009, Jose Mourinho was at Inter Milan. He sought a playmaker who could excel in his formation. He found him in Wesley Sneijder, the Dutch playmaker who had endured a difficult time at Real Madrid. He was brought to Inter Milan to be a key man in Mourinho’s new project and Mourinho moulded the side around Sneijder, making players like Samuel Eto’o, Goran Pandev and Diego Milito do the defensive work from the front, allowing Sneijder to play a free role behind the striker.

The 2009/2010 season would be a great success for both player and club. A record treble-winning season and a World Cup final marked a great 12 months for Sneijder. Nicknamed “the Sniper” for his playmaking ability to assist and his pinpoint set piece deliveries, Sneijder grew into his role as Inter’s trequartista. His performances were rewarded by UEFA and he was named as the best midfielder of the 2009/2010 season, and shortlisted for the 2010 Ballon D’Or. Lionel Messi took the accolade yet there is a strong case that Sneijder should have won it that year.

Another playmaking 10 that Mourinho worked with was Mesut Özil, perhaps the most talented playmaker of his generation. After impressing for Germany’s U21 side at the 2009 U21 European Championships Özil then showcased his talent on the biggest stage - at the 2010 World Cup - taking Germany to a semi-final with some mesmerising displays. A move to a big club was imminent and it was Real Madrid who would come for him.

The German playmaker excelled at Real Madrid under Mourinho and then moved to Arsenal in 2013. Özil would benefit from the tutelage of Jose Mourinho and with the attacking talents of Cristiano Ronaldo and Karim Benzema he would provide the highest number of assists in European football during his time at Madrid and prove to be one of the best playmakers in world football.

However, there is a question mark over Sneijder and Özil. Yes they are fantastic players… but are they suitable to the modern game and what it requires of its players? Despite their track records there have been arguments that suggest Sneijder’s inflexibility in a modern world of fluid positions has made his role redundant. There is an argument that he lacks the flexibility of movement which the current game requires.

If Sneijder had been playing during the late 90’s and early 2000’s it is conceivable that he could have been one of the greats. During the 90’s Sneijder would have been blessed with time and space which he could have exploited and prospered in, yet this space and time has disappeared or at least become minimised.

It is important to note that whereas many regard Sneijder as an ‘attacking midfielder’ he is in fact more of a ‘second striker’, and this is where the problems of his suitability arise. Under Mourinho he was not instructed to track back and help his midfield when defending. His role was to wait for a counter attack and be in space to receive the ball. Other managers, since, have asked him to play deeper and support his midfield, to make a ‘three'. Like Özil, defending is not something he wishes to do.

As great as these playmakers are when in possession, they do not give their side defensive balance or support when out of possession and against better sides, especially those who play with a three man midfield they fail to provide the team with the cover and support which is required. There is very little room in that midfield three for a luxury player. The modern required ‘complete’ midfielders.

In the summer of 2012 it appeared that Mourinho had learnt his lesson regarding the ‘10’. Perhaps it was a lesson from the previous season’s failure in the Champions
League semi-final against Bayern. Although the tie went to penalties, Madrid were abject in midfield. A midfield two of Sami Khedira and Xavi Alonso can outplay many sides, yet against a side possessing Schweinsteiger, Gustavo, and Toni Kroos, they were overloaded. Simply put Özil did not provide the defensive support required and Madrid were over-run.

This semi-final exit appeared to be the reason that Luka Modric was signed. Modric is a very talented footballer and, as we saw in the previous chapter, a more complete player than Özil. His reliability in possession offers more support defensively. In 2013/2014 Modric - alongside Ángel Di María and Xabi Alonso - offered Madrid the ability to play a three man midfield and dominate games - one reason why they won the Champions League. What is evident is that the ‘complete’ midfielder has replaced the classic playmaker in the central areas. So is there a place for the playmaker in the modern game?

The Özil situation was reflected in the case of Juan Mata in England. Ever since Juan Mata arrived in English football he has been a revelation. Chelsea’s player of the season for two years running highlighted how important he was for the club and the team. He helped them win the Champions League and Europa League too in that time. He became Chelsea’s ‘key’ man. Mata is a classic trequartista, a player who excels as the archetypal ‘10’. He drifts wide (often to the right) but enjoys the space between the opposition’s defence and midfield.

However, with the return of Jose Mourinho at Chelsea Mata was not seen as a key part of the side. Instead, the Brazilian Oscar was the player given the ‘10’ role. Mourinho prefers Oscar because of what he offers defensively. Mourinho had determined what the modern game requires, and appears to no longer trust or see value in players who often neglect their defensive duties and fail to drop back to make a three man midfield. There are many similarities with Oscar and Modric and it is clear that Mourinho has gravitated towards a three man midfield rather than rely on a classic 10 in the ‘hole’.

The modern playmaker
In the summer of 2012 Dortmund would lose Shinji Kagawa to Manchester United,
meaning their academy product Mario Götze would step into the central playmaker
role. Dortmund looked to be more of a complete side with Götze in that role and
would reach the Champions League final and face Bayern. Götze pointed towards a
new type of playmaking midfielder.
Unlike a classic trequartista like Mata, Özil, or Kagawa, Götze was much more
dynamic. He roamed into wide areas, playing like a winger, or even a forward when
required. He could drop deeper, overload the midfield and seek to link play. And he
could be a playmaker in central areas when required. In an attacking sense he could
do it all.
And importantly - defensively - he could press, track, and support the team. As we
saw earlier, the importance of the whole team participating in the defensive phase is
fundamental and Götze offered Dortmund this more than Kagawa did.
It was a huge loss for Dortmund to lose Götze, especially losing him to their rivals
Bayern. The Munich club were able to take a world class player from their rivals as
well as add a complete playmaker to play alongside another new modern playmaker
in Thiago Alcantara. Guardiola was building a midfield filled with the new
generation of complete, playmaking midfielders. A clear move to universality?

In the summer of 2014 the World Cup pointed to the importance of this ‘type’ of
playmaker. The standout player was James Rodriquez, the Colombian Number 10.
Shining during his time at Porto, Rodriquez moved to Monaco in 2013 for
€45 million. After his sensational performance in the World Cup where he scored
six goals for his country, he became eagerly sought after, and it would be Real
Madrid who would pay €75 million for him.

Rodriquez is a modern forward; similar to Götze (who would score the winner in
the World Cup final for Germany playing as a false nine). He is capable of playing in
a multitude of positions across the forward line. Central, wide, and up front is not an
issue for him, an asset which makes him extremely valuable in a game where
versatility and movement is becoming more important.

In players like Lionel Messi, David Silva, Santi Cazorla, Mario Götze and Eden Hazard we have the modern playmakers. These are ‘fluid’ players. As romantic as the position and player was, the truth is the classic trequartista has been left behind by football’s evolution, fixed and rigid has been replaced by fluidity. It is another step towards universality.

As we can see, in the space of 15 years the ‘10’ has evolved significantly. The modern playmaker must be more than a creative attacking talent, he must be flexible and importantly willing to do his work when out of possession. Just as the fixed trequartista was replaced by the dynamic and athletic midfielder in the early 2000’s, so it appears the same trend has happened once more. The speed of this evolution highlights how quickly the game is changing. Evidence once more that football is forever in flux.

Adios Riquelme
As for Juan Roman Riquelme, he will remembered with great nostalgia, not only for what he did as a player, for how he graced the pitch and played with such creative genius it made watching football a genuine joy. But because he is one of the last of his kind. While the role may have evolved and not died, there is no doubt in my mind that the Riquelme type playmaker will not be seen at the top levels of the game again.
The game has got quicker, space has become more restricted the needs of the modern game require not only physical speed and athleticism, as well as a mentality and willingness to defend, but also a move away from fixed positions and the embracing of fluid football.

Riquelme characterises an era and a personality which isn't seen in the modern game. A retro footballer who played to the beat of his own drum and who played the game his way. This freedom of expression has been nullified somewhat by the ever growing micro-management of tactical systems and strategies. While technical skill, speed and creativity appears to be getting better and quicker, that sense of freedom on a pitch has been seemingly lost. This is why Riquelme’s retirement means so much to the game, it really is the end of a glorious era of a type of player we may never see again.

Ray Hudson once said of Ronaldinho "Like Betamax, they don't make them like him anymore", personally I think that's a fitting tribute to Juan Roman Riquelme. Adios, it was a delight to watch you play.
The Whitehouse Address @The_W_Address

the source:
http://whitehouseaddress.blogspot.my/2015/01/adios-riquelme-end-of-classic.html

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An interesting view on breaking down tough defenses without making use of playmakers:

https://decorrespondent.nl/4755/Je-...ders-kun-je-niet-scoren/419905324575-b6bb2da3

It's apparently a hot topic in German tactics.

 

That spielverlagerung website notes too that Holland was the first to use 'gegenpress'....

 

Except we don't do it anymore.